Conventionalism once seemed an attractive way to justify the viability of the positivistic social thesis. Subsequent criticism, however, has significantly lessened its attractiveness. This paper attempts to revive jurisprudential interest in conventionalism by claiming that positivists would profit more from the conventionalism of Ruth G. Millikan than that of David Lewis.

Three arguments are proffered to support this contention. First, Millikan's conventionalism is not vulnerable to the major criticism leveled at conventionalism, viz its compliance-dependence (i.e., the main reason to follow a convention is that other social actors do so), as this is not its defining feature. Second, Millikanian conventionalism retains conventionalism's ability to explain how law emerges from social practices while avoiding the main disadvantage of Lewisian conventionalism, viz its inability to explain the normativity and contestability of law. Third, Millikan's conventionalism can more effectively repel Dworkin's and Greenberg's assaults on legal positivism than its Lewisian counterpart.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of philosophical work on consent. Within this body of work, philosophers often appeal to an account of the interests, values, or functions that underpin the power of consent. By far the most commonly cited value realized by the power of consent is the promotion and protection of the power-holder's autonomy. This focus on autonomy yields what I call the Gate Opener Model of consent, according to which the central valuable function of consent is to give the power-holder control over whether other people can act in certain ways. In this article, I argue that the Gate Opener Model of consent is inadequate. I then defend an alternative Relational Model of consent, according to which a central valuable function of consent is to enable a non-instrumentally valuable form of interaction between people.

This article explores the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the recognition of a ground of unlawful discrimination. It is important not only to have a coherent understanding of the currently enumerated grounds, but also to have a theoretical framework that can assist in enumerating new grounds through the open-ended “other status” aspect of many legal frameworks. To that end, this article argues that personal characteristics that are generally morally irrelevant, and that are socially salient in that they carry with them a prevalence of inequality-laden attitudes, amount to necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for recognizing a ground of unlawful discrimination. Other conditions, such as immutability and the presence of relative group disadvantage, will be assessed and dismissed as contingent but not necessary conditions.

How do legal texts determine legal content? A standard answer to this question—sometimes called “the standard picture”—is that legal texts communicate something and what they communicate is identical to legal content. Mark Greenberg criticizes the standard picture and offers in its place his own “moral impact theory.” My goal here is to respond to Greenberg by showing how the standard picture better explains legal practice than the moral impact theory does. To that end, I first clarify certain aspects of the moral impact theory. I then critique the theory, focusing on its inability to explain (i) why practitioners reason about legal content as they do and (ii) why they agree on legal content as often as they do. Finally, I refine the standard picture and demonstrate how it explains what the moral impact theory cannot.

This paper offers a novel substantive justification for mandatory electoral quotas—e.g., gender or racial quotas—and a new methodological approach to their justification. Substantively, I argue for a political egalitarian account of electoral quotas. Methodologically, based on this account and a political egalitarian grounding of political participatory rights, I offer an alternative to the External Restriction Approach to the justification of electoral quotas. The External Restriction Approach sees electoral quotas as at best justified restrictions on political participatory rights. I argue for the Internal Restriction Approach instead, which can justify electoral quotas by specifying the pro tanto scope of political participatory rights rather than by justifying restrictions on the pro tanto scope of these rights. On this approach, adequately set electoral quotas do not even conflict with and are not balanced against political participatory rights, while electoral quotas—when justified—are pro tanto required rather than merely permitted.

Legal reasoning is commonly thought of as being based on either rules or analogies. More specifically, there is ongoing debate regarding whether precedential reasoning is best characterized as rule-based or analogical. This article continues that work by comparing recent and representative approaches from each camp, namely, Stevens's analogical model and the “rule-based” model of Horty and Rigoni. In the course of the comparison improvements on each approach are suggested and the improved models serve as the basis for the ultimate evaluation. The evaluation demonstrates that the “best” approach depends on the goals one has in theorizing legal reasoning as well as the jurisprudential assumptions one is willing to make.

John Rawls wrote that people can voluntarily acquire political obligations to institutions only on the condition that those institutions are at least reasonably just. When an institution is seriously unjust, by contrast, attempts to create political obligation are “void ab initio.” However, Rawls's own explanation for this thought was deeply problematic, as are the standard alternatives. In this paper, I offer an argument for why Rawls's intuition was right and trace its implications for theories of authority and political obligation. These, I claim, are more radical than is often thought.

This paper explores a novel type of argument in legal theory—a psychological debunking argument—by the example of the justification of human rights and based on a psychological dual-process model of decision-making. Debunking arguments undermine confidence in a belief because of shortcomings of the empirical conditions under which it was formed. They thereby open a route from the descriptive to the evaluative, from Is to Ought, without illicitly crossing metaethical waters since they involve normative premises. As they are epistemic, they cannot replace substantive arguments on the merits. However, they may be useful when substantive arguments are stalled or the necessity to make a judgment precludes further discussions.

The controversial justification of human rights is a good test case for debunking arguments. The challenge is to find features in the formation of beliefs about human rights that undermine their epistemic justification. Some psychologists claim that relevant beliefs arise from the rationalization of intuitions. This process is ill-suited to generate correct beliefs; so formed beliefs may be debunked. This also shows how legal reasoning might be improved.

At the core of Hohfeld's contribution to legal theory is a conceptual framework for the analysis of the legal positions occupied by agents in intersubjective legal relations. Hohfeld presented a system of eight “fundamental” concepts relying on notions of opposition and correlation. Throughout the years, a number of authors have followed Hohfeld in applying the notion of opposition to analyze legal concepts. Many of these authors have accounted for Hohfeld's theory in direct analogy with the standard deontic hexagon. This paper reviews some of these accounts and extends them employing recent developments from opposition theory. In particular, we are able to extend application of opposition theory to an open conception of the law. We also account for the implications of abandoning the assumption of conflict-freedom and admitting seemingly conflicting legal positions. This enables a fuller analysis of Hohfeld's conceptual analytical framework. We also offer a novel analysis of Hohfeld's power positions.

Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.

Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

Criminal law theorists overwhelmingly agree that for some conduct to constitute punishment, it must be imposed intentionally. Some retributivists have argued that because punishment consists only of intentional inflictions, theories of punishment can ignore the merely foreseen hardships of prison, such as the mental and emotional distress inmates experience. Though such distress is foreseen, it is not intended, and so it is technically not punishment. In this essay, I explain why theories of punishment must pay close attention to the unintentional burdens of punishment. In two very important contexts—punishment measurement and justification—we use the term “punishment” to capture not only intentional harsh treatment but certain unintentional harsh treatment as well. This means that the widely accepted view that punishment is an intentional infliction requires substantial caveats. It also means that any purported justification of punishment that addresses only the intentional infliction of punishment is woefully incomplete.