Chile's 1989 constitutional reforms constituted a trade-off: the military gave up protected democracy provisions but acquired greater autonomy. The democratic opposition could accept or reject, but not modify, constitutional changes proposed by the outgoing dictatorship. This study addresses a very limited time period in the transition to democracy: the moment after the transition has been secured and transitional rules have been established. The dynamics of this period differ markedly from those in the larger democratic transition. The approach in this study complements alternative explanations of why the 1989 reforms benefited the outgoing dictatorship more than the incoming democratic government. Although the outgoing regime granted several opposition demands by reducing restrictions on political pluralism and eliminating barriers to political party activity, it also secured provisions that made the military more independent of civilian authorities than originally conceived in the 1980 Constitution.

The historical Chagres River Basin, which serves as the basin for the Panama Canal, extends some 3,260 kilometers in length and is not only the most important river basin in Panama but also one of the most strategic river basins in the world. Its two major lakes — Gatún and Alhajuela — function as reservoirs for the water needed to operate the inter-oceanic canal as well as to supply the water requirements of both Panamá City and Colón, urban concentrations that contain more than half the country's population.

Gatún Lake was created in 1913, when the Chagres River was closed off at its Atlantic outlet, while the Alhajuela was created in 1934 by damming up the Madden River in the high, mountainous part of the country.

Structural reforms, institutional arrangements, and the dominant mode of political party-base linkage all militate against effective popular participation in Chilean local democracy. Structural reforms have constrained local leaders' resources as well as their policymaking prerogatives; institutional arrangements limit public officials' accountability to their constituents and citizens' opportunities for input in decisionmaking. The parties of the center-left Concertación have reinforced this vicious cycle by pursuing a mode of linkage with civil society designed to promote their electoral success with only minimal organization and participation by their grassroots constituents. Such conditions fit well with the desire of elites of the Concertación and the right to depoliticize civil society in order to preserve macroeconomic and political stability. Yet they leave in doubt the efficacy of popular participation and the strength of local democracy in Chile.

This article outlines the factors that explain changes in the rules of the game in Chile after the restoration of democracy in 1990. It looks particularly at the reasons why the right-wing parties—strong defenders of the constitution imposed by General Augusto Pinochet in 1980—accepted reforms that eliminated many of what the literature has termed authoritarian enclaves. The article explains this shift by observing significant changes in the political context that, in turn, affected the priorities of veto players. In this context, short-term strategic calculations by the right-wing parties, aiming to achieve a new balance of power less detrimental to their interests, opened a window of opportunity that led to congressional approval of important reforms. Particular institutional features of the Chilean political system—party discipline and a balance of power in favor of the executive—also helped the political actors to reach agreement.

The integration process as developed in MERCOSUR has been largely a success, albeit led (and often aggravated) by Brazil. Three cases illustrate Brazil’s dominant role: the dispute over the automobile regime that began in 1995, the import-financing conflict of 1997, and the recent negotiations over the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Brazil’s behavior pattern does not threaten MERCOSUR’s stability, however, or the all-but-irreversible progress of regional integration.

Latin Americans have been voting for a surprisingly large number of ex-presidents and newcomers in presidential elections since the late 1980s. This article looks at both the demand and supply sides of this phenomenon by focusing on economic anxieties and party crises as the key independent variables. Sometimes the relationship between these variables is linear: economic anxieties combined with party crises lead to rising ex-presidents and newcomers. At other times the relationship is symbiotic: the rise of ex-presidents leads to party crises, economic and political anxieties, and thus the rise of newcomers. This article concludes that the abundance of ex-presidents and newcomers in elections—essentially, the new face of Latin America's caudillismo—does not bode well for democracy because it accelerates de-institutionalization and polarizes the electorate.

This article evaluates the effectiveness of OAS mechanisms for safeguarding democracy through multilateral diplomacy, what some scholars have dubbed the interamerican defense of democracy regime. Drawing on a range of international relations theories, this study derives competing hypotheses about member states' responses to democratic crises in the Americas. It then analyzes all instances in which a collective response—that is, an application of Resolution 1080 or the Inter-American Democratic Charter—was debated in the OAS between 1991 and 2002. Patterns of state behavior suggest that domestic politics, rather than the structural or systemic traits of the interamerican system, best explain foreign policy responses to crises of democracy in the region. The OAS record in confronting such crises is uneven.

This article investigates the performance of the new democracies of the third wave by developing a conceptual model of the core elements of liberal democratic government and by constructing a new Database of Liberal Democratic Performance. The performance is shown to be uneven in two main ways. First, the institutional attributes of democratic government advance while individual and minority rights languish. Second, particular institutional attributes coexist uncomfortably, as do particular rights. A comparison of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala complements the big picture drawn from the database and focuses on the specific contextual conditions that can create the general political contours of the wave. The uneven democratic performance of these cases is mainly explained by the combination of persistent oligarchic power and a largely unaccountable military. Yet uneven performance, and the imperfect rule of law in particular, does not necessarily prevent democratic survival.

A great many of the political initiatives of Mexico's President Echeverría were responses to stimuli generated directly by the university community's behavior during the 1968 student government crisis. Prior to this 1968 confrontation, student activism had a marginal “nuisance effect”; since then, however, it has risen to political prominence in Mexico.

