Several definitions have been given to express an exact meaning corresponding to the intuitive idea of ‘effective calculability’ as applied for instance to functions of positive integers. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the computable functions introduced by the author are identical with the λ-definable functions of Church and the general recursive functions due to Herbrand and Gödel and developed by Kleene. It is shown that every λ-definable function is computable and that every computable function is general recursive. There is a modified form of λ-definability, known as λ-K-definability, and it turns out to be natural to put the proof that every λ-definable function is computable in the form of a proof that every λ-K-definable function is computable; that every λ-definable function is λ-K-definable is trivial. If these results are taken in conjunction with an already available proof that every general recursive function is λ-definable we shall have the required equivalence of computability with λ-definability and incidentally a new proof of the equivalence of λ-definability and λ-K-definability.

A definition of what is meant by a computable function cannot be given satisfactorily in a short space. I therefore refer the reader to Computable pp. 230–235 and p. 254. The proof that computability implies recursiveness requires no more knowledge of computable functions than the ideas underlying the definition: the technical details are recalled in §5.

We will study syntactical and semantical properties of propositional logics weaker than the intuitionistic, in which the contraction rule (or, the exchange rule or the weakening rule, in some cases) does not hold. Here, the contraction rule means the rule of inference of the form

if we formulate our logics in a Gentzen-type formal system. Some syntactical properties of these logics have been studied firstly by the second author in [11], in connection with the study of BCK-algebras (for information on BCK-algebras, see [9]). There, it turned out that such a syntactical method is a powerful and promising tool in studying BCK-algebras. Using this method, considerable progress has been made since then (see, e.g., [8], [18], [27]).

In this paper, we will study these logics more comprehensively. We notice here that the distributive law

does not hold necessarily in these logics. By adding some axioms (or initial sequents) and rules of inference to these basic logics, we can obtain a lot of interesting nonclassical logics such as Łukasiewicz's many-valued logics, relevant logics, the intuitionistic logic and logics related to BCK-algebras, which have been studied separately until now. Thus, our approach will give a uniform way of dealing with these logics. One of our two main tools in doing so is Gentzen-type formulation of logics in syntax, and the other is semantics defined by using partially ordered monoids.

In this paper, we are concerned with the arithmetical definability of certain notions of integers and rationals in terms of other notions. The results derived will be applied to obtain a negative solution of corresponding decision problems.

In Section 1, we show that addition of positive integers can be defined arithmetically in terms of multiplication and the unary operation of successor S (where Sa = a + 1). Also, it is shown that both addition and multiplication can be defined arithmetically in terms of successor and the relation of divisibility | (where x|y means x divides y).

“From two integers k, l one passes immediately to kl; this process leads in a few steps to numbers which are far larger than any occurring in experience, e.g., 67(257729).

Intuitionism, like ordinary mathematics, claims that this number can be represented by an arabic numeral. Could not one press further the criticism which intuitionism makes of existential assertions and raise the question: What does it mean to claim the existence of an arabic numeral for the foregoing number, since in practice we are not in a position to obtain it?

A proof of the (propositional) Craig interpolation theorem for cut-free sequent calculus yields that a sequent with a cut-free proof (or with a proof with cut-formulas of restricted form; in particular, with only analytic cuts) with k inferences has an interpolant whose circuit-size is at most k. We give a new proof of the interpolation theorem based on a communication complexity approach which allows a similar estimate for a larger class of proofs. We derive from it several corollaries:

1. (1) Feasible interpolation theorems for the following proof systems:

   1. (a) resolution

   2. (b) a subsystem of LK corresponding to the bounded arithmetic theory (α)

   3. (c) linear equational calculus

   4. (d) cutting planes.

2. (2) New proofs of the exponential lower bounds (for new formulas)

   1. (a) for resolution ([15])

   2. (b) for the cutting planes proof system with coefficients written in unary ([4]).

3. (3) An alternative proof of the independence result of [43] concerning the provability of circuit-size lower bounds in the bounded arithmetic theory (α).

In the other direction we show that a depth 2 subsystem of LK does not admit feasible monotone interpolation theorem (the so called Lyndon theorem), and that a feasible monotone interpolation theorem for the depth 1 subsystem of LK would yield new exponential lower bounds for resolution proofs of the weak pigeonhole principle.

The question of what constitutes fairness in betting quotients has been studied by Ramsey, deFinetti, and Shimony. Thanks to their combined efforts we now have a satisfactory definition of fairness.

