Is darker skin pigmentation associated with less favorable social and political outcomes in Latin America? We leverage data from 18 Latin American countries across multiple survey waves to demonstrate the robust and potent negative relationship between the darkness of skin tone and socio-economic status. Then we examine the relationship between skin color and attitudes toward the political system. In spite of our substantial sample size, we find little support for the expectation that respondents with darker skin are less favorably disposed toward the political system—indeed, on balance, our findings run counter to this expectation. Our findings suggest that the socio-economic “pigmentocracy” that pervades the region does not necessarily translate into pronounced differences in attitudes about the political system. This finding casts some doubt on the expectation that social inequalities are likely to destabilize governments or undermine their legitimacy.

Recent studies confirm that Anglxs’ racial attitudes can shape their opinions about the Affordable Care Act (ACA), particularly when this federal health care policy is linked to Barack Obama. Strong linkages made between Obama and the ACA cue Anglxs to apply their racialized feelings toward Obama to their health policy preferences. This is consistent with a growing body of research demonstrating that “racial priming” can have a powerful impact on Anglxs’ political opinions. Yet few studies have explored racialized policy opinion among minorities, and fewer still have explored racial priming among Latinxs. In this paper, we compare the effect of racial priming on the health policy preferences of Latinxs and Anglxs. Using survey evidence from the 2012 American National Election Study, we find important Anglx–Latinx differences in racialized policy preferences. However, we also find that racial priming has an effect on U.S.-born Latinxs that closely resembles its effect on Anglxs. Results suggest that increasing ethnic diversity in the United States will not necessarily produce increasingly liberal politics as many believe. American politics in the coming decades will depend largely on the ways in which Latinxs’ racial sympathies and resentments are mobilized.

How do legislators respond to coethnic and cominority constituents? We conduct an audit study of all state legislators to explore white legislators’ responsiveness to different minority groups and minority group legislators’ responsiveness to each other. Black and Latino Americans currently make up about one-third of the overall U.S. population and an even larger share of some state populations. In light of this growing diversification of the American electorate, legislators may have incentives to appeal to a broad racial constituency. In our experiment, state legislators are randomly assigned to receive an email from a white, Black, or Latino constituent. Our findings suggest a lack of legislators’ discrimination, on average, against Black relative to white constituents. Instead, we find that all legislators, on average, respond more to both white and Black constituents relative to Latinos. The evidence suggests that Black legislators do not exhibit coethnic solidarity toward their Black constituents or cominority solidarity toward their Latino constituents; however, Latinos do exhibit coethnic and cominority solidarity (though there are too few Latino legislators to definitively establish this claim). We also estimate effects among white legislators by party and racial composition of districts in order to provide suggestive evidence for white legislators’ intrinsic vs. strategic motivations.

How well do we understand the political moment in which we find ourselves in the wake of the Trump presidency? The United States has long failed to keep up with its democratic peers on a wide range of social outcomes but the struggle to keep a pandemic at bay, coupled with increases in social violence and new uprisings over state violence have exposed the failures of the American state in a stark manner. While research on political attitudes continues to offer crucial insights into what Americans want from government and how race, class, and gender are formative dimensions of public opinion, we know considerably less about how these attitudes intersect with the highly fragmented and decentralized nature of U.S. political institutions. In this essay, I offer a framework for understanding our current moment through the lens of racialized anti-statism and state failure. I focus on the intersection of two reinforcing and overlapping features of the U.S. political system: the highly fragmented, veto-laden structure of American politics and the persistence of anti-egalitarian movements. By situating our analysis at this intersection, we observe the convergence of racial and economic power in an anti-statist alliance that undermines American state-building, even when large majorities of Americans favor it.

Thousands of Latin Americans migrate to the United States every year. This article seeks to understand how immigrants’ premigration political experiences influence the acquisition of party identification upon arrival in the United States. This research proposes that premigration political experiences influence the acquisition of party identification among Latino immigrants in the United States. Utilizing data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) and Proyecto Élites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas (Latin American Parliamentary Elites Project), this paper analyzes how the ideology of the government in power in the immigrants’ country of origin influences party identification among Latino immigrants in the United States. Employing multinomial regression analysis, I demonstrate that the ideology of governments in power in Latin American countries when Latinos migrate influences the party identification of those immigrants in the United States. The results of this study contribute to the conversations on premigration experiences and challenge the applicability of classical theories of party identification for immigrants.

