This paper traces interpersonal utility comparisons and bargaining in the work of John Harsanyi from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. As his preoccupation with how theorists can obtain information about agents moved from an approach centered on empathetic understanding to the more distanced perspective associated with game theory, Harsanyi shifted emphasis from the social scientist’s lack of information vis-à-vis agents to agents’ lack of information about each other. In the process, he provided economists with an analytical framework they could use to study problems related to the distribution of information among agents while consolidating the perspective of a distant observer whose knowledge can replace that of real people.

In this article we analyze Edwin Walter Kemmerer’s contribution to the creation of the Federal Reserve System. Firstly, we contrast Kemmerer’s role in the transition from the Aldrich banking reform plan to the Glass–Owen plan with those of A. Piatt Andrew (who was Aldrich’s main advisor), H. Parker Willis (i.e., Carter Glass’s advisor), and J.L. Laughlin (who was Willis’ mentor). Secondly, we deal with theoretical questions posed by Kemmerer, who, as we assert, developed his own banking reform plan. Even if his proposals were not immediately taken into account in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, he contributes to the institutional structure of the Federal Reserve System.

In 1883 Henry Sidgwick complained that, with the recent undermining of the authority of political economy, “utterances of dissent from economic orthodoxy” could obtain a ready hearing. This was of particular concern to those writing and teaching on political economy at Cambridge University. As Henry Dunning Macleod was one of the dissenters named by Sidgwick, it appears odd that Macleod was also recognized as a lecturer in political economy at Cambridge between the late 1870s and mid-1880s. This article examines that peculiar occurrence, showing how Macleod exploited the struggle between reformers and conservatives over teaching reform in the university.

The author's path from heterodoxy to economic history to the history of economics is used as a case study to explore tensions between “doing economics” and “doing the history of economics,” between the ideological vision (Schumpeter) motivating a research agenda and the even-handed execution of research. These same tensions appear in the history of capital controversy, which contains deep questions of history and path dependence versus equilibrium models, limitations of aggregate production functions, and the roles of vision and ideology in the reluctance to abandon insights of one-commodity models when results are not robust.

The article contrasts an intellectual history perspective on the transition from classical to neo-classical economics with doctrinal accounts of the marginal revolution. Marshall’s opinions on the mixture of theoretical, methodological, and moral and political elements involved in the generational divide shows that more was at stake than accounts in which theory alone is stressed suggest. It is also argued that in other respects less was at stake: drawing a sharp dividing line between pre- and post-marginal treatments of policy issues does not do justice to underlying continuities in the empirical utilitarian tradition. The article is dedicated to the memory of R. D. C. (Bob) Black, whose work on Jevons illustrates the benefits of an intellectual historian’s approach to this significant transition in economic thinking.

In this paper, we show that Paul Samuelson (1915–2009), renowned as one of the main advocates of the mathematization of economics, has also contributed to the change of the place of visual representation in the discipline. In his early works (e.g. Foundations of Economic Analysis published in 1947), he rejected diagrammatic analysis as a relevant tool of theorizing but used diagrams extensively, both as a pedagogic tool in his introductory textbook Economics (1948) and as a way of clarifying his theory of public expenditure (1954-5). We show that Samuelson’s reluctance to use diagrams in his early works can be explained by his training at Chicago and Harvard and his rejecting Marshall’s economics, whereas his adoption of visual language in Economics was a product of the peculiar context affecting American mass-education after WWII. A methodological debate which opposed him to Kenneth Boulding in 1948 led him to reconsider the place of visual representation in order to clarify conceptual controversies during subsequent debates on mathematical economics. Therefore, it can be said that the prominent place of visual language in the diffusion of economic ideas was stabilized in the mid-1950s, as mathematical language became the prevailing tool of economic theorizing. From this, we conclude that the idea that algebra simply upstaged geometry in the making of economic analysis must be qualified.

