In recent years, important indigenous parties have emerged for the first time in Latin American history. Although some analysts view this development with trepidation, this essay argues that the indigenous parties in Latin America are unlikely to exacerbate ethnic conflict or create the kinds of problems that have been associated with some ethnic parties in other regions. To the contrary, the emergence of major indigenous parties in Latin America may actually help deepen democracy in the region. These parties will certainly improve the representativeness of the party system in the countries where they arise. They should also increase political participation and reduce party system fragmentation and electoral volatility in indigenous areas. They may even increase the acceptance of democracy and reduce political violence in countries with large indigenous populations.

Since at least 2005, Mexico has confronted a severe security crisis that threatens to undermine its rule of law and democracy. An effective police response has been hindered by frustrated citizens who do not report crime, come forward with information, serve as witnesses, or support their police. This foments a vicious cycle whereby insecurity and corruption foster dissatisfaction, which yields further insecurity and corruption. Breaking this cycle requires a better understanding of why citizens are dissatisfied with their police. One view holds that discontent is due to police corruption, but a somewhat rival perspective contends that citizens are primarily concerned with security outcomes. This study uses comparative survey data from 14 major Mexican cities to test these potentially rival approaches. It finds that both corruption and security outcomes matter, but direct experience with bribery has the single largest impact on dissatisfaction with the police.

What explains the remarkable resilience of pension regulation in postauthoritarian Chile, even after decades of majoritarian voter discontent and growing international and domestic criticism of Pinochet’s pioneering private capitalization system? This puzzling outcome can be understood only by looking at the combined effect of the pension industry’s long-term power-building investments and its short-term political actions to outmaneuver state and societal challengers. Engaging new theoretical developments in political economy and historical institutionalism, this study examines the long-term process by which the previously nonexistent Chilean pension industry expanded and leveraged its power during key episodes of open contestation. The analysis of pension regulation in Chile between the 1980s and the 2010s illustrates the importance of placing business power in time, motivating new rounds of theory building in the quest to address the perennial question of how business gets what it wants in the political arena.

This article argues that the common narrative of a Bolivian backlash against neoliberalism should be reconsidered in light of the continuities and mutual constraints between popular mobilization and neoliberal policy reforms. The study draws on literature that conceptualizes neoliberalism as a particular construction of state and social forms; but unlike those works, it includes an analysis of International Monetary Fund policy shifts to understand how popular mobilization constrains policy implementation. Responding to popular mobilization between 1985 and 2006, the IMF came to accept divergence from orthodox policy in order to encourage political stability. The government of Evo Morales and the IMF are mutually constrained by concern for the investment climate. This study further advocates that analysts probe beyond simple binary divisions between “neoliberalism” and “alternatives” and look more seriously for pragmatic strategies for negotiating neoliberal spaces.

One of the most important developments in Latin America since the end of World War II, has been the rapid growth of all major cities, generally at a pace well beyond the rate of growth of the rural areas as well as the countries as a whole. The expansion due to normal growth (high birth rates coupled with declining death rates and increased longevity) is at times high. However, such growth has often been augumented sharply due to a seemingly irreversible flow of migrants from the rural areas. And among the many problems and difficulties raised by such migration, the very large squatter shantytowns are perhaps the most obvious as well as the most misunderstood developments that have resulted. Both popular journalists and academic social scientists have commented at length and in lurid terms about the "belts of mushrooming misery" and the "festering sores" which these squatter settlements supposedly comprise.

The debate over presidential reelection reappeared in Latin America in the last decade, and promises to continue in the years ahead. Arguments in favor contend that the possibility of immediate reelection increases politicians' responsiveness to citizen demands and allows voters the freedom to retain popular incumbents. Arguments against emphasize the danger of abuse of power by incumbents who seek to prolong their tenure. This article illustrates the parallels between these arguments and those made historically regarding the issue. It also suggests that the means by which provisions to allow reelection are adopted can provide valuable signals of their consequences.

Analysts agree that political corruption is an obstacle to democratic consolidation but disagree about how to measure the extent of corruption in individual nations. This analysis of the Central American countries demonstrates that the most important competing quantitative measures of political corruption produce strikingly different rankings. These contradictory results are caused less by poor measurement techniques than by the existence of two different dimensions of corruption that do not always coincide. Statistical indicators based on expert perceptions of corruption and alternative indicators based on ordinary citizens' firsthand experiences with bribery measure, respectively, grand corruption by senior officials and petty corruption by lower-level functionaries. This study attempts to explain why several Central American nations suffer primarily from one or the other rather than both. It advances recommendations for future research and future anticorruption policies that may be applied to Latin America as a whole.