On the other hand, the explication of the concept of degree of confirmation (inductive probability) has progressed rapidly in recent years, thanks primarily to Carnap. This explication has usually proceeded by laying down the axioms for frequency-probabilities, and elaborating on these. While in the case where a frequency interpretation is intended these axioms are clearly justified, in our case they have been laid down without any justification. Carnap's presentation has been criticized for just this reason.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the probability axioms are necessary and sufficient conditions to assure that the degrees of confirmation form a set of fair betting quotients. In addition it will be shown that one additional, highly controversial, axiom is precisely the condition needed to assure that not only deFinetti's weaker criterion but Shimony's criterion of fairness is also satisfied.

The theories considered here are based on the classical functional calculus (possibly of higher order) together with a set A of non-logical axioms; they are also assumed to contain classical first-order number theory. In foundational investigations it is customary to further restrict attention to the case that A is recursive, or at least recursively enumerable (an equivalent restriction, by [1]). For such axiomatic theories we have the well-known incompleteness phenomena discovered by Godei [6]. Quite far removed from such theories are those based on non-constructive sets of axioms, for example the set of all true sentences of first-order number theory. According to Tarski's theorem, there is not even an arithmetically definable set of axioms A which will give the same result (cf. [18] for exposition).

We extend in a natural way the operation of Turing machines to infinite ordinal time, and investigate the resulting supertask theory of computability and decidability on the reals. Every set. for example, is decidable by such machines, and the semi-decidable sets form a portion of the sets. Our oracle concept leads to a notion of relative computability for sets of reals and a rich degree structure, stratified by two natural jump operators.

Games of infinite length and perfect information have been studied for many years. There are numerous determinacy results for these games, and there is a wide body of work on consequences of their determinacy.

Except for games with very special payoff functions, games of infinite length and imperfect information have been little studied. In 1969, David Blackwell [1] introduced a class of such games and proved a determinacy theorem for a subclass. During the intervening time, there has not been much progress in proving the determinacy of Blackwell's games. Orkin [17] extended Blackwell's result to a slightly wider class. Blackwell [2] found a new proof of his own result. Maitra and Sudderth [9, 10] improved Blackwell's result in a different direction from that of Orkin and also generalized to the case of stochastic games. Recently Vervoort [18] has obtained a substantial improvement. Nevertheless, almost all the basic questions have remained open.

In this paper we associate with each Blackwell game a family of perfect information games, and we show that the (mixed strategy) determinacy of the former follows from the (pure strategy) determinacy of the latter. The complexity of the payoff function for the Blackwell game is approximately the same as the complexity of the payoff sets for the perfect information games. In particular, this means that the determinacy of Blackwell games with Borel measurable payoff functions follows from the known determinacy of perfect information games with Borel payoff sets.

If Σ is any standard formal system adequate for recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its Gödel number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula with Gödel number q is provable in Σ. Is this formula provable or independent in Σ? [2].

One approach to this problem is discussed by Kreisel in [4]. However, he still leaves open the question whether the formula (Ex)(x, a), with Gödel-number a, is provable or not. Here (x, y) is the number-theoretic predicate which expresses the proposition that x is the number of a formal proof of the formula with Gödel-number y.

In this note we present a solution of the previous problem with respect to the system Zμ [3] pp. 289–294, and, more generally, with respect to any system whose set of theorems is closed under the rules of inference of the first order predicate calculus, and satisfies the subsequent five conditions, and in which the function (k, l) used below is definable.

The notation and terminology is in the main that of [3] pp. 306–326, viz. if is a formula of Zμ containing no free variables, whose Gödel number is a, then ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, a) (read: the formula with Gödel number a is provable in Zμ); if is a formula of Zμ containing a free variable, y say, ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, g(y)}, where g(y) is a recursive function such that for an arbitrary numeral the value of g() is the Gödel number of the formula obtained from by substituting for y in throughout. We shall, however, depart trivially from [3] in writing (), where is an arbitrary numeral, for (Ex){x, ).

We shall say that a logic is “simply consistent” if there is no formula A such that both A and ∼ A are provable. “ω-consistent” will be used in the sense of Gödel. “General recursive” and “primitive recursive” will be used in the sense of Kleene, so that what Gödel calls “rekursiv” will be called “primitive recursive.” By an “Entscheidungsverfahren” will be meant a general recursive function ϕ(n) such that, if n is the Gödel number of a provable formula, ϕ(n) = 0 and, if n is not the Gödel number of a provable formula, ϕ(n) = 1. In specifying that ϕ must be general recursive we are following Church in identifying “general recursiveness” and “effective calculability.”

