Histories of the early American political economy present that world in fractured form, dividing political and constitutional dimensions from economic aspects. The fragmented approach reflects an old, oft-denigrated, but still powerful imagery, one that naturalizes economic activity as a set of myriad spontaneous and individuated exchanges, conducted with a conventional medium, money, and predictably composing a market sphere. The motif and its underlying assumptions in turn dissuade exploration of money and markets as territories of public decision, insulating by neglect the structural power of determinations made there. This essay traces the naturalization motif through a historiography of macroeconomic models of money. It then considers how money, recognized as a dynamics of value, would look if the law structuring it were approached as a complex set of relations that expressed, reiterated, and revised the distribution of authority in society. The early American political economy appears in a different light: money becomes a matter of value and governance at once, and therefore a crucial area of constitutional debate. Through that medium, the political economy of early America is transformed not once but repeatedly, from a mercantilist to a domestic paper to a liberal capitalist form.

This article analyzes narratives of sexual consent and coercion in 15 criminal seduction cases tried in New York City from 1903 to 1918. I explore courtroom accounts of seduction to explain how dominant notions of masculinity and femininity constrain the effectiveness of sex crime laws. Unlike men, women in the Progressive era (1900–1920) who engaged in premarital sex faced potentially significant social costs in the form of unwanted pregnancy and ostracism. These women could sometimes seek redress by bringing felony charges against men who reneged on their promises of marriage. New York's “seduction law” not only criminalized betrayal but it also functioned as a tool in the prosecution of sexual assault. Yet a patriarchal ideology of romantic courtship embedded in the statute, and defense attorney strategies that drew on this ideology, limited the law's ability to address sexual coercion.

Law professors and political scientists generally subscribe to opposed theories of Supreme Court decision making. Law professors, to a great degree, adhere to an internal view: Supreme Court justices decide cases according to legal rules, principles, and precedents. Political scientists follow an external view: justices decide cases according to their political ideologies or preferences. This article develops an interpretive-structural theory that harmonizes these seemingly opposed views. This interpretive-structural theory not only explains why the internal and external views often are both effective but also why, sometimes, one approach might be more effective than the other. The article concludes by comparing the interpretive-structural theory with the “new institutionalism” that is emerging in political science.

This paper examines the paradoxical and problematic position of rights discourses in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) parents' custody and adoption cases. In it, I analyze the ways in which different types of rights are framed by the litigants and, alternatively, by the judges, as well as how the same constitutional rights (e.g., the right to privacy) are often deployed both in defense of and in opposition to gay /lesbian parents. An in-depth analysis of judicial decisions over a 50-year period and interviews with key family law players reveal the indeterminacy and therefore complexity of rights as a strategy and a discourse in the family law context. Consistent throughout this analysis are the problematic intersection of the collective and the individual in rights-based claims, and evidence of the distinct nature of LGBT rights claims as revolutionary in both their bases and their implications. The analysis confirms in some ways, but also contradicts and complicates many assertions of the “rights critique” of the past two decades. It also suggests a more complex and less dichotomous relationship between rights, status, and contract.