One of the reasons why social behavior is so much harder to understand than other phenomena is that it has meaning, both for the actor and for the observer. This is particularly true of law, which is preeminently an expression of values. A central question in the social theory of law has therefore been: what is the normative meaning of law for social actors? The answer to that question is often influenced by the values which the theorist attributes to the law. Isaac Balbus, in his article in this issue, denominates two extreme responses as instrumental pluralism and instrumental marxism. The first perceives law under western liberal capitalism as an ideal harmonization of the values of all citizens. The second sees that law as pure exploitation, an instrument of naked ruling class domination. All of the writers in this issue reject both extremes. The relationship—between the values of social actor or analytic observer, and legal reality—is far more complex. That complexity is often expressed as the “relative” autonomy of law, although the phrase may be more elliptical than illuminating. The recognition that law is related to, but also partly autonomous from, both economic infrastructure and normative superstructure, is obviously the beginning of analysis, not the end. Perhaps the most important contribution of the articles that follow is their determination to study those relationships empirically, rather than deducing them from ideological presuppositions, as has so often been done in the past.

This paper argues that American legal culture, specifically the complex of public attitudes toward our major legal institutions and values, is truly democratic. The most persistent, although often unexplained, theme in that complex of attitudes is the demand for equal treatment. Americans endorse the ideals of equal treatment and believe that the most glaring defect of the present legal system is its failure to provide such treatment. Yet, as de Tocqueville noted, our ideas of equality are often incomplete; the demand for equal treatment appears to be a demand for equality between oneself and those now accorded preferential treatment rather than a demand that those less favored be treated as well as oneself. Evidence in support of the argument is gathered from survey studies of public attitudes toward the police, lawyers, and courts as well as of their attitudes toward crime, punishment, and civil liberties.

Some aspects of the effects of the legal regulation in the socialist economy are discussed on the basis of interviews with two samples of managers of state enterprises in Poland. Emphasis is on the mode of adaptation by the managers to what they perceive as conflicting economic, legal, and administrative demands—especially in interactions between the enterprises. An attempt is made to specify the role played by the norm and mechanism of reciprocity, as well as by the other mutual sanctions that order economic cooperation, beyond the official legal regulations.

Studies in nations with different social and economic systems indicate that the norms of contract law are seldom applied through the litigation process and that disputes are avoided or settled where there is a long-term relationship between the parties. Yet legal scholarship, as well as many proposals for reform, continue to be based on a picture of the contracts lawsuit, to a great extent. It is likely that this distortion is prompted by overgeneralization from a nonrepresentative sample of possible and actual disputes, and by the indirect influence of legal norms; it may also express the needs of legal scholars and reformers. It is questionable whether capitalist, socialist, or mixed economic systems would benefit if more disputes were resolved by the application of officially sanctioned contract norms.

We reach, then, not a simple conclusion (law = class power) but a complex and contradictory one. On the one hand, it is true that the law did mediate class relations to the advantage of the rulers; not only is this so, but … the law became a superb instrument by which these rulers were able to impose new definitions of property to their even greater advantage. … On the other hand, the law mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed, again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the rulers. [Thompson, 1975:264]

As always in social life, the heart of the mystery lies in the relationship between the struggle for power and the beliefs people hold about what is good for them and what they are capable of achieving. That relationship is the cave into which we must follow the enigma. [Unger, 1976b:242]

After a good deal of thought I have decided not to respond directly to Professor Trubek's exhaustive review of The Dialectics of Legal Repression, but will rather leave it to readers of my book to determine for themselves the adequacy of his description, analysis, and evaluation of the material contained therein. However, insofar as Professor Trubek also refers briefly in his essay to my “more recent,” and until now unpublished, work, it seems appropriate to present a sample of this work, especially since Trubek himself argues that it entails a “major refinement” which “allows Balbus to explain what remains unexplained in The Dialectics.” Indeed, in certain respects the following essay constitutes an autocritique of the theoretical analysis in my book, and a comparison of the two will thus permit the reader to assess indirectly the extent of my agreement with Trubek's critique. At the same time, what follows also constitutes an implicit and, at times explicit, critique of Trubek's own effort to elaborate and apply an alternative to my position, the effort he calls “critical social thought about law.”

We noted with considerable interest Leon Robertson's article (1976), in a recent issue of this journal, dealing with statistical measures of the effectiveness of helmet and daytime headlight laws for motorcyclists. For some time, proponents and opponents of such legislation have been trading enthusiastic arguments and impassioned denials, often including misleading statistical presentations. The result has been that most followers of this debate are left with their personal views and little in the way of substantive support for either side. Robertson uses what appear to be promising data bearing on the safety controversy but, in our view, he does not perform the analyses required to clear the muddled waters and he seriously misinterprets the statistics he employs.

The comment by the Cohens on my article, “An Instance of Effective Legal Regulation” (1976), consists mainly of speculation about the fatality distributions and questions regarding the adequacy of the statistical models that I used to test for deviation from random fluctuation. Such speculation is unwarranted, and particularly so when the issue is public policy affecting human life. A point by point examination of the Cohens' comments indicates that they are without merit.