First, a modification is made in Gödel's proofs of his theorems, Satz VI (Gödel, p. 187—this is the theorem which states that ω-consistency implies the existence of undecidable propositions) and Satz XI (Gödel, p. 196—this is the theorem which states that simple consistency implies that the formula which states simple consistency is not provable). The modifications of the proofs make these theorems hold for a much more general class of logics. Then, by sacrificing some generality, it is proved that simple consistency implies the existence of undecidable propositions (a strengthening of Gödel's Satz VI and Kleene's Theorem XIII) and that simple consistency implies the non-existence of an Entscheidungsverfahren (a strengthening of the result in the last paragraph of Church).

Asymptotic extremal combinatorics deals with questions that in the language of model theory can be re-stated as follows. For finite models M, N of an universal theory without constants and function symbols (like graphs, digraphs or hypergraphs), let p(M, N) be the probability that a randomly chosen sub-model of N with ∣M∣ elements is isomorphic to M. Which asymptotic relations exist between the quantities p(M1,N),…, p(Mh,N), where M1,…, M1, are fixed “template” models and ∣N∣ grows to infinity?

In this paper we develop a formal calculus that captures many standard arguments in the area, both previously known and apparently new. We give the first application of this formalism by presenting a new simple proof of a result by Fisher about the minimal possible density of triangles in a graph with given edge density.

In what follows there is presented a unified semantic treatment of certain “paradox-free” systems of entailment, including Church's weak theory of implication (Church [7]) and logics akin to the systems E and R of Anderson and Belnap (Anderson [3], Belnap [6]). We shall refer to these systems generally as relevant logics.

The leading idea of the semantics is that just as in modal logic validity may be defined in terms of certain valuations on a binary relational structure so in relevant logics validity may be defined in terms of certain valuations on a semilattice—interpreted informally as the semilattice of possible pieces of information. Completeness theorems can be given relative to these semantics for the implicational fragments of relevant logics. The semantical viewpoint affords some insights into the structure of the systems—in particular light is thrown upon admissible modes of negation and on the assumptions underlying rejection of the “paradoxes of material implication”.

The systems discussed are formulated in fragments of a first-order language with → (entailment), &, ⋁, ¬,(x) and (∃x) primitive, omitting identity but including a denumerable list of propositional variables (p, q, r, p1,…etc.), and (for each n > 0), a denumerable list of n-ary predicate letters. The schematic letters A, B, C, D, A1,… are used on the meta-level as variables ranging over formulas. The conventions of Church [9] are followed in abbreviating formulas. The semantics of the systems are given in informal terms; it is an easy matter to turn the informal descriptions into formal set-theoretical definitions.

Let E be a set of expressions representing real, single valued, partially defined functions of one real variable. E* will be the set of functions represented by expressions in E.

If A is an expression in E, A(x) is the function denoted by A.

It is assumed that E* contains the identity function and the rational numbers as constant functions and that E* is closed under addition, subtraction, multiplication and composition.

To what extent can mathematical thought be analyzed in formal terms? Gödel's theorems show the inadequacy of single formal systems for this purpose, except in relatively restricted parts of mathematics. However at the same time they point to the possibility of systematically generating larger and larger systems whose acceptability is implicit in acceptance of the starting theory. The engines for that purpose are what have come to be called reflection principles. These may be iterated into the constructive transfinite, leading to what are called recursive progressions of theories. A number of informative technical results have been obtained about such progressions (cf. Feferman [1962], [1964], [1968] and Kreisel [1958], [1970]). However, for some years I had hoped to give a more realistic and perspicuous finite generation procedure. This was first done in a rather special way in Feferman [1979] for the characterization of predicativity, which may be regarded as that part of mathematical thought implicit in our acceptance of elementary number theory. What is presented here is a new and simple notion of the reflective closure of a schematic theory which can be applied quite generally.

Two examples of schematic theories in the sense used here are versions of Peano arithmetic and Zermelo set theory.