Most accounts of the turmoil that shook Argentina in 2001–2 focused on the harmful impact of the financial environment, imprudent policymaking, and institutional weaknesses. These explanations paid little attention to the cultural frames and cognitive patterns that underlie the connection between civil society and political society. Based on a discourse analysis of Internet forums and presidential speeches, this article argues that the Argentine crisis cannot be fully grasped without considering the link between collective behavior and ingrained conceptions of national identity. The analysis finds that national myths and definitional questions of national purpose are key factors in the way citizens behave in the context of an economic and political crisis.

This article shows that the institutional design of Argentine federalism allows for differences in the protective scope of the provincial domestic violence laws. It holds that the broad legislative capacities of subnational districts enable the working of political and social local factors, which, in turn, determine heterogeneity in these laws’ protective scope. It analyzes, compares, and measures 37 laws on domestic violence sanctioned between 1992 and 2009. It advances a methodology to measure their differences and it evaluates the impact local factors have on legal variations across jurisdictions. The article shows that the protective scope of these laws is determined by the intensity of the local electoral competition and by the strength of women's organizational capacity. Results also show that time matters insofar as it allows for the diffusion of more protective laws.

The literature studying the behavioral effects of political corruption is rapidly growing. While some studies explore the contextual and institutional factors that can neutralize the effects of corruption, this article addresses a different mechanism for weak electoral accountability for corruption: citizen (de)mobilization. It uses a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative AmericasBarometer survey in Colombia to isolate the causal effect of political corruption on electoral participation. The results suggest that receiving credible information about the corrupt behavior of politicians running for office decreases the likelihood of participation in elections. It also shows that corruption demobilizes voters even when corrupt politicians are able to provide public works to their constituencies, which casts doubt on the idea that citizens exchange integrity for favorable policy outcomes.

In recent years, a violent social and political upheaval has been underway in Central America. A revolutionary regime has taken power in Nicaragua, and leftist guerrilla forces have begun to threaten the survival of the existing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala. Geographically surrounded by these three politically unstable countries, Honduras, in contrast, has remained remarkably free of serious internal revolutionary pressures. Although Honduras shares many of the problems of poverty, inequality, dependency, and authoritarian tradition that are associated with its neighbors, Honduran authorities have managed to maintain political order.

In a global context in which authoritarian regimes often hold elections, defeating dictators at the polls can play a key role in transitions to democracy. When the opposition is allowed to campaign for votes in such elections, there are strong reasons to believe that its efforts will be more persuasive than those of the authoritarian incumbent. This article examines the effect of televised campaign advertising on vote choice in the 1988 plebiscite that inaugurated Chile's transition to democracy. Using matching to analyze postelectoral survey data, it shows that the advertising of the opposition's no campaign made Chileans more likely to vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet, whereas the advertising of the government's yes campaign had no discernible effect. These findings suggest that the no campaign played an important causal role in the change of political regime.

Even a cursory review of recent writings on Latin American politics suggests an inclination by many to have done once and for all with the concept of populism. Either it is defined so broadly as to be useless or is relegated to a historical era presumably never again to be seen in the region. Yet the term shows a vitality and stubborn resilience in refusing to disappear, notwithstanding periodic revisions and redefinitions. This is scarcely unique to Latin Americanists. As a pair of European authorities contended more generally:

This essay argues that Manuel Castells’s explorations of networks and the emergent network society in his recent trilogy The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture may offer useful clues to recent religious developments in Latin America. In this regard, Pentecostalism, by adopting a logic of horizontal integration, rapid response, and flexible production, might be more successful than the Catholic Church in attracting followers.

This article argues that Spain has been the driving external force in the advancement of LGBT rights in Latin America, from marriage in Argentina to the regional recognition of “sexual diversity rights” as human rights. Acting as “norm entrepreneurs,” Spanish activists and organizations, relying on development aid, have promoted their perspectives through two approaches: strategic consulting and resource transfer. Their diffusion is illustrated primarily by the Argentine case. There, activists underwritten by Spanish resources have borrowed Spanish strategies to achieve “the same rights with the same names.” Besides broadening our understanding of the struggle for LGBT equality in Latin America, this article deepens the explanation of norm diffusion, focusing on emergence. In this stage, specific individuals and organizations deliberately select appropriate “targets” for and moments of intervention. But norm “receptors” must also be ready for action.

The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.

Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

Federalism has increasingly shaped Brazilian politics in the 1990s. Because the military regime of 1964 to 1985 heavily centralized government in Brasília, civilian political forces since 1985, in reaction, have expanded decentralization in the name of representation and participation. Institutional reforms, free-market (“neoliberal”) policies, and privatizations since 1990 have moved the country away from the legacy of statist authoritarian rule. The executive has lost power to the legislative and judicial branches, the union to states and municipalities, and the state to society, private enterprise, and market forces. The Constitution of 1988 recognized the local government units called municípios (loosely, municipalities) as component parts of the federation and shifted considerable political power and tax resources from the federal government to the states and municipalities (Selcher 1989).