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Humanitarian intervention after Syria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Arman Sarvarian
Arman Sarvarian*
Affiliation:
University of Surrey
*
Arman Sarvarian, School of Law, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper examines the legal status of humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of the abortive military operation in Syria. In tracing the history of the doctrine up to the beginning of the Syria crisis, it asserts that the negative reaction to the abortive use of force has reinforced the unlawfulness of humanitarian intervention. In appraising in detail the legal positions of the UK, the USA, France and other states, it analyses the interplay of constitutional law and international law in the Syria crisis with reference to the role of consultations of national parliaments. It asserts that the Syrian precedent illustrates the difficulty of identifying the opinio iuris of a state in which the input of international law through legal advice and public debate affects the output of that state through the expression of its legal position on doctrinal questions. By scrutinising the approach of the British government in consulting the House of Commons in relation to the continuing operations against Islamic State in Iraq, it argues that the National Security Strategy review in 2015 should address the concerns expressed by parliamentary committees regarding consultation of Parliament, the provision of legal advice and the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 20 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 2016

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Footnotes

*

The author is grateful to Dr Rudy Baker, Dr Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Dr Maria Ioannidou and Dr Filippo Fontanelli for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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25. Ibid, at 188, 189 (para 374).

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41. Gray, above n 4, p 47.

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51. See eg Stahn, above n 48, at 120.

52. Vashakmadze, above n 48, at 1216–1218.

53. UNSC Res 1973 (2011), Preamble, OP 4, 6. The responsibility to protect was also cited by the Security Council in adopting targeted sanctions regarding Côte d'Ivoire – UNSC Res 1975 (2011), Preamble.

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59. See Koh, above n 5, and Bethlehem, above n 5.

60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 107–108 (para 205).

61. Koh, above n 5.

62. Binder, above n 18.

63. See further Henriksen and Schack, above n 6; Akande, above n 58.

64. Bethlehem, above n 5.

65. M Wood ‘Second report on identification of customary international law’, International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/672 (22 May 2014) at 53–63 (paras 75–80).

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78. Carswell, above n 17, at 476.

79. Ibid, at 456, 479.

80. Hansard HL Deb, vol 566, col 1719, 29 August 2013, ‘Syria and the use of chemical weapons’.

81. Ibid, cols 1767–1768 (Lord Brennan), 1769 (Lord Thomas of Gresford), 1779 (Lord Phillips of Sudbury), 1780 (Lord Rathsbotham), 1782–1783 (Lord Desai), 1791–1792 (Lord Inglewood), 1800 (Lord Cormack), 1807 (Baroness Tonge), 1812 (Baroness Uddin), 1816 (Lord Triesman), 1820 (Lord Wallace of Saltaire).

82. Ibid, col 1739 (Lord Goldsmith).

83. Ibid, col 1730 (Lord Wright of Richmond).

84. Ibid, col 1731 (Lord Howard of Lympne), 1734–1735 (Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hampdon).

85. Ibid, cols 1825–1826.

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88. Perez, above n 57. The White House Legal Counsel, Ruemmler Kathryn, was also quoted by the New York Times as saying that ‘the president believed a strike would be lawful, both in international law and domestic law, even if neither the Security Council nor Congress approved it’ – C Savage ‘Obama tests limits of power in Syrian conflict’ (8 September 2013); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 9 October 2015).

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93. No reference was made to the responsibility to protect in an interview with Le Monde on 31 August – ‘Syrie interview du Président dans le Monde du 31 août2013’; available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/la-france-et-la-syrie/actualites-2013/article/syrie-interview-du-president-dans (accessed 9 October 2015). M Fabius likewise did not refer to it in a press conference with Secretary Kerry on 7 September – ‘Recontre entre Laurent Fabius et John Kerry (Paris, 7 septembre 2013)’; available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/la-france-et-la-syrie/actualites-2013/article/rencontre-entre-laurent-fabius-et-108231 (accessed 9 October 2015).

