The purpose of this paper is to examine a new work on legal reasoning by two American jurists whose aim is to ‘demystify’ it. The paper will not dispute the authors' central thesis that the existence of special forms of reasoning in law is false, but it will argue that a social science epistemologist would find their analysis at best inadequate. It will be argued that legal reasoning is not just reasoning from and about rules; it is also reasoning about facts and about the construction of factual situations. Consequently, it is vital for anyone wishing to have a serious understanding of how lawyers reason to have a familiarity with how social scientists, and indeed natural scientists, reason about fact. Such reasoning certainly involves induction, deduction and analogy but these methods are by no means adequate as an epistemological framework; schemes of intelligibility and paradigm orientations are equally important. If there is one paradigm orientation that is special to certain disciplines like theology and law, it is the authority paradigm, an orientation that must be distinguished from an inquiry paradigm. The problem with works by legal philosophers on legal reasoning is, it will be implied, that they are often conducted from within the authority paradigm and that this, in the end, prevents any demystification.

Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 has often been derided as a Cinderella provision, but during the last few years, this has started to change. This paper examines how Art 14 has developed and how it may live up to its potential as a powerful non-discrimination principle. The case-law developments in relation to the ‘ambit’ requirement in Art 14, the development of indirect discrimination case-law and the approval of positive action, all point to a more substantive conception of equality, which offers protection to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

The Comedy of Errors, always loved on the stage, has long been deemed less substantial than Shakespeare's ‘mature’ works. Its references to private and public law have certainly been noted: a trial, a breached contract, a stand-off between monarchical and parliamentary powers. Yet the play's legal elements are more than historical curios within an otherwise light-hearted venture. The play is pervasively structured by an array of socio-legal dualisms: master–servant, husband–wife, native–alien, parent–child, monarch–parliament, buyer–seller. All confront fraught transitions from pre-modern to early modern forms. Those fundamentally legal relationships fuel character and action, even where no conventionally legal norm or procedure is at issue. ‘Errors’ in the play serve constantly to highlight unstable and shifting relationships of dominance and submission. Law undergoes its own transition from feudal–aristocratic to commercial forms. Through a theatrical framing device, it thereby re-emerges to remind us that those dualisms, even in their new incarnations, will remain squarely within law's ambit.

Recently, the Law Commission has indicated that it will be considering the abolition of the crime of high treason. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interesting legal history of one of the offences which go to make up high treason – violating the sovereign's wife or his eldest unmarried daughter or the wife of his eldest son and heir – and to argue for its abolition.

Although nanotechnologies create new and innovative opportunities in many industrial and technological sectors, they present a number of regulatory challenges. There is evidence to suggest that some nanomaterials may pose risks of harm to health and the environment. The nature of these risks, however, is profoundly uncertain. In the first part of this paper, I show that legislative provisions currently used to regulate nanomaterials are ill-equipped for this purpose. In light of this, I proceed in the second part to examine how risks from nanomaterials ought to be regulated. Using what loosely may be described as a cost–benefit analytical framework, I appraise alternative regulatory options and draw initial conclusions about which is likely to prove the most cost-effective.

Twenty years after Ireland adopted an external supervisory board model to promote public confidence in the handling of complaints against the police (the Garda Síochána), it had to replace it with a cross between the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Independent Police Complaints Commission in England and Wales. This paper examines the nature and scale of the board's failure and offers a critique of the internal and external factors responsible. It focuses, in particular, on how the police and the government, acting separately and in combination, managed to smother the potential of the supervisory board model. It also offers insights into how the board contributed to its own failure. The paper concludes by drawing attention to the fact that several of these negative forces can also be active in the new complaints procedure that commenced operations in 2007.