In his Nobel lecture, Friedman built on his earlier argument for a “natural rate of unemployment” by painting a picture of an economics profession which, as a result of foolish mistakes, had accepted the Phillips curve as offering a lasting trade-off between inflation and unemployment, and was thereby led to advocate a policy of inflation. It is argued here that, in fact, the orthodox economists of the time often did not accept Phillips’ analysis; almost no one made the mistakes in question; and very few advocated inflation on bases vulnerable to Friedman’s theoretical criticisms. The Phillips curve was put to various uses, but advocating inflation was hardly amongst them. It is suggested that one lasting result of the uncritical acceptance of Friedman’s history is to limit what appears to be within the reasonable range of views about macroeconomic policy.

This paper intends to provide a comprehensive and critical survey of the valuable but neglected contributions of Fritz Machlup to the debate on the Transfer Problem. Machlup took three different and conflicting lines of approach to the problem in the course of his lifelong study of it. The third, which is of a basically monetary character, provides original results, especially in relation to the demand-oriented and quantitative approach that dominates in the standard literature.

Oral history has always held a rather ambiguous position within the study of economics. While widely read and enjoyed, such interviews are secretly scorned, dismissed as merely a lightweight diversion. Yet, to conduct revealing and insightful work of this type is difficult, requiring a firm grasp of economics, especially individual contributions to the discipline. This article examines my own attempts to come to grips with the methodology and ideology of the Chicago School through a series of conversations with some nineteen of George Stigler’s contemporaries. Oral history, if skillfully conducted, can prove to be one of the more useful tools in recapturing and understanding the past history of economics as a fiercely fought over discipline.

The article contrasts an intellectual history perspective on the transition from classical to neo-classical economics with doctrinal accounts of the marginal revolution. Marshall's opinions on the mixture of theoretical, methodological, and moral and political elements involved in the generational divide shows that more was at stake than accounts in which theory alone is stressed suggest. It is also argued that in other respects less was at stake: drawing a sharp dividing line between pre- and post-marginal treatments of policy issues does not do justice to underlying continuities in the empirical utilitarian tradition. The article is dedicated to the memory of R. D. C. (Bob) Black, whose work on Jevons illustrates the benefits of an intellectual historian's approach to this significant transition in economic thinking.

Aleksander Bilimovich (1876–1963) is often considered to have been one of the last representatives of the Kiev School of economics, which was influenced by the German Historical School as well as by the emerging neoclassical theory. After the Soviet revolution, Bilimovich continued his work in exile and was developing his theoretical and methodological views along two lines of the Kiev tradition. On the one side he maintained the historical approach, and on the other side he was inclined towards the deductivist and mathematical approach. The paper thus questions the established view among the historians of Russian economic thought of Bilimovich as a consistent adherent of marginalism. His work bears also several features of historicism.

Before the emergence of the field of development economics in the mid-1940s, the mainstream of Western economists had very little to say about the world outside western Europe. However, perhaps due to Russia’s ambivalent location as a nation considered not fully European (nor completely Asiatic) and to her status as a major player in the international arena despite the fact of her modest economic achievements, from the eighteenth century onwards the “Russian case” called the attention of some of the most prominent Western minds, including the first economists. By discussing Russia’s economy, they came to notions and concepts regarding development and backwardness that, to a great extent. informed the twentieth-century debate. The aim of this article is to explore the way in which Russia as a case study affected the evolution of ideas on economic growth or development. The evidence of things Russian, it will be argued, raised doubts about common economic views, thus enabling new thinking that pointed either to criticism of liberal orthodoxy, or to expansion and refinement of its arguments.

It is well known that classical mechanics played a significant role in the thought of several major economists in the neoclassical tradition from the 1860s to the 1910s. Less well studied are the particular parts or features of mechanics that exercised this influence, or the depth and extent of the impact. After outlining the main traditions of mechanics and the calculus, and describing types of analogy between theories in general, I review some main pertinent features of the work of eight neoclassical economists from the 1830s to the 1910s. I argue that the influence took various forms but that in practice it was modest. Then I briefly describe a fresh set of possible influences with the development of dynamical systems in the period 1920–1950, where again the role of mechanics was limited. I end by raising a large question: does economics need some mathematics designed for its own purposes rather than that traditionally obtained by analogizing from mechanics and physics?