94. Assemblée nationale, XIVe législature, deuxième session extraordinare de 2012–2013, compte rendu, prèmiere séance du mercredi 04 septembre 2013; Sénat, Journal officiel des débats, compte rendu intégral, séance du mercredi 04 septembre 2013, débat sur la situation en Syrie.

95. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Government Foreign Policy towards the United States, oral evidence (3 December 2013) at Q168 and Q175 (Mike Gapes MP). However, Mr Gapes stated in email correspondence with the author that he had ‘got his information from media reports’.

96. ‘Documents parlementaires’; available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/documents/index.asp (accessed 9 October 2015).

97. Ibid, M. Christian Jacob (Président du groupe Union pour un Movement Populaire), M. Jean-Louis Borloo (Union des démocrates et indépendants), M. Paul Giacobbi (Radical, républicain, démocrate et progressiste) and M. André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicaine).

98. Ibid, M. Jean-Louis Borloo (Union des démocrates et indépendants).

99. Ibid, M. André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicain).

100. See eg R Neukirch ‘Military intervention: Germany caught in the middle over Syria’ Der Spiegel Online International 2 September 2013; available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-government-takes-delicate-position-on-attack-on-syria-a-919736.html (accessed 9 October 2015). It has been noted that ‘the Danish government followed the British approach in its legal justification – Henriksen and Schack, above n 6, at 127 (note 23).

101. ‘Monthly press conference by the NATO Secretary-General’ NATO Newsroom 2 September 2013); available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_102716.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 9 October 2015). See also ‘NATO chief calls for intervention in Syria’ Deutsche Welle 2 September 2013; available at http://www.dw.de/nato-chief-calls-for-intervention-in-syria/a-17061245 (accessed 9 October 2015).

102. ‘Statement from HR Ashton reflecting the agreed position of the European Union – all 28 Member States’ (7 September 2013); available at http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/statements/statement-from-hr-ashton-reflecting-the-agreed-position-of-the-european-unionall-28-member-states (accessed 9 October 2015).

103. ‘At G20 summit, Ban, UN–Arab League Envoy push for political solution to Syria crisis’ UN News Centre 24 September 2013; available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45780&Cr=syria&Cr1=g20&Kw1=syria&Kw2=&Kw3=#.UyLUiSguPIU (accessed 9 October 2015).

104. ‘G20 Syria divide: world's largest nations speak out against US-led strike’ Russia Today 6 September 2013; available at http://rt.com/news/g20-against-syria-strike-527/ (accessed 9 October 2015).

105. B Kendall ‘Syria crisis: no winner in Russia–US G20 duel’ BBC News 7 September 2013; available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23999009 (accessed 9 October 2015). For the text of the statement, see ‘Joint statement on Syria’ (6 September 2013); available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/06/joint-statement-syria (accessed 9 October 2015).

106. ‘Arab League urges UN-backed action in Syria’ Al Jazeera 2 September 2013; available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/09/20139118235327617.html (accessed 9 October 2015).

107. UNGA First Committee, 68th Session, 3rd Meeting (7 October 2013) at 5–8.

108. ‘16ème Sommet des Chefs d'État ou de Gouvernement du Mouvement des Pays Non-Alignés, Document Final, Téhéran, République Islamique d'Iran’ at para 31.5 (31 August 2012). See also paras 24.2, 24.3, 24.6, 25.4, 27.8, 28.2, 29, 31.5.

109. 5th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.5 at 10 (Brazil), 24 (Chile), 50 (South Africa), 55 (Sri Lanka); 6th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.6 at 5 (Austria), 15 (Iran); 7th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.7 at 2 (Switzerland), 11 (Argentina), 21 (Sweden), 40 (Italy); 9th Meeting (25 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.9 at 13 (Poland), 16 (Swaziland); 10th Meeting (25 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.10 at 12-13 (Bolivia), 21-22 (Trinidad and Tobago); 16th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.16 at 7 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); 17th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.17 at 5 (Sudan), 18 (Venezuela), 18th Meeting (28 September 2013), 7 (Mauritius), 8 (Vanuatu), 16 (Malaysia), 45 (Kyrgyzstan), 19th Meeting (28 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.19 at 8 (Ireland), 28 (Yemen); 21st Meeting (30 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.21 at 9 (Syria); 23rd Meeting (1 October 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.23 at 5 (Botswana), 9 (Holy See), 19 (Dominica), 25 (Ecuador).

