In his recent book, The Left and Rights, Tom Campbell argues that the concept of an individual right has no special or exclusive connection with the political philosophy of liberalism, or with the legal order of a liberal society. The belief that there is some such connection has been shared by both the revolutionary left and the libertarian right. Campbell argues that both groups falsely attribute to the concept of a right features that are contingently associated with the particular rights enforced in bourgeois society. A socialist society, he argues, would have good reason to accord and respect certain individual rights even though these might differ in content, and perhaps in form, from the classic rights of liberal individualism.

It is always a good idea to start with a text. Where better for a lawyer to find his than in a speech by Lord Wilberforce. During the debate on the Bill which became the Law Commissions Act 1965, the Act which established the two Law Commissions in London and Edinburgh as full time law reform agencies, Lord Wilberforce said: ‘law reform is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to lawyers’. What I should like to try to do in this paper is to give some consideration to the role of lawyer and layman (especially legislators) in the process of reforming our law. By ‘reform’ I mean improvement of the law. Mere change should not be confused with useful reform.

While it is no doubt possible to subsume many kinds of inquiry under the head of historical jurisprudence one should certainly distinguish between two rather different kinds. First there is the kind that takes a particular legal notion or idea as it becomes crystallised at some point in a country’s legal history and traces its subsequent history in legal thought, investigating its diffusion and influence and assessing its continuing utility. Such an inquiry is concerned only with the facts in the sense of the ascertainment of what has actually happened. It is in no degree speculative; nor does it seek to investigate the relationship between social conditions and legal notions or rely upon any particular theory of social evolution.

There is, it seems, a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. But then there is always a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. In the 1960s Wortley began his text, Jurisprudence, with a study of anarchism, and the early 1980s saw a succession of papers and articles on anarchist critiques of law. Despite this, discussion of anarchist legal theory has rarely moved beyond the introductory stage. Basic tenets have been outlined but detailed analysis eschewed. Part of the reason for this may lie in basic difficulties of definition. The concern has been with ‘anarchist theories of law’, but what is anarchism?

Most writers, whether they be anarchist theorists or academic commentators, begin with the proposition that the word anarchism is derived from the Greek anarchos and means either ‘no government’ or ‘no ruler’. Such etymology cannot take the place of definition but, beyond the bare fact that anarchism involves the rejection of rulers, no further definition seems possible.

The incorporation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act, 1982, marks a decisive development in the legal entrenchment of human rights in Canada. This contemporary experiment in the protection of fundamental rights by the constitutional limitation of legislative power, and in particular the social priorities established by the Charter and the delicate balancing of interests and values inherent in its provisions, offer useful insights into the viability of mechanisms associated with an enforceable bill of rights within the framework of a modern federal state. Of even greater interest, in the context of multi-racial and multi-religious communities in the modern Commonwealth, is the recent body of case law in the shaping of which Canadian judges have shown perception in imparting effectiveness to guarantees embodied in the Charter, while being acutely aware of the risk of exacerbating tensions with the legislative and administrative organs of government.

It would be the height of naivety to suppose that philosophical analysis of contested concepts could, of itself, result in the reconciliation of competing ideologies or achieve anything very much by way of removing the underlying divergencies of vested interests which express themselves in social and international conflict. The ‘correct’ analysis of the concept of rights is not a panacea for world peace.’ On the other hand, conceptual confusion can generate unnecessary misunderstandings and lead to misplaced disputes which are hardly conducive to the search for such common ground as exists between conflicting groups and nations and it is surely a stage on the way to such agreement as is possible to identify the genuine as opposed to the merely linguistic areas of disagreement, even if this may produce nothing beyond the agreement to differ.

It has been aptly observed that ‘Of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties of definition’. More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeal in England has made the comment: ‘There has never been a complete and satisfactory definition of manslaughter.’

The complexity of definition is associated with a peculiar feature of manslaughter, in that the essential mental requisite consists of the accused's state of mind in relation to his physical act rather than to a particular consequence of the actus reus. The crime of manslaughter postulates mew Tea only in the special sense of intention to commit the act which brings about the consequence of death, even though this consequence may not have been desired or even foreseen by the accused. Thus, the intention to cause death or serious injury is not necessarily a requirement of liability for manslaughter.

‘Whatever the future of the subject, the content of the present courses suggests that jurisprudence has a capacity for self-renewal and an elasticity which enables it to interpret ideas from philosophy and the social sciences to law students in a way which stresses their modern relevance to the social and theoretical problems which an intelligent and critical study of law should suggest.’ So concludes the last survey of jurisprudence teaching in British universities carried out in 1972/73 by Cotterrell and Woodliffe. To what extent could their sentiments be echoed in 1983/84?

Ten years have elapsed since the previous survey was completed during which time important changes have occurred in legal education and its environment.

Sterilisation (vasectomy in the case of the male and tubal ligation or laporoscopy or other variants in the case of the female) is a common method of contraception. It is perceived as having none of the practical and aesthetic disadvantages of ‘mechanical’ methods and none of the health risks associated with oral contraception. It seems to be generally assumed that these procedures are one hundred per cent effective. Indeed, they probably are the most effective methods available, but there are at least two possible sources of failure. First, the procedure may not be performed correctly, though in the case of vasectomy this does not present a very serious problem if, as is normal vasectomy practice in this country, fertility tests are carried out over a fairly extended period before the patient is advised that he may rely upon the operation.

The occasion of the publication of a survey of jurisprudence teaching in the law schools of the United Kingdom is a good occasion for reflecting upon the point of jurisprudence teaching in a law school. There are indeed other good occasions for such reflection, and in fact this paper was initially prepared for such an other occasion. By the invitation of the Editor, it now appears in this Journal in revised form as an outrider to Barnett and Yach's survey ofjurisprudence teaching in the United Kingdom.