This paper utilizes original survey data to examine whether individuals believe they share views on public policy with members of their own racial or ethnic group and whether they place an importance on living in legislative districts with people from their own racial or ethnic group. We find strong evidence that Latino and African-American respondents have a sense of shared policy preferences within their own group. Our results also indicate white Republicans are very likely to view themselves as having shared policy preferences within their group. Respondents who have a strong sense of shared policy preferences with their racial group are also the most likely to think it is important to live in legislative districts with others from their own racial or ethnic group. This paper affords a deeper understanding of the extent to which voters express commonality with their racial and ethnic minority group on matters related to public policy.

The radical right has become a central political force in most Western democracies. This process has been the result of the normalization and mainstreaming of its political leaders, discourses, and visions of society, notably involving the scapegoating of immigration and the use of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. However, the normalization and mainstreaming of radical right actors competing for the leadership of their overall political family remain an under-researched topic. The scope of the current article is to explore this phenomenon by considering the case of France, which after the United States, is the largest Western state that could potentially be ruled by a radical right president with extensive executive powers. The analysis shows that actors competing for the leadership of the radical right in a given country can generate diverging strategies of normalization and mainstreaming to secure their political distinction. Immigration and the Great Replacement constitute, respectively, a topic and a conspiracy theory that are emphasized and/or downplayed by opportunistic stakeholders weaving a web of interactions to define their comparative legitimacy and supremacy in the public sphere.

While partisanship in American politics has been historically tied to racial identity and racial attitudes, most studies of Latino partisanship do not incorporate these factors into understanding their partisan attachments. I argue that the concepts of race, color, and mestizaje as they are understood within Latino communities in the United States can influence political attitudes and partisanship among Latinos themselves. Using six consecutive Cooperative Election Study (formerly Cooperative Congressional Election Study) surveys I examine how self-identification as white, racial resentment, and color-blind attitudes influence Latino partisanship. I find that white racial identity has a small but significant positive association with Republican partisanship among Latinos, and a negative association with Democratic partisanship. Additionally, negative racial attitudes among Latinos are strongly related to identification as Republican, even when controlling for ideology and other factors like immigrant generation and religion. These results have important implications for understanding current and future Latino voting patterns.

This paper explores the dynamics of presidential attention and rhetoric on Native issues and peoples during the self-determination era. Using data from all public statements and papers of the presidents from 1969 to 2016, the work analyzes the level of attention and rhetorical frames of each president from Nixon to Obama, with additional comments on Trump. The analysis reveals that most presidents have given relatively little attention to Native issues compared to their overall volume of public statements, with Democratic Presidents Clinton and Obama offering the most attention. In addition, presidents have used very different rhetorical frames to address Native issues and peoples in their public statements. Presidential rhetoric has been characterized by fluctuating attention and frames, and presidents have not consistently supported Nixon's “new and coherent strategy” throughout the self-determination era.

The Catholic Church currently sits at the forefront of U.S. demographic change as a prominent institution that is working on how to positively respond to a growing Latino population. Understanding the factors that either complicate or facilitate that endeavor may help other institutions in their future efforts to likewise integrate and serve Latino communities. Further, there may be broader implications for the success of Catholic churches to serve as research has found that participation in church activities is positively related to increased rates of civic and political engagement. However, these positive effects cannot be felt if churches fail to present the opportunity to participate in the first place. To that end, this study examines the relationship between Latino population density, the presence of a Latino minister, and the likelihood a church would offer Spanish mass or any other service relevant to the Latino community. I find these factors are useful in predicting service provision to a limited degree, and that individual leaders’ initiative and decision making also play a role in determining institutional responsiveness.