110. See the statements of Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Panama, Poland, Libya, Australia, the Netherlands, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Botswana, the Holy See and Denmark.

111. UNGA Res 68/38 (‘Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation’, 10 December 2013) at OP6.

112. UNGA Res 68/182 (‘Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’, 18 December 2013) at OP 4, 12.

113. Constitutional law has a profound practical role in the work of governmental legal advisers – M Wood ‘International law and the use of force: what happens in practice?’ Unpublished paper, cited with permission.

114. ICC Assembly of States Parties Resolution RC/Res.6 (‘The Crime of Aggression’) (11 June 2010); available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf (accessed 9 October 2015). The amendments activating the Court's jurisdiction over aggression will enter into force upon ratification by 30 State Parties and a final decision of the Assembly of State Parties. As of 7 February 2015, 22 States Parties have ratified; available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-b&chapter=18&lang=en (accessed 9 October 2015).

115. House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Parliament’s Role in Conflict Decisions: A Way Forward Twelfth Report of Session 2013–14, HC 892, 20 March 2014 (HMSO, 2014); House of Commons Defence Committee, above n 45.

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117. The declaration of the UK accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is available online at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=GB (accessed 9 October 2015).

118. R v Jones (Margaret) and others [2007] 1 A.C. 136 at 162 (para 30, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill). See further Joseph, R The War Prerogative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 110–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

119. Statute of the ICC 1998, Art 17: ‘Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.’

120. See eg ‘Statement by Baroness Anelay, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, General Debate’ (11 December 2014) p 3; available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/GenDeba/ICC-ASP13-GenDeba-UK-ENG.PDF (accessed 9 October 2015).

121. See further eg Kreß, C and von Holtzendorff, L ‘The Kampala compromise on the crime of aggression’ (2010) 8 J Int'l Crim Just 1179 at 1195–1199 Google Scholar; Blokker, N ‘A consensus agreement on the crime of aggression: impressions from Kampala’ (2010) 23(4) Leiden J Int'l L 889 at 893–894.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

122. Kreß and Holtzendorff, above n 121, at 1214–1215.

123. ‘UK statement to the 10th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC’ (9 February 2012) p 2; available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ICC-ASP10-GenDeba-UK-ENG.pdf (accessed 9 October 2015).

124. Kreß and von Holzendorff, above n 121 at 1203–1207, 1212–1213.

125. For background and analysis, see Joseph, above n 118, pp 44–109.

126. House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 115, p 11 (para 11).

127. ICC Statute, Art 27.

128. The monarch has the ‘right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn’ (Bagehot, W The English Constitution (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867))Google Scholar, which provides the possibility for a material role on the formulation of policy. Although the modern convention has been that the monarch does not exercise the prerogative in a personal capacity, since at least the nineteenth century, in practice monarchs have ‘continued to play a material, if hidden, part in the direction of foreign affairs’ – Joseph, above n 118, p 59. In addition, former Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Guthrie has suggested that the monarch has a reserve power to countermand the Prime Minister in the event of a ‘mad’ decision to deploy nuclear weapons – R Knight ‘Whose hand is on the button?’ BBC Radio 4 2 December 2008; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7758314.stm (accessed 9 October 2015). The possibility of criminal responsibility for the monarch has never been a factor due to the immunity of the Crown from domestic prosecution as a facet of kingship – Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 29 (London: Lexis Butterworths, 2014) at paras 84–86.

