The scope and intensity of political violence in a democratizing society are influenced particularly by regional opportunities arising from state weakness that favor the formation of coalitions against the state. The illicit market for coca in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley fostered a tactical alliance between Shining Path guerrillas and coca producers that funded Shining Path’s national presence. Falling coca prices in the 1990s, combined with key state-strengthening measures under the Fujimori government, destroyed that relationship and weakened the‘ guerrilla organization.

This article explores the role of environmental concerns in free trade areas made up entirely of developing countries. It surveys the environmental institutions of Mercosur, the Common Market of South America, and its member states. It also presents a case study of the recently terminated negotiations over a regional environmental legal instrument as an example of collective environmental decisionmaking. The article concludes that all the environmental components of the agreement are weak, and have even been downgraded in recent years. Even so, national environmental protections have increased during the years of the Mercosur agreement, and some regional actors are poised to join their northern counterparts in opposition to any potential free trade area of the Americas that does not include environmental provisions.

The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) redistributed a surprising amount of land to Brazil's landless. Assessing that reform, this study argues that an adequate appreciation of land redistribution must transcend the debate about the number of beneficiaries and place the reform in the larger context of state policies toward land and agriculture. It then asks to what extent such policies under Cardoso represented the dismantling of past state practices in the countryside. Although the Cardoso administration enacted some significant and democratizing changes, it missed other opportunities to benefit the rural poor, and its policies essentially maintained the agricultural model of the past two decades.

Unlike indigenous social movements in several other Latin American countries, Mayan movements in Guatemala have not formed a viable indigenous-based political party. Despite the prominence of the Mayan social movement and a relatively open institutional environment conducive to party formation, indigenous groups have foregone a national political party in favor of a more dispersed pattern of political mobilization at the local level. This article argues that the availability of avenues for political representation at the municipal level, through both traditional political parties and civic committees, and the effects of political repression and violence have reinforced the fragmentation and localism of indigenous social movements in Guatemala and prevented the emergence of a viable Mayan political party. The result has been a pattern of uneven political representation, with indigenous Guatemalans gaining representation in local government while national political institutions remain exclusionary.

Transnationalism has made significant contributions to the study of immigration, but it has failed to recognize the importance of the multiethnic, multicultural context of host societies in the construction of immigrants’ identities. Two Peruvian Catholic religious brotherhoods in Paterson, New Jersey, illustrate individual and collective identities that transcend traditional notions of nationality through complex relations with Latino immigrants from other nations. Religion contributes to the articulation of a pan-Latino identity in the host society.

Guyana has become the second “socialist” republic in the Western Hemisphere after Cuba. The history of how this occurred is an almost classic example of the futility of inept intervention by outside great powers. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, brought to office in 1965 by Anglo-American intervention that ousted Marxist Cheddi Jagan from power, has turned Guyana from a safe U.S. client committed to a capitalistic economic model into a strident anti-American bastion on the South American mainland, with a politicoeconomic system in theory and increasingly in practice inspired by Marxism-Leninism. The Burnham regime has nationalized all significant foreign firms, declared itself a cooperative socialist republic, and has forged close collaborative links with Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and such left-oriented African countries as Tanzania, Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique.

In the life of Latin American cities the rapid expansion of slum neighborhoods has emerged as a compelling problem. The inability of city authorities to provide adequate and inexpensive housing for rural-to-urban migrants, as well as for those economically poor persons born and raised in the city, has clashed with the tremendous growth of the population and its drive toward urbanization. The impoverished families must settle wherever they can. Scattered throughout Mexico City, for instance, on vacant lots adjoining factories or on the periphery of the metropolitan area are shack homes built of miscellaneous materials, known as jacales, or the rows of single-story concrete, brick, or adobe dwellings called vecindades. Beyond Mexico City, there are the villas miserias of Buenos Aires, the favelas on the rocky promontories of Rio de Janeiro, the barrios clandestinos of Bogotá, the barriadasmarginales of Lima, the ranchos of Caracas, and the callampas (mushrooms) of Santiago.

The central question of this article is why indigenous social movements formed electorally viable political parties in Latin America in the 1990s. This development represents a new phenomenon in Latin America, where ethnic parties have been both rare and unpopular among voters. Institutional reforms in six South American countries are examined to see if the creation and success of these parties can be correlated with changes in electoral systems, political party registration requirements, or the administrative structure of the state. The study concludes that institutional change is likely to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence and electoral viability of ethnic parties.

The results of a survey of 311 members of voluntary associations in São Paulo and Belo Horizonte suggest that members of voluntary associations incorporate the values introduced by social movements during the democratization process: they claim organizational autonomy from the state, and they defend more participatory forms of decisionmaking. These findings are important for the debate between democratic consolidation and delegative democracy. Democratization might benefit from the incorporation of these actors into new participatory designs.

US Chief Executive Ronald Reagan Declared WAR on drugs in February 1982, and pledged his administration to the task of curtailing the burgeoning drug epidemic in the United States. To accomplish this urgent “national security” objective, the federal government rapidly increased expenditures for narcotics control programs during the ensuing seven years of his two-term presidency, reaching $4.3 billion annually in 1988. Enthusiastically backing the president's initiative, the US Congress approved tougher national drug legislation, widened the US military's involvement in the war, supported the administration's drive to intensify interdiction efforts along US borders, and expanded USdesigned eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement programs in foreign source and transit countries. First Lady Nancy Reagan launched her “Just Say No” campaign, flooding the American educational system and the public media with anti-drug messages. Ostensibly, all sectors of American society enlisted in the war on drugs and the country began mobilizing for battle.

