Much family law scholarship in recent years has been focused on the recognition of different types of family relationship. Often, the rationale for the grant of rights and duties to new forms of relationship is said to be because the parties have shown commitment, or the same degree of commitment, as those in formally recognised unions, such as marriage. But there has been relatively little consideration of why or how commitment can provide an adequate rationale for the imposition of legal consequences, in particular, legal obligations, especially when such commitment may be lacking on the part of one of the parties, or comes to an end. This paper explores the meanings of obligation and commitment within the family and questions whether commitment provides a necessary or sufficient justification for the imposition of legal obligations in family relationships.

This paper examines the legal status of humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of the abortive military operation in Syria. In tracing the history of the doctrine up to the beginning of the Syria crisis, it asserts that the negative reaction to the abortive use of force has reinforced the unlawfulness of humanitarian intervention. In appraising in detail the legal positions of the UK, the USA, France and other states, it analyses the interplay of constitutional law and international law in the Syria crisis with reference to the role of consultations of national parliaments. It asserts that the Syrian precedent illustrates the difficulty of identifying the opinio iuris of a state in which the input of international law through legal advice and public debate affects the output of that state through the expression of its legal position on doctrinal questions. By scrutinising the approach of the British government in consulting the House of Commons in relation to the continuing operations against Islamic State in Iraq, it argues that the National Security Strategy review in 2015 should address the concerns expressed by parliamentary committees regarding consultation of Parliament, the provision of legal advice and the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.

Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford and Cinnamon Carlarne have delivered a hard but justified message: environmental law scholarship is still perceived by many in the field as immature, and this is a reflection of the methodological challenges posed by its subject. This paper expands on their argument that scholars should think more closely about what can be learnt from debates about method in the wider legal mainstream and interdisciplinarity as part of the process of developing the discipline. It locates what is called ‘classic’ and ‘novel’ environmental law scholarship at the margins of the legal academy, which is conceptualised as an imagined legal ‘space’. The paper then explores the ways in which insights derived from the environmental humanities and sciences can invigorate and mature environmental law scholarship by creating exciting new interdisciplinary contexts for the development of legal research methods.

How easy ought it to be to enact constitutional amendment? In the absence of constitutionally prescribed procedures, fundamental reforms in the UK can often appear hurried, under-consultative and controlled by transient political majorities. In the recent referendum on Scottish independence, the NO campaign's promise of additional powers to Holyrood in the face of a possible ‘Yes’ vote appears to fit this pattern (even if, for reasons of political sensitivity, it was not driven directly by members of the Coalition government). A recent sample of concluded constitutional reforms, including the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, have drawn criticism from within Westminster on the grounds of defective process. Specific options to improve pre-parliamentary and parliamentary stages of constitutional reform have been proposed with a view to attaining principled procedures of constitutional reform removed from executive control that signal attachment to process values such as wide and effective consultation, deliberation outside and inside Parliament, and informed scrutiny. The foregoing prescriptions for remedying defective processes may, however, be said in the ultimate analysis to retain a normative preference for a more formal, elite-managed vision of constitutional change that is premised upon a limited conception of the citizens' ‘informed consent’. In any case, in purely descriptive terms, top-down managed change does not capture the totality of patterns of past constitutional reform in the UK. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, radical grassroots campaigns for the extension of the franchise resulted ultimately in universal adult suffrage. More recently, the Scotland Act 1998 can be seen as the culmination of a civic society–led, deliberative engagement with ordinary voters over decades that offered an alternative vision of ‘bottom-up’ constitutional reform to that seen in more formal, elite-led processes of constitutional reform. The inclusive and participatory nature of the campaign for Scottish devolution marked out a radically different model of constitutional reform to that which has typified Westminster-style amendment and which is still largely directed by political elites. In such circumstances as prevail currently at Westminster, it is difficult to give much credence to claims that the outcomes of constitutional reform processes enjoy the ‘informed consent’ of the people.

This paper concerns the origination, development and emergence of what might be termed ‘Olympic law’. This has an impact across borders and with transnational effect. It examines the unique process of creation of these laws, laws created by a national legislature to satisfy the commercial demands of a private body, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It begins by critically locating the IOC and Olympic law and examining Olympic law as a transnational force. Using two case studies, those of ambush marketing and ticket touting, it demonstrates how private entities can be the drivers of specific, self-interested legislation when operating as a transnational organisation from within the global administrative space and notes the potential dangers of such legal transplants.

This paper considers the highly discretionary equitable redistribution scheme governing ancillary relief in Ireland pursuant to the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. The paper begins by drawing on the most up-to-data empirical data highlighting the principal difficulties inherent in the Irish ancillary relief system as currently applied and placing the spotlight firmly on the need for reform. It then considers the constitutional parameters that limit any change to the ancillary relief system applied before presenting a detailed proposal for reform. It concludes that although legislative change may be politically challenging, the commonly cited constitutional impediments to reform do not preclude the adoption of an alternative ancillary relief scheme. Instead, the paper argues that the adoption of a more rule-oriented, ‘pillared’, approach to ancillary relief provision may better resolve the challenges currently faced and ought to be afforded serious consideration in Ireland.

This paper addresses how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency has been implemented and interpreted in the US and the UK. The Model Law has attained a measure of international acceptance and is intended to achieve greater efficiencies in the administration of insolvency cases with transnational dimensions. But different manners of implementation in different countries and differing interpretations may hinder the prospects for harmonisation and coordination of laws. The paper will address in particular whether US interpretations differ from those in the UK and whether the US decisions are so infused with ‘American exceptionalism’ that they cannot be relied upon as sure guides in other countries.