The following discussion focuses on establishing a casual relationship between student protest and Echeverría's reformism. It will begin with a possible framework for the student protest movement within the national political context in terms of structural-functional concepts. To that part pertains also the section dealing with protagonists' tactics in the confrontation—i.e., principal student measures to organize, communicate demands and mobilize support, and the government countermeasures aimed at discrediting the students' protest and reducing the effectiveness of their dissent. Issues concerning the link between the 1968 events and the reform policies of the Echeverría administration will be noted.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR), the Latin American church's largest and most dynamic lay movement, demands scholarly attention for its extraordinary appeal among Catholic laity and its unanimous approval by national episcopacies. If the church is finally using mass media and other Protestant techniques for evangelization, it is because of the Charismatics, whose missionary zeal rivals that of their chief competitors, the Pentecostals. This study uses the tools of religious economy to analyze the reasons for the Renewal's rapid growth and acceptance. In attempting to explicate the CCR's success, the study also examines the major ecclesial trends during the movement's three decades in Latin America.

The objective of this article is to explain the territorial variation in indigenous political representation at the subnational level in Peru. The Peruvian state introduced a weak indigenous electoral quota, and its effects have varied across provinces. This article presents a typology that combines descriptive and substantive dimensions of political representation. Using a subnational comparative method, the four cases studied illustrate distinct dynamics. The article argues that these differing dynamics are explained by a combination of sociostructural variables (i.e., political articulation and cohesion of indigenous organizations as a result of a conflict) and individual variables (i.e., candidates’ political capital). This article demonstrates how, even in an institutionally adverse environment that does not feature ethnic parties, both descriptive and substantive indigenous political representation can be achieved, and that these two dimensions are not necessarily related. The article is based on fieldwork and interviews with key provincial political actors.

In the United States there is a constant preoccupation with the qualitative aspects of our educational system. This occurs in a nation where over 98 per cent of all children between the ages of seven and fourteen are attending school and where over 95 per cent of all inhabitants are considered literate. Thus, in terms of literacy and level of education, the United States is classified as highly advanced. Not so fortunate are the developing nations of the world.

Latin America, as a major world region, is classified as underdeveloped and shares many of the economic and social misfortunes which plague that sector of the world's populace. Within Latin America there is a wide diversity of educational attainment. Although seven nations may be classified as advanced or moderately advanced, these represent less than one quarter of the region's population. The vast majority are less advantaged and among these are the inhabitants of Guatemala. Less than one quarter of its children between the ages of seven and fourteen attend school; less than 30 per cent over ten years of age are considered literate.

This article argues that social democratic and orthodox Marxist conceptualizations of politics are unable to “engage in solidarity” with many new forms of Latin American popular politics. Such movements challenge the politics of representation, the market economy, and the state form by reinventing territorialized experiments in self-government, which politicize place, subjectivities, and social relations. Developing a critique of these frameworks of political analysis, this article argues that conceptual categories combining the insights of autonomist or open Marxism and poststructuralism and the critical reflections and theorizations by Latin America's newest social movements enable a deeper engagement with such movements. This critique challenges academics committed to progressive social change to reexamine long-held notions about the nature and agents of social transformation and the epistemological categories that orient our research. It argues that if we fail to do this, then we risk becoming gatekeepers of the status quo.

The relations between Argentina and the United States have been characterized by long periods of distrust and mutual hostility alternating with relatively brief intervals of rapprochement and collaboration. This pattern of habitual antagonism followed by sporadic reconciliation has turned the Argentine-US relationship into a peculiar case of rivalry in the interamerican scene. However, there has never been a period such as the one between 1980 and 1989, in which the bilateral relations fluctuated so widely between conflict and harmony.

From one of the poorest countries in Europe in the late 1950s, Spain emerged as a middle industrial power by the time of the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975. Subsequently, under the leadership of King Juan Carlos I, Franco's successor as chief of state, Spain negotiated a smooth transition from authoritarianism to a parliamentary-monarchy. On the first of January 1986, the Iberian nation acceded to full membership in the European Community (EC). However, prior to this date and independently of the EC (now the European Union), the Spanish state had already set in motion, in 1981, two great undertakings related to Latin America: (1) the commemoration of Columbus' fateful voyage to the New World in 1492 and (2) the formation of an “Iberoamerican Community of Nations.”

The rise of leftist governments in the Americas and the adoption of policy initiatives contrary to U.S. interests highlight a disconnect in interamerican relations, which cannot be understood simply as U.S. “neglect” of Latin America. In contrast to arguments that attribute the deteriorating relations to U.S. preoccupation with the Middle East, the article examines whether the “War on Terror” acted as a guiding paradigm for the George W. Bush administration in Latin America. Opposition to this “War on Terror” paradigm was evident following Colombia's 2008 air strike in Ecuador. Justified as a preemptive strike against a terrorist threat, Colombia's action met regional condemnation. The article argues that this Colombia-Latin America division reflects a larger geostrategic disconnect, whereby the “War on Terror” is challenged, causing the increasing marginalization of Washington and resistance to U.S. policy.

In his insightful book On the Law of Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan states that international law “is not higher law or better law; it is existing law. It is not a law that eschews force; such a view is alien to the very idea of law. Often as not it is the law of the victor; but it is law withal and does evolve” (Moynihan 1990, 19).

The Aylwin and Frei administrations have taken a cautious approach in formulating economic policies. This article analyzes how they have maintained economic stability, fueled sustained growth, and coped with inflows of foreign capital. While achieving successes in macroeconomic policy, export development, and poverty alleviation, Chile also faces challenges, including high social inequality and the increasing difficulty of dealing with the effects of financial globalization.

Democratic transitions create an opportunity for elected officials to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and create institutions that permanently shift power away from the military. This article develops a theoretical argument about how civilian control- is established. Venezuela institutionalized weak civilian control in the wake of its 1958 democratic transition, allowing the regime to survive the 1992 coup attempts. Argentina moved close to strong civilian control by 1995, although such control is exercised through questionable institutional channels.