There is a distinction between semantical paradoxes on the one hand and logical or mathematical paradoxes on the other, going back to Ramsey [1925]. Those falling under the first heading have to do with such notions as truth, assertion (or proposition), definition, etc., while those falling under the second have to do with membership, class, relation, function (and derivative notions such as cardinal and ordinal number), etc. There are a number of compelling reasons for maintaining this separation but, as we shall see, there are also many close parallels from the logical point of view.

The initial solutions to the paradoxes on each side—namely Russell's theory of types for mathematics and Tarski's hierarchy of language levels for semantics— were early recognized to be excessively restrictive. The first really workable solution to the mathematical paradoxes was provided by Zermelo's theory of sets, subsequently improved by Fraenkel. The informal argument that the paradoxes are blocked in ZF is that its axioms are true in the cumulative hierarchy of sets where (i) unlike the theory of types, a set may have members of various (ordinal) levels, but (ii) as in the theory of types, the level of a set is greater than that of each of its members. Thus in ZF there is no set of all sets, nor any Russell set {x∣x∉x} (which would be universal since ∀x(x∉x) holds in ZF). Nor is there a set of all ordinal numbers (and so the Burali-Forti paradox is blocked).

Let C be the closure of a recursively enumerable set B under some relation R. Suppose there is a primitive recursive relation Q, such that Q is a symmetric subrelation of R (i.e. if Q(m, n), then Q(n, m) and R(m, n)), and such that, for each m ϵ B, Q(m, n) for infinitely many n. Then there exists a primitive recursive set A, such that C is the closure under R of A. For proof, note that , where f is a primitive recursive function which enumerates B, has the required properties. For each m ϵ B, there is an n ϵ A, such that Q(m, n) and hence Q(n, m); therefore the closure of A under Q, and hence that under R, includes B. Conversely, since Q is a subrelation of R, A is included in C. Finally, that A is primitive recursive follows from [2] p. 180.

This observation can be applied to many formal systems S, by letting R correspond to the relation of deducibility in S, so that R(m, n) if and only if m is the Gödel number of a formula of S, or of a sequence of formulas, from which, together with axioms of S, a formula with the Gödel number n can be obtained by applications of rules of inference of S.

It has been pointed out by Carnap that ‘probability’ is an equivocal term, which is used currently in two senses: (i) the degree to which it is rational to believe a hypothesis h on specified evidence e, and (ii) the relative frequency (in an indefinitely long run) of one property of events or things with respect to another. This paper is concerned only with the first of these two senses, which will be referred to as ‘the concept of confirmation,’ in order to avoid equivocation.

We may distinguish a quantitative and a comparative concept of confirmation. The general form of statements involving the former is

The degree of confirmation of the proposition h, given the proposition

e as evidence, is r (where r is a real number between 0 and 1).

In this paper the notation for a statement of this form is

The general form of statements involving the comparative concept is The proposition h is equally or less confirmed on e than is the proposition h′ on e′,

which may be symbolized as

The following abbreviations will also be used in discussing comparative confirmation:

The former of these two abbreviations means intuitively

The proposition h is less confirmed on evidence e than h′ is on e′. The latter means

The proposition h is confirmed on evidence e to the same degree that h′ is on e′.

One of the main ideas of calculi of natural deduction, as introduced by Jaśkowski and Gentzen, is that assumptions may be discharged in the course of a derivation. As regards sentential logic, this conception will be extended in so far as not only formulas but also rules may serve as assumptions which can be discharged. The resulting calculi and derivations with rules of any finite level are informally introduced in §1, while §§2 and 3 state formal definitions of the concepts involved and basic lemmata. Within this framework, a standard form for introduction and elimination rules for arbitrary n-ary sentential operators is motivated in §4, understood as a contribution to the theory of meaning for logical signs. §5 proves that the set {&, ∨, ⊃, ⋏} of standard intuitionistic connectives is complete, i.e. &, ∨, ⊃, and ⋏ suffice to express each n-ary sentential operator having rules of the standard form given in §4. §6 makes some remarks on related approaches. For an extension of the conception presented here to quantifier logic, see [11].

In this paper we shall be concerned with questions regarding decision problems for certain classes of sentences (without quantifiers) of various kinds of algebra. In the first section we shall establish a result of a general nature, which enables one, in a number of cases, to reduce a decision problem of the type considered to a somewhat simpler problem. In the second section we formulate a rather broad sufficient condition for the existence of a decision method for sentences without quantifiers; and in the last section we show that this condition holds of lattices.