1 Alexander, L and Sherwin, E Demystifying Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2008).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 There have been a number of collective works published recently in France in the areas of natural science, social science, theology, political philosophy and the like; these works, which will be cited in the notes that follow, contain a range of very rich essays on epistemology and method. They provide a good survey of contemporary thinking in the theory of knowledge and in methodology.

3 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 3.

4 Makkreel, RA Expliquer et comprendre’ in Mesure, S and Savidan, P (eds) Le dictionnaire des sciences humaines (Presses Universitaires de France, 2006) p 441.Google Scholar

5 This appears to be one of the questions behind the problem of reasoning about facts: see Nadeau, R Fait’ in Lecourt, D (ed) Dictionnaire d'histoire et philosophie des sciences (Presses Universitaires de France, 4th edn, 2006) p 486 at p 487.Google Scholar

6 Cf Masquelet, AC Le raisonnement médical (Presses Universitaires de France, 2006).Google Scholar

7 Another question, of course, is whether ‘ordinary’ reasoning recognises a sub-category of ‘legalistic reasoning’: cf Twining, W and Miers, D How To Do Things With Rules (Butterworths, 4th edn, 1999) pp 8–13.Google Scholar

8 An important question in the philosophy of science: D Lecourt ‘Épistémologie’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 428.

9 Valade, B De l'explication dans les sciences sociales: holisme et individualisme’ in Berthelot, J-M (ed) Épistémologie des sciences sociales (Presses Universitaires de France, 2001) p 357;Google Scholar B Valade ‘Individualisme et holisme méthodologiques’ in Mesure and Savidan, above n 4, p 620.

10 Cf Vigour, C La comparaison dans les sciences sociales: Pratiques et méthodes (Éditions La Découverte, 2005).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Stein, P Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp 78–121.Google Scholar

12 On which see P Legrand ‘European legal systems are not converging (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52.

13 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 3.

14 Ibid. Twining and Miers adopt a similar attitude in their exhaustive treatise on reasoning and rules: see Twining and Miers, above n 7, p 127.

15 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 24.

16 Ibid, p 25.

17 Ibid, pp 25–26.

18 See also Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 123–156.

19 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, pp 3–4.

20 Interestingly Twining and Miers advocate an approach from the position of an advocate rather than a judge: Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 333–340. This makes much sense when approaching legal reasoning in terms of argumentation but it does not have the same formal ‘authority’ as an assertion by a judge.

21 The same criticism cannot be made with such force against Twining and Miers, ibid, because although they are committed to the rule model their book draws much from American Realism and thus is more committed to the importance of facts: see in particular Twining and Miers, ibid, pp 182–183.

22 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 233.

23 Lord Simon in Lupton v FA and AB Ltd [1972] AC 634 at 658–659.

24 See also Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 350–355.

25 The example is taken from Oléron, P Le raisonnement (Presses Universitaires de France, 4th edn, 1995) p 52.Google Scholar

26 D Vernant ‘Déduction’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 339 at pp 339–340.

27 This is what differentiates logic from argumentation: see generally Plantin, C L'argumentation (Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).Google Scholar

28 Granger, G-G La science et les sciences (Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edn, 1995) p 70.Google Scholar

29 Consequently, some assert that Marxist theory has proved inadequate because its prediction about proletarian revolutions in the industrialised states never occurred: H Barreau ‘Théorie’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 1092 at p 1098.

30 Busino, G Sociologie des sciences et des techniques (Presses Universitaires de France, 1998) pp 85–86.Google Scholar

31 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 22.

32 Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 138–143.

33 Ibid, pp 143–146.

34 Soler, L Introduction à l'épistémologie (Ellipses, 2000) pp 43–44.Google Scholar

35 Lord Goff of Chieveley ‘Judge, jurist and legislature’ 1987 Denning Law Journal 79 at 92.Google Scholar Quoted in DW Vick ‘Interdisciplinarity and the discipline of law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163 at 178.

36 Vick, ibid, at 178–179

37 On systems theory and law, see Teubner, G Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, 1993).Google Scholar

38 It must be stressed again that ‘authority’ is to be understood in this context in terms of the authority paradigm: what judges say in their judgments has a formal authority.

39 See, eg, Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 129.

40 Lupton v FA and AB Ltd [1972] AC 634 at 659 (emphasis added).

41 See also Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 355–357.

42 Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Exch 265.