One cannot but compliment the authors on the thoroughness of their survey work and on the richness of detail of their report. This comment will not seek to rival that richness.

Twelve years ago, in Brutus u Cozens, the House of Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word of the English language was not a matter of law for the judge, but a question off act for the jury. The way was opened to the argument that in the definition of criminal offences, the metes and bounds of criminal liability were themselves no longer matters of law, but matters off act for the jury. This would allow a judge, when giving his direction, to read a short sentence or two, and leave the jurors to form a largely untutored view of whether an offence had been committed. No matter that different juries would reach different conclusions on the same facts. No matter that there would be little opportunity for an appellate court to correct what it perceived to be an incorrect verdict.

The proposition that ‘Restitution is based on unjust enrichment’ is usually the first that a student of Restitution is presented with. It is a claim at several different levels: as to the terminology we should use in discussing Restitution; as to the sort of rules the subject contains; and as to the way these rules have been developing or should develop in the future. Nor is this confusion of claims particularly surprising. Much of the work of the academic lawyer consists of interpreting the judgements of the higher courts; it is not really very odd when those courts’ ambivalent approach to whether they are making the law, or simply applying it, rubs off. ‘Restitution is based on unjust enrichment’ is really a collection of subsidiary propositions about Restitution; and it is clear that, of those who believe that Restitution is so based, not all would subscribe to every one of the subsidiary propositions.

Whereas it was before dispersed and hidden, Goff and Jones have brought Restitution together and made it prominent. Lacking the generations of textbooks which have organised other subjects, its case law will for many years attract debate as to how best it should be arranged and how it relates to other categories. Many writers think that the key is to be found in the ideas and language of unjust enrichment. But the lock does not immediately turn. Hedley's paper says that it will not. Indeed he thinks that any hope of an elegant theory, or, which may be the same thing, an integrated and economical classification, is vain, since Restitution is more various, empirical, and endemically muddled than the unjust enrichment camp dares to admit. His paper valuably compels a re-examination of fundamental questions.

The law relating to markets illustrates the extent to which the English legal system bears the indelible stamp of its historical origins. Despite a mass of legislation during the last one hundred and fifty years, the common law of markets has retained much of its significance. Although aspects of the common law dating from the Middle Ages are singularly ill-adapted to contemporary social and economic conditions pressure on parliamentary time and the rigid application of the doctrine ofstare decisis combine to preserve this distinctly anachronistic area of the law.

The well-known disadvantages of having an undefined requirement of dishonesty in theft have caused some writers to propose that the requirement should be more precisely stated. Section 2(1) of the Theft Act 1968 specifies cases where the defendant is declared not to have been dishonest (belief in right, belief that onc would have the owner's consent, belief that the owner cannot be discovered), and an obvious way of clarifying the law would be to abolish thc general issue of dishonesty but to allow a defence in these specific cases (together with such other specific cases as might be determined).

The only difficulty in the way of this solution, as I see it, is to decide what is to be done about people who abstract money from a fund intending to repay, or intending and also being presently able to repay. In the past, opinions have been sharply divided between what may be called the orthodox and the lenient approach.

Normally one person is not obliged to confer a benefit on another unless he has promised to do so. Even if he did promise to confer the benefit, he will not normally be liable for failing to confer it if the promisee gave no consideration for the promise. Moreover even if the promisee did give consideration, a third party, who did not, but for whom the benefit was intended, cannot sue. In principle the same applies where a party provides another with some article or service. The recipient cannot complain that the article or service is not good enough, unless the other party promised, for consideration, to provide the thing or service, and what is provided falls below the quality promised. So actions based on the failure to confer a benefit, or sufficient benefit, normally lie in contract.

On 20 February 1982 a baby girl was born in France to Jean-Pierre and Marie-Hélène C. They determined to call their child Manhattan, after an eponymous popular song that had enjoyed currency in the year they were married. The registrar (officier de l’état civil), however, declined to register the child under that name and, when the parents subsequently refused to select any others, the procureur de la République applied to the French civil courts to give the child a forename. The tribunal de grande instance gave the infant its parents’ forenames, refusing to grant the latters’ request to register the child under the name of Manhattan.

The discipline of criminology has been dominated since the turn of the century by an explanatory paradigm known as ‘positivism’. The distinctive features of that paradigm have been both substantive and methodological. On the substantive side ‘positivist criminology’ has been marked by a commitment to the explanation of criminal behaviour (and deviance generally) in terms of characteristics of the individual. Thus positivist criminology has been notable for its explanations of criminal behaviour in terms of gross bodily features, patterns of child-rearing, genetic defect, and idiosyncratic personality traits. On the methodological side positivist criminology has been marked by a preference for scientific method in the evaluation of theory and scientific ideas in the formulation of that theory. By and large these methodological predilections have meant assigning a primacy both to the role of systematic observation in the evaluation of theory and to the avoidance of theoretical assumptions whose validity could not be checked by recourse to observation.

An efficient system of law reporting is beneficial in a number of ways. First, accurate reports are necessary if the principle that like cases should be decided alike is to be achieved. Secondly and relatedly, a strict system of precedent, which renders most decisions binding on courts, requires all decisions which have precedential value to be recorded. Thirdly, full reports of what judges say, including dissents, enable subsequent courts to consider the complex of normative and practical arguments which has been articulated in previous decisions. This both adds to the richness of material guiding lawyers and citizens at large and improves the quality of judicial decision-making. Fourthly, reporting courts’ reasons for reaching a decision is important since it exposes judges to scrutiny by fellow judges, practitioners, academics and the public at large. Reporting therefore serves the principle of accountability.