Scholars have credited the victory of Edward Brooke, America's first popularly elected black U.S. senator, to a “deracialized” or “color-blind” election strategy in which both the candidate and the electorate ignored racial matters. This article revises this prevailing historical explanation of Brooke's election. Drawing from the historical-ideational paradigm of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, this paper argues that Brooke was much more of a “race-conscious” candidate than is generally remembered. Primary documents from the 1966 campaign reveal that Brooke spoke openly against racial inequality, argued in favor of racially targeted policies, and called for stronger racial equality legislation. In addition, this paper argues that Brooke's appeals were not targeted primarily to the state's small black population but to liberal whites. Far from ignoring race, internal campaign documents and interviews with campaign staff reveal that Brooke's campaign strategists sought to appeal to white desires to “do the right thing” by electing an African American candidate. Internal polling documents from the Brooke campaign and newspaper commentaries further demonstrate that a proportion of the white electorate cited Brooke's race as the reason for supporting his candidacy. This paper suggests that Brooke's election was extremely well timed—coming soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act but before the urban riots of the “long hot summer of 1967”, the King assassination riots, and anti-busing riots in Boston. The first half of Brooke's 1966 campaign slogan “Proudly for Brooke: A Creative Republican” signals the race-conscious dynamics of his candidacy.

This study asks if Black mayors’ individual and collective responses to George Floyd’s killing were qualitatively different than mayoral reactions to the deaths of Michael Brown and Freddie Gray. Specifically, I examine whether Black mayors rejected the “timeworn” tradition of respectability politics in favor of a new paradigm in 2020. I also consider the characteristics of mayors, cities, and media that may explain this change. My original dataset includes 232 public statements issued by 31 Black mayors during either the Obama administration (2014–2015) or Trump administration (2020). I find that the cohort of Black mayors leading large cities during Era 2 were demonstrably less likely to activate respectability politics when talking about Floyd’s murder than their predecessors. I discuss the implications of these observations considering the political climate mayors are confronting at the time of writing, around the 2-year anniversary of Floyd’s death.

This article identifies the justification frame as a common narrative used by public officials to justify the use of lethal force by police. Officials deploy the justification frame to obfuscate the use of force or claim that victims posed a threat to officers in order to justify civilian deaths. I examine initial statements given in the aftermath of officer-involved deaths in 2016, focusing on incidents where an on-duty officer used force against victims who did not pose a threat when they were killed. I find that elements of the justification frame appear frequently in the explanations issued after these incidents. Statements about Black decedents are more likely to deploy the justification frame.

While popular narratives regarding the destiny of demographics assume Latino interstate migrants will alter destination state politics as Latinos disperse across the states, no studies directly assess the empirical validity of the underlying assumption of migrant's political preferences. Moreover, established theories of domestic migrant preferences suggest a variety of potential individual-level behaviors that often diverge from the underlying assumption of a uniform introduction of more liberal voters. Employing data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, this study presents an analysis on Latino interstate migrant voting behavior, while also overcoming a variety of data limitations in existing studies. Countering some previous findings that homophily, adaptation, or even a static liberal orientation describes migrant voting behavior, the results suggest that Latino interstate migrant preferences vary by the political context of their previous state of residence. The results imply that the destiny of demographics will be conditioned, to some extent, by the migratory patterns of Latinos and the dyad of departure and destination states. When Latinos leave liberal (conservative) states, they bring more liberal (conservative) policies. In short, Latinos seem to pack their politics when moving across state lines.

How do Asian Americans think about their ethnic origin? How do ethnic identities affect political preferences? Drawing on interviews with a diverse group of Asian Americans, I provide a nuanced understanding of how they think about their ethnic origin and pan-ethnic identities. The findings reveal that ethnicity plays a significant role in shaping electoral preferences, as Asian Americans exhibit coethnicity preferences, conditional on partisanship. Moreover, I uncover several factors that have been underexplored in the existing literature, including transnational ties, news consumption, and political preferences on foreign policies related to their home country. This article provides a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of Asian American identities by showing that the ethnic origin roots of Asian Americans can have significant influence on their political interests and candidate preferences.

Recent election cycles show a reluctance among Black millennials to support the Democratic Party, which suggests that they are not captured by the party like their predecessors. While we know that African Americans have historically remained a loyal voting bloc, it is important to analyze whether there are generational differences with respect to Black Democratic Party loyalty. In this study, I analyze Black millennial partisanship identification and compare it to Black non-millennials (Baby Boomers and Gen X’ers). To test this, I employ a multi-method approach. My results show that while Black millennials continue to identify with the Democratic Party, they are not as loyal to the Democratic Party when compared to Black non-millennials. Further, I find that Black millennials are not changing loyalties to the Republican or a third party. Instead, Black millennials are willing to withhold their vote altogether if they are not satisfied with any Democratic candidates. My work has critical implications in how we understand Black politics and reveals that Democratic candidates will have to earn Black millennials vote going forward.