43 National Telephone Co v Baker [1893] 2 Ch 186.

44 It might be better to say from fact to fact: Blanché, R Le raisonnement (Presses Universitaires de France, 1973) p 177.Google Scholar

45 A Benmakhlouf ‘Analogie’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 35 p 39.

46 Ibid, p 40.

47 See, eg, MacCormick, N Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1978) pp 161–194.Google Scholar

48 Blanché, above n 44, p 182.

49 If the taxonomical scheme does not permit itself to be structured in terms of genus and species, then, according to Michel Foucault, one is stopped from thinking in scientific terms: see his reaction to Borges' Chinese Encyclopedia: Foucault, M Les mots et les choses (Gallimard, 1966) pp 7–11 (‘cette distorsion du classement qui nous empêcher de le penser, ce tableau sans espace coherent ... ’).Google Scholar

50 Besnier, J-M Les théories de la connaissance (Presses Universitaires de France, 2005) p 102.Google Scholar

51 Perelman, C and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L Traité de l'argumentation (Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1988) pp 1–5 and 527–542.Google Scholar Or, during the nineteenth century, rhetoric, of which analogy no doubt forms a part: Plantin, above n 27, pp 7–10.

52 Durand, D La systémique (Presses Universitaires de France, 5th edn, 1992) pp 51–53.Google Scholar

53 Delacour, J Le cerveau et l'esprit (Presses Universitaires de France, 1995) pp 34–42.Google Scholar

54 Ibid, pp 32–33.

55 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 66.

56 Ibid, p 87.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid, p 76.

59 Ibid, p 87.

60 Ibid, p 86.

61 Ibid, p 129. MacCormick, however, sees analogy not as a means of arriving at an obligatory decision but as a step in the permissibility of a proposed decision: MacCormick, above n 47, pp 181–182 and 188–189.

62 Although, of course, such analogies can be very valuable in science: Durand, above n 52, p 50.

63 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 66.

64 Benmakhlouf, above n 45, p 39.

65 [1953] 3 WLR 773 at 777.

66 (1875) LR 10 Exch 261.

67 Above n 65, at 777.

68 See, eg, Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400.

69 [1954] 2 QB 182 at 196–197.

70 Ibid, at 197–198.

71 Ibid, at 198. The Court of Appeal thus reversed the decision of Devlin J, but his holding was reinstated by the House of Lords: [1956] AC 218.

72 Or perhaps two different principles: MacCormick, above n 47, pp 152–194.

73 See Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 70.

74 See the public nuisance case of Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400.

75 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 75.

76 Ibid. Again it is worth recalling that MacCormick, although an adherent to the rule model, does not see analogy as mere intuition, but as a permissible step in the process towards a legal solution: MacCormick, above n 47, pp 152–194.

77 Blanché, above n 44, pp 184–185.

78 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, pp 64ff.

79 Jonsen, AR and Toulmin, S The Abuse of Casuistry (University of California Press, 1988) p 19 (original emphasis).Google Scholar

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid, pp 34–35.

82 See, eg, Bureau, D Codification’ in Alland, D and Rials, S (eds) Dictionnaire de la culture juridique (Presses Universitaires de France, 2003) p 225 at p 227.Google Scholar

83 Cf MacCormick, above n 47, pp 152–194.

84 Space dictates that this historical analysis cannot be repeated here. However, an historical analysis can be found in Samuel, G Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate, 2003).Google Scholar A more detailed treatment is to be found in One might note also that the history of methodology in theology follows the same pattern as in law; see A de Libera ‘Scholastique’ in Lacoste, ibid, p 1312; O Riaudel ‘Systématique (Théologie)’ in Lacoste, ibid, p 1367; JC Puddefoot ‘Sciences de la nature’ in Lacoste, ibid, p 1310.

85 For the powerful use of analogy in the casuistic reasoning employed by the medieval Roman lawyers, see Thomas, Y L'extrême et l'ordinaire: remarques sur le cas médiéval de la communauté disparue’ in Passeron, J-C and Revel, J (eds) Penser par cas (Éditions de l'école des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2005) p 45.Google Scholar

86 See generally Thomas, ibid.

87 Bechtel, W and Abrahamsen, A Connectionism and the Mind (Basil Blackwell, 1991) p 227.Google Scholar

88 See, eg, Granger, above n 28, pp 90–92.

89 See, in particular, Berthelot, J-M L'intelligence du social (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990);Google Scholar J-M Berthelot ‘Programmes, paradigmes, disciplines: pluralité et unité des sciences sociales’ in Berthelot, above n 9, p 457.

90 See in particular G Samuel above n 84, pp 295–334; Samuel, G Taking methods seriously (part one) (2007) 2 Journal of Comparative Law 94 Google Scholar and ‘Taking methods seriously (part two)’ (2007) 2 Journal of Comparative Law 210.