It was hardly surprising that the December 1989 US intervention in Panama received strong public support. General Manuel Antonio Noriega had replaced Muammar al Qadaffi and the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the foreign leader the US public most loved to hate. In addition, the Bush administration was quickly able to proclaim its intervention in Panama a virtually unqualified success, confidently asserting that the stated goals of protecting US lives, capturing General Manuel Antonio Noreiga and sending him to the United States for trial, defending the Panama Canal Treaties, and “restoring democracy” to Panama had all been met (Christian Science Monitor, 1990). The US military is involved in helping form the new “Panamanian Public Force” (PPF) to replace General Noriega's Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and US advisors are working to rebuild the economy.

Theories of the rise of the modern state hold that central rulers make land property “legible” to extract revenue, leading landholders to oppose state registration. This study revises this logic and argues that when land ownership is disputed, landholders use inscription into state records to secure legal property rights. To minimize resulting tax liabilities, propertied interests may exploit opportunities to manipulate land valuations, which determine the tax burden. The argument is substantiated using historical tax and cadastral records from Colombia. Difference-in-differences analyses of two critical attempts at land reform, led by the Liberal Party, show that land property registration spiked disproportionately in threatened Conservative municipalities, where tax revenues lagged behind nonetheless, due to systematic undervaluation of property. The study concludes that landholders’ selective subversion of state building may disrupt the assumed link between legibility and taxation and spawn territorially uneven patterns of state capacity that mirror domestic conflict lines.

The Latin American military is a complex institution in a complex society. It probably has always been, but in the past the dynamics acting upon the change versus order equation have allowed new structural relationships to be worked out over extended periods of time, relatively free from ideological passions and exogenous influences. That time has passed. Probably in no other region of the world are military establishments undergoing the degree of institutional selfexamination and mission redefinition as are the armies of Latin America today. They have neither the development-oriented self-confidence of the armies of the “new” nations, nor the threat-oriented Weltanschauung of the military in the established countries. Previously acceptable roles—as moderators in the political process or guarantors of their own image of the country's traditions—are under examination not only in the society at large but in the heart of the military institutions.

For the past 30 years, Chilean unionism has been shrinking. Through a comparison of the membership trajectories of 26 unions in two firms between 1990 and 2004, this article explains why some unions defied this trend and how their success affected overall union density in their firms. It argues that the unions that experienced the most favorable membership outcomes were those that, at key junctures of firm restructuring, earliest or most aggressively established a partnership relationship with management. However, in a context of great labor weakness, these cases of union accommodation took the form of exclusive patron-client exchanges, which exacerbated collective action problems and further eroded union density.

Over the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.

This article examines the challenges and opportunities of indigenous justice for women in Ecuador. The legal recognition of indigenous justice is a major component of democratization in the region. Yet it also raises the risk of institutionalizing detrimental gender biases within indigenous forms of law. Taking the Remache case as a point of departure, this article identifies some of the fault lines in legal pluralism and women's conflicted relationship with it. Rather than rejecting customary law, however, women advocate for their rights within it—lobbying for gender parity within indigenous justice in the 2008 Constitutional Assembly. As women's support for indigenous justice relocates legal authority, it also challenges conventional practices of state sovereignty. To understand the attractiveness of legal pluralism for women and its impact on the state, this study explores the confines of feminist alliances, the accessibility of indigenous justice, and its implications for state sovereignty.

Although there is a substantial literature examining public confidence in the judiciary in developed nations, scholars have paid scant attention to analyzing judicial confidence in developing countries. Building on extant work regarding developed nations and introducing original hypotheses in the context of developing nations, this research explains influences on public confidence in Latin American judiciaries by developing a theory that focuses on the potential influences of institutional quality, experiences, and individual attitudes. The hypotheses are empirically tested with the rich individual-level data compiled by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006 survey. The results indicate that a variety of factors influence public confidence in Latin American courts; the role of context explains points of consistency and divergence with research on developed nations.

Mercosur has survived several crises by resorting to presidential diplomacy, but it risks becoming an empty shell unless member states work to coordinate macroeconomic policies. Its survival depends on the outcome of domestic political struggles in Brazil and Argentina and on the harmonization of exchange-rate policies between the two countries. This article examines the Argentine-Brazilian “trade wars” provoked by successive devaluations of the Brazilian currency, aggravated in 2001 by the Argentine economic crisis. The social explosion in Argentina in December 2001 showed that domestic actors can successfully challenge proglobalization policies. To consolidate, Mercosur will have to address the democratic deficit while building supranational institutions and an effective dispute-settlement system.

This article explores practices of political clientelism in a native village in Mexico City during recent elections (2006, 2012), aiming to create more conceptual clarity and to demonstrate the usefulness of ethnographic approaches. Seen from the clients' and the brokers' perspective, political clientelism and vote buying are two different practices, carried out in different ways, with different degrees of legitimacy. The problem-solving network studied here bridges the gap between the citizen and the state, while the political operators hope to be rewarded with public employment. In this case, one candidate-patron changed parties a few months before the 2012 elections, and the electoral statistics provide indications of the numerical effectiveness of his clientelist network. Multiparty competition, instead of undermining clientelist practices, appears to “democratize” them.

In May 1996 Brazil's National Confederation of Industry (CNI) convened a meeting of industrialists in Brasilia for a mass show of unity and focused lobbying in favor of constitutional reform. Industrialists large and small heeded the call. Nearly three thousand of them from all over Brazil chartered planes and packed shuttles. Fortified by a morning of speeches demanding constitutional reforms, the industrialists fanned out over Brasilia in the afternoon to argue their case to members of the national congress. As if to demonstrate that it could not be intimidated, however, Congress chose that very afternoon to vote down a reform proposal backed by business. By the end of that year, it was clear that business had made little progress in pushing several amendments it supported.