129. See Art 8bis(a) of the crime of aggression amendments to the ICC Statute, above n 114. For background on the crime of aggression with particular reference to the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, see eg Sayapin, S The Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Springer: The Hague, 2014) pp 149–160, 222–225, 290–297CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sellars, K ‘Crimes against Peace’ and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp 113–139, 260–287CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heller, KJ ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: the leadership requirement in the crime of aggression’ (2007) 18(3) Eur J Int'l L 477–497.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

130. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Waging War: Parliament’s Role and Responsibility 15th Report of Session 2005–06, HL 236-I, 27 July 2006, p 15 (para 30).

131. Ibid, pp 26–43 (paras 60–111).

132. Ibid, pp 28–30 (paras 68–74); House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 126, pp 18–20 (paras 41–47).

133. Ibid, p 6 (para 11) (emphasis added).

134. House of Commons Defence Committee, above n 45, p 5 (para 10).

135. House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 126, pp 15, 21–22 (paras 29, 48, 50). The Committee's proposals call for enshrining Parliament's consultative role through a resolution rather than an Act, specifically to avoid the prospect of judicial review. See also the proposal for a statutory underpinning with a limited ‘backstop’ role for the courts in Joseph, above n 118, at 181–216.

136. Joseph proposes that ‘the enactment of a statute which would require the government to obtain in the House of Commons a majority vote in support of deployment of the Armed Forces, except in identified situations; impose duties on the government to provide Parliament (and the public) with certain information about the proposed deployment; and establish a special joint committee of Parliament to scrutinize the relevant information and exercise a general oversight role over the deployment of forces’ – Joseph, above n 1188, at 181. One reviewer, while approving this specific proposal, does not feel that it fully considers the problem of ‘inadequate government accountability before Parliament’ in the British constitution as a whole – D Jenkins ‘Publication review: Joseph, The War Prerogative’ (January 2015) Pub L 188–191, at 191.

137. For background on the legacy of the Iraq legal advice, see Joseph, above n 1188, at 208–209.

138. ‘Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position’ (‘UK government legal position’); available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position (accessed 9 October 2015).

139. Ms Caroline Lucas MP, Mr Edward Miliband MP and Mr James Arbuthnot MP referred to the ‘summary of legal advice’ in the debate to criticise its lack of detail – Hansard, HC Deb, vol 566, cols 1426, 1443, 1463, 29 August 2013. However, Dr Liam Fox MP, Sir Menzies Campbell MP and Mr Andrew Mitchell MP did refer to it for the purpose of substantiation – ibid, at cols 1454, 1456, 1462.

140. Ibid.

141. Although the Attorney General has a ministerial role, in the provision of legal advice he has been likened, in the words of former Attorney General Lord Morris of Aberavon, to ‘a family solicitor, with the Government as his client’ – House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, above n 130, p 29 (para 71). Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (9th edn, January 2014) rC15. Although Sir John Hobson was tried by his Inn of Court for professional misconduct in 1963, the Bar Standards Board found in 2003 that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a complaint of misconduct against Lord Goldsmith regarding the impartiality of his legal advice concerning the Iraq War – see Sarvarian, A Professional Ethics at the International Bar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 39–40 (n 95).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

142. The Prime Minister did, however, inaccurately describe the document as ‘the Attorney-General's excellent legal advice to the House’ in the course of debate – Hansard, HC Deb, vol 566, col 1430, 29 August 2013.

143. The Cabinet is a committee of HM's Privy Council, composed of Ministers of the Crown and the collective decision-making body of the government. Constitutionally, the Cabinet advises the monarch on the exercise of her prerogative on the use of force.

144. The first question posed to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons debate was ‘why [the Prime Minister] has refused to publish the Attorney-General's full advice’ – Hansard, HC Deb, vol 566, col 1426, 29 August 2013. The Prime Minister replied: ‘There had been a long-standing convention, backed by Attorney-Generals of all parties and all Governments, not to publish any legal advice at all. This Government changed that. With the Libya conflict, we published a summary of the legal advice. On this issue, we have published a very clear summary of the legal advice and I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to read it.’ A ministerial statement carries with it the possibility of ministerial accountability, including the theoretical (though arguably obsolete) possibility of impeachment, last attempted in 2004 against the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, over the Iraq War – O Gay and N Davies ‘Impeachment’ House of Commons Library, SN/PC/02666 (16 November 2011) at 4.

145. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, above n 130, p 20 (para 47).

146. Ibid, p 29 (para 49).

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. ‘Letter from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (July 5, 2004)’ in Wood, above n 113.

150. House of Commons Defence Committee, above n 45 (vol II) p 61 (Ev w58).

151. In Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7948, October 2010, para 2.10 states the UK Armed Forces are deployed ‘only … where justifiable under international law’. In A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy Cm 7593, October 2010, para 3.32 asserts: ‘Our strategic interests and responsibilities overseas could in some circumstances justify the threat or use of military force. There will also be occasions when it is in our interests to take part in humanitarian interventions.’

152. Constitution of the United States of America, available at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm (accessed 9 October 2015), Art I, s 8, clause 11: ‘[The Congress shall have Power …] to Declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.’

153. 50 U.S.C. 1541–1548.

154. H Koh ‘Syria and the law of humanitarian intervention (Part I: Political miscues and U.S. law)’ EJIL: Talk! Blog 26 September 2013; available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-humanitarian-intervention-part-i-political-miscues-and-u-s-law/ (accessed 9 October 2015).

155. Ibid.

156. Constitution of 4 October 1958, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/ (accessed 9 October 2015), Arts 5, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21.

157. Henderson, above n 8, at 211.

158. See eg S Bomboy ‘Experts ponder Obama's War Powers curveball’ Constitution Daily Blog 12 September 2014; available at http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/09/experts-ponder-obamas-war-powers-curveball/ (accessed 9 October 2015).

159. Henderson, above n 8, at 217–218.

160. Hansard, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1255, 26 September 2014.

161. Ibid.

162. ‘Summary of the government legal position on military action in Iraq against ISIL’ (25 September 2014); available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-position/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-against-isil (accessed 9 October 2015).

163. Hansard, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1263, 26 September 2014. See further the House of Commons Defence Select Committee Seventh Report The Situation in Iraq and Syria and the Response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH) (27 January 2015) at paras 20–23.

164. Hansard, HC Deb, vol 585, cols 1256, 1259, 1263–1264, 1270–1271, 1274, 1279, 1283, 1288, 1290–1293, 26 September 2014.

165. T Rupar ‘Obama's request for congressional authorization to fight the Islamic State: full text’ The Washington Post 11 February 2015; available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/11/obamas-request-for-congressional-authorization-to-fight-the-islamic-state-full-text/ (accessed 9 October 2015).

166. R Van Steenberghe ‘The alleged prohibition on intervening in civil wars is still alive after the airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq: a response to Dapo Akande and Zachary Vermeer’ EJIL: Talk! Blog 12 February 2015; available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-alleged-prohibition-on-intervening-in-civil-wars-is-still-alive-after-the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-a-response-to-dapo-akande-and-zachary-vermeer/ (accessed 9 October 2015).

167. Ibid, at 220.

168. International Law Association Washington Conference (2014) Use of Force Committee, ‘Draft report on aggression and the use of force’ (14 March 2014) s C.1; available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1036 (accessed 9 October 2015). The author is a member of the Committee, but the views contained in this paper are entirely his own and do not reflect those of the Committee.

169. Henriksen and Schack, above n 6, at 147; Stahn, above n 5, at 35, 45–46.

170. Uniting for Peace, above n 17, A(1).

171. Binder, above n 18, at 455–456 (‘Once the five permanent members of the Security Council (“P5”) realized that the resolution was a double-edged sword – and indeed threatened their sovereign interests by potentially undermining their own respective veto powers – it was relegated to obscurity’.)

172. Yet safeguards can fail, particularly in the face of large government majorities and three-line whips: it was the House of Commons, after all, that voted by 412–149 in favour of the Blair ministry's motion to endorse the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – Hansard, HC Deb, col 907, 18 March 2003.