Why did classical utilitarian thinkers offer only a thin defense of the institution of private property? Utilitarians might have viewed such a defense as irrelevant, trivial, or impossible. A fourth hypothesis holds that utilitarians were ambivalent about the institution, itself. The utilitarians are clear on the relevance of a defense. Triviality would have to be based on 18th century philosophers and historians. Impossibility would raise serious questions about the utilitarian project. Ambivalence seems the most plausible explanation. Utilitarian writings throw considerable doubt on their own commitment to the strongest versions of the defense of private property.

This paper describes Gary Becker’s theoretical models of marriage. At the micro level, these are all rational choice models. At the market level, Becker offers two major types of models: partial equilibrium models based on price theory as taught by Marshall and Friedman; and optimal sorting models based on optimal assignment models. This paper examines some of the possible intellectual influences on Becker’s theory of marriage, compares Becker’s research on marriage with that of some scholars interested in intra-marriage distribution, and documents that Becker’s students at Chicago were more interested in Becker’s Friedmanian models of marriage than in his optimal assignment models.

Frank H. Knight held two different concepts of “uncertainty” in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). The first is based on the possibility of insuring against an outcome. This interpretation can be found in the existing literature on Knight’s work. The second refers to all instances where individuals have subjective expectations about the future. This second meaning forms the basis of Knight’s (1921) theory of profit and entrepreneurial action (Knight I). Knight I is limited; it provides no explanation of the incentive for entrepreneurial action. Knight’s neglected later theory of profit (1942) (Knight II) highlights the deficiencies of Knight I by offering a clear incentive for entrepreneurial action. The differences between the two theories of profit reflect the impact of incorporating historical time into economic analysis.

This article examines the literature on the periodical recurrence of economic crises up to the 1840s, illustrating how awareness of this phenomenon was far more widespread than the few existing histories of business cycle theories indicate, that observations of this phenomenon began much earlier than previously documented, and also that early writers were more interested in emphasizing the intermittent return of crises rather than their precise timing.

In this article, I argue that Adam Smith’s system of perfect liberty contains some of the seeds of perfect competition, but that the modern perfectly competitive model differs from Smith’s perfect liberty in some important respects—in particular, the role of active competition among firms and the role of the entrepreneur. The article examines the analytical linkages between Smith’s system of liberty and three strands of modern economic theory—neoclassical perfect competition, contestable market theory and the Austrian analysis of market process.

During August and September 1938, Harrod discussed a first draft of his “Essay in Dynamic Theory” with Keynes and Marschak. The aim of this paper is to discuss Harrod’s correspondence with Marschak in the light of the subsequent interpretations of the “Essay.” Firstly, we show how Marschak focused on some of the features of Harrod’s theory that would later give rise to widely different interpretations and some misunderstandings. Three issues in particular have been broadly debated in the literature: the concept of warranted rate of growth; instability; and non-linearity. Secondly, we show that a possible reason why Harrod neglected Marschak’s remarks lies in their respective methodological approaches. While Marschak tried to frame Harrod’s theory by means of a closed model, Harrod thought that the analysis of equilibrium and of the succession of states belonged to separate stages; this made building a complete model difficult at this stage, when he was presenting a “new tool of analysis.” In spite of their respective conflicting approaches, Marschak’s comments remain of great importance, and if Harrod had followed some of his advice, his theory would probably have improved in several respects, and certainly it would have been clearer and less ambiguous.

In this paper we address the subject of Keynes as a speculator. We look first at the primary sources of information, which are in the form of unpublished letters and broker’s statements. Secondly, we look at the theory Keynes sparingly presented in his writings, but which nevertheless is grounded on his first-hand knowledge of speculative behavior. Thirdly, we examine the focus on speculation in commodities, which had great weight in his portfolio, and have chosen a particular commodity -wheat- for our investigation. In particular, we examine some of Keynes’s dealings in wheat futures with the aim of shedding light on the underlying investment strategy.