This essay reflects on contemporary justifications for the grading of crimes, especially the conception that the gravity of crimes is rooted in “desert,” understood to depend particularly on the offender's state of mind and to a lesser extent on the harm done or threatened to society.

Drawing on Dante's Inferno, the essay shows how the gravity of crimes is socially constructed. For reasons rooted in the sociopolitical forces, as well as the philosophy and law of his day, Dante found the crimes most deserving of punishment to be those of betrayal of trust. He conceived such crimes to be the most deliberate and to do the most damage to the social fabric. Contemporary law has found that crimes of betrayal are generally less deserving of punishment than crimes of violence; the essay shows how social and historical forces, including even the traditions upon which Dante drew, have shaped this choice. In the course of grading crimes in this way, the law has altered its conceptions of “intent” as well as of harm to society so radically that the notion of “desert” has lost much of its coherence. The importance of trust in modern society, moreover, has been misunderstood in the contemporary grading of crimes.

Although scholars have devoted considerable attention to the formation, modification, and dissemination of knowledges in and around the legal complex, few systematic inquiries have been made into the sociology of legal knowledges. In this paper, we focus on two areas of law–liquor licensing and drunk driving–and contextualize their development from the perspective of police science. We document the ways in which contemporary police science authorizes a “common knowledge,” which is not to be confused with lay knowledge, or even trade knowledge. Rather, the “common knowledge” that is authorized is what legal authorities believe everyone should know, despite any lay or trade knowledge individuals may have. This analysis demonstrates the need for further work on the ways in which knowledges are formed and authorized within law, with particular emphasis on documenting how a “responsibility to know” comes to be deployed beyond the state.

First Amendment absolutists and proponents of speech regulation are locked in a normative stalemate over the best way to diminish racial “hate speech.” I argue that this stalemate can be overcome by considering a more expansive theory of the “force of words” and the risks the right of free speech entails for individuals. Drawing on a cultural theory of symbolic power, I discuss the merits and limitations of two recent texts which redefine hate speech as discriminatory conduct. As an alternative to this strategy, I develop an analytical framework for describing the social risks the right of free speech entails, and propose juridical and deliberative-democratic remedies that might redistribute and attenuate these risks. Cultural and legal theory can find common ground in the analysis of the undemocratic effects of symbolic power. Such common ground can be achieved if legal theorists consider the force of words as a problem for democracy and if cultural theorists consider the resources provided by democratic institutions and practices for the redistribution of the social risks of speech.