91 Professor Berthelot has summarised them in the following way: ‘the causal scheme (if x, then y or y = f (x)); the functional scheme (S→X→S, where one phenomenon X is analysed from the position of its function – X→S – in a given system); the structural scheme (where X results from a system founded, like language, on disjunctive rules, A or not A); the hermeneutical scheme (where X is the symptom, the expression of an underlying signification to be discovered through interpretation); the actional scheme (where X is the outcome, within a given space, of intentional actions); finally, the dialectical scheme (where X is the necessary outcome of the development of internal contradictions within a system)’: ‘Programmes, paradigmes, disciplines: pluralité et unité des sciences sociales’ in Berthelot, above n 9, p 484 (translation G Samuel).

92 Berthelot, ibid, p 12.

93 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 at 982.

94 At 982.

95 At 983.

96 At 983.

97 The late Professor Berthelot himself never applied his schemes to the analysis of legal cases.

98 See, eg, Lord Denning MR at 982.

99 See, eg, Lord Denning MR at 976 and 980.

100 See, eg, Lord Denning MR at 976, 977 and 981–982.

101 In fact, Wilhelm Dilthey asserted that the difference between the natural sciences and social sciences was that the former privileged a causal scheme of intelligibility while the latter, which he described as Geiteswissenschaften, should privilege the hermeneutical scheme since the work of social scientists was one of interpretation of social fact. See S Mesure ‘Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1833–1911’ in Mesure and Savidan, above n 4, p 277.

102 See, eg, Cumming-Bruce LJ at 989.

103 See generally the judgment of Lord Denning MR.

104 Cumming-Bruce LJ at 989.

105 Lord Denning MR at 981.

106 Cumming-Bruce LJ at 989.

107 See, in particular, Cumming-Bruce LJ at 989.

108 Lord Denning MR at 976.

109 See, eg, his judgment at 987.

110 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 127.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid, p 22.

113 Ibid, p 21.

114 See generally Nadeau, above n 5.

115 See eg Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd [2007] 3 WLR 876.

116 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 234.

117 Masquelet, above n 6, pp 119–123.

118 See Samuel ‘Taking methods seriously (part one), above n 90.

119 For an illustration how the different schemes explain the different critical approaches to a film, see ibid.

120 Lord Clyde in Birmingham City Council v Oakley [2001] 1 AC 617 at 632–633.

121 At 633.

122 At 634–635.

123 At 635.

124 At 628.

125 At 628.

126 At 631.

127 At 637 (original emphasis).

128 At 637.

129 At 628.

130 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, pp 218–219. Alexander and Sherwin's use of the term ‘incoherent’ in this context also fails to take account of MacCormick's view that principle and analogy have an important role to play in coherence in law: see MacCormick, above n 47, pp 152–194. MacCormick could be wrong, of course, but it might have been useful if Alexander and Sherwin had engaged in depth with MacCormick's point.

131 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1 p 151.

132 Ibid, at 166.

133 Thus the presentation of facts is not just a question of an ‘appeal to emotion’: cf Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 367–368.

134 For other examples as to how a judge can come to a different decision than some other judge by expanding the image, so to speak, see Samuel, above n 84, pp 200–213.

135 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 22.

136 See, in particular, Samuel, above n 84, pp 200–207. Some rule model theorists such as Twining and Miers would equally appear not to subscribe to this kind of assertion by Alexander and Sherwin; see, eg, Twining and Miers, above n 7, pp 367–368.

137 See, eg, Principles of European Contract Law, art 9.502.

138 One cannot, it seems, just carry on digging; the whole construction job has to be done again.

139 Ruxley Electronics Ltd v Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344.

140 For example, one could talk in terms of the House of Lords applying the rule of efficient breach of contract.

141 Granger, above n 28, p 49.

142 See, eg, Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 141.

143 Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335 at 349. Very similar assertions have been made more recently in judgments rendered by the House of Lords in the case of Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] 3 WLR 593.

144 Or quasi-normative as one jurist puts it: Dubouchet, P Sémiotique juridique: introduction à une science du droit (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990) pp 144–145.Google Scholar

145 Kuhn, T The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1970).Google Scholar

146 L Soler ‘Paradigme’ in Mesure and Savidan, above n 4, p 843 at p 843.

147 Berthelot ‘Programmes, paradigmes, disciplines’, above n 89, p 457.

148 See further Samuel ‘Taking methods seriously (part one), above n 90, at 110–115.

149 See generally Popper, K The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson, 1959; Routledge edn, 2002).Google Scholar See also A Boyer ‘Réfutabilité’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 958.

150 K Armstrong ‘Unholy strictures’ The Guardian 11 August 2005.

151 With respect to theology, see Riaudel, above n 84, p 1367.

152 Dubouchet, above n 144, pp 37–70.

153 JC Puddefoot ‘Mathématiques’ in Lacoste, above n 84, p 860.

154 Although there was an import debate in Germany as to whether corporate personality was a fiction or a concept reflecting a reality: Jones, JW Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford University Press, 1940) pp 74–78.Google Scholar

155 Renoux-Zagamé, M-F Domat, Jean’ in Arabeyre, P, Halpérin, J-L and Krynen, J (eds) Dictionnaire historique des juristes français XIIe–XXe (Presses Universitaires de France, 2007) p 254 at p 255.Google Scholar And see Dubouchet, above n 144, pp 37–70.

156 Bergel, J-L Théorie générale du droit (Dalloz, 4th edn, 2003) p 292.Google Scholar

157 See, eg, Mathieu-Izorche, M-L Le raisonnement juridique (Presses Universitaires de France, 2001).Google Scholar

158 For an excellent account with respect to property law, see Gray, K and Gray, S The rhetoric of reality’ in Getzler, J (ed) Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts (Butterworths, 2003) p 204.Google Scholar

159 See on this debate, Samuel, G Can Gaius really be compared to Darwin?’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 297;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

160 See on this authority problem, Pfersmann, O Normativisme et décisionnisme’ in Raynaud, P and Rials, S (eds) Dictionnaire de philosophie politique (Presses Universitaires de France, 3rd edn, 2003) p 508.Google Scholar

161 Vick, above n 35, at 179.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

164 Riles, A Comparative law and socio-legal studies’ in Reimann, M and Zimmermann, R (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 775 at pp 808–809.Google Scholar

165 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 166.

166 H Barreau ‘Test’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 1085.

167 Cf on this point MacCormick, above n 47, pp 73–99.

168 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 213.

169 Ibid, p 214.

170 Ibid. The authors emphasise these terms in their text.

171 Ibid.

172 See, eg, R Nadeau ‘Objectivité’ in Lecourt, above n 5, p 818.

173 Ibid, at 823.

174 Berthelot ‘Programmes, paradigmes, disciplines, above n 89; Épistémologie des sciences humaines, op.cit .

175 Berthelot, above n 9, pp 381–382.

176 Desjeux, D Les sciences sociales (Pressess Universitaires de France, 2004) p 95.Google Scholar

177 J-Y Lacoste ‘Herméneutique’ in Lacoste Dictionnaire critique de la théologie, above n 84, p 633.

178 Desjeux, above n 176, pp 12–14.

179 Ibid, p 116.

180 Berthelot, above n 9, pp 11–13.

181 See Samuel, G Is law really a social science? a view from comparative law 2008 Cambridge Law Journal 288.Google Scholar

182 But sadly Professor Bethelot died in 2004.

183 Berthelot, above n 9, p 12.

184 Ibid, pp 12–15.

185 Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 4.

186 See, eg, Lord Donaldson in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian plc [1990] 2 WLR 421 at 432: ‘Lord Hailsham once said that “the rule of law is a confidence trick”. What he meant was that the rule of law depends upon public confidence and public acceptance of the system whereby Parliament makes the laws, the courts enforce them and the vast majority of citizens accept them until they can get them changed’.

187 See generally, eg, MacCormick, above n 47.

188 See, eg, the statement by Alexander and Sherwin, above n 1, p 17: ‘For in a community of rule-sensitive particularists, everyone would realize that no one was treating rules as serious rules. Therefore, the settlement value of rules would be reduced, which in turn would mean less expected compliances with rules and therefore less settlement value, and so on until the rules collapsed completely as serious rules’. This may or may not be true, but the authors feel under no obligation to offer the reader any empirical evidence as to the validity of this prediction. Consequently is their assertion that different from the assertion by one William Miller (1782–1849) who applied scientific and mathematical methods to the Book of Revelation and concluded that the Second Coming of Christ would occur in the year of 1843? On this Miller assertion see Armstrong, K The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Harper Perennial, 2004) pp 90–91.Google Scholar Armstrong observes that the failure of Christ to return did not mean the end of millenialism: ‘other sects... adjusted the eschatological timetable, and, by eschewing precise predictions, enabled new generations of Americans to look forward to an imminent End of history’ (p 91). Perhaps Miller should have become a legal theorist.

189 D Bradnack ‘Face to faith’ The Guardian 6 September 2008 at 35.