The importance of institutional trust for structuring welfare state support (WSS) has been advanced by several scholars. Yet, the thesis has not received convincing empirical support. We argue that the weak evidence observed by previous research is caused by the failure of not extending the analytical framework beyond the study of public institutions. Using Sweden as a test case, our analytical framework covers trust in public institutions (TPI) and market institutions (TMI). The main findings are: (1) TMI has a robust negative effect on WSS; (2) the expected relationship between TPI and WSS is strengthened controlling for TMI; (3) TMI mediates the relationships between socio-economic variables and WSS. These findings underline the importance of bringing in other institutional configurations that are seen as conceivable alternatives to the state for administrating social welfare, not the least in studies primarily interested in the link between TPI and support for state-organised welfare.

Globalization is said to restrict severely the state's capacity to fulfill its welfare function in advanced industrial societies. This paper tests empirically the redistributive capacity of the state operationalized as the difference in percent of households who live below 50% of the median income in their respective country before taxes and transfers and after taxes and transfers, based on the latest Luxembourg Income Study data. Besides globalization, specific sets of domestic political institutions predictably and systematically affect the redistributive capacity of the state: what is termed ‘collective veto points’ buoy redistribution by the state, while ‘competitive veto points’ have the opposite effect. Partisan coloration is introduced as a control variable which, surprisingly, does not affect this critical function of the welfare state. The research design is a cross-sectionally dominant panel design (N=15, t=2). This study finds evidence that globalization and collective veto points both positively affect the redistributive capacity of the state while the converse is true for competitive veto points.

Most studies of tobacco control policy focus on the central level of national governments. Yet within the European Union, three levels of government have responsibilities for tobacco control: the EU; the central governments of member states; and provinces or devolved levels of government. This article examines the role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the United Kingdom. It compares the theory of regulatory federalism with multilevel governance as explanations for tobacco regulatory policy within the EU. While executive-legislative fusion in the United Kingdom leads to the practice of discretionary federalism, the EU provides mixed support for the theory of regulatory federalism. There is significant policy innovation in the UK and its devolved territories as well as limited policy authority for tobacco control in the EU. Overall, multi-level governance (MLG) may be a superior, albeit incomplete, explanation of tobacco control within the EU and the UK.

In 2000 a Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former president of the European Monetary Institute was appointed by the Economics and Finance Ministers Council to make recommendations on the regulation of the European securities markets. It proposed a four-level system to improve the legislative process while ensuring what it called a democratic and institutional balance. Our paper questions to what extent the concepts of two basic modes of delegation – agency and trust relationships – are appropriate tools to interpret the new structure set up by the Committee. It formulates hypotheses about its policy effectiveness and the balance of power between Community institutions. Evidence supports the agency hypothesis: the Lamfalussy process has reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the first framework directives at level 1 and it has facilitated the removal of bottlenecks in the process through parallel working at levels 1 and 2. In this sense, delegation has enhanced policy effectiveness in the securities sector. But it is much more difficult to assess the trustee hypothesis: that is, whether the Commission and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in fact act as trustees of the member states for the benefit of market actors. For the time being, whether CESR might evolve into a European securities regulator remains an open question.

Regulatory reform is often seen as a road paved by good intentions, but leading to ‘policy hell’. The example of the railways seems to represent a prime example of regulatory failure, not only in Britain but also in Germany. This article analyses the notion of ‘regulatory failure’ in the railway domain by taking an analytical and a comparative perspective. First, it introduces a variety of explanations as to why regulation can go wrong. Second, it considers the design and the consequent evolution of the regulatory regimes for the railways in Britain and Germany since the early 1990s. Both countries offer similar life-cycles of regulatory reform, however differing in design, perceived failures and advocated solutions. Finally, it discusses how the literature on regulatory failure contributes to the understanding of British and German railway regulation and argues that any regulatory regime is not only characterised by a conflict of interests, but also by conflicts of standards of appropriateness that lead to inherent tension and potential causes for failure.

We assess the European Union’s (EU) most significant international tax policy. The 2005 Tax and Savings Directive obliges cooperating jurisdictions to withhold tax or report on interest income earned by entities whose beneficial owner is an EU resident. As the Directive applies only to beneficial ownership in cooperative jurisdictions, it can be circumvented by transferring ownership to a non-EU resident or company or by transferring the entity to a non-cooperative jurisdiction. Using a database on individual offshore entities leaked from two firms in 2013, we compare the response of EU-owned entities with a control group of non-EU-owned entities. We show that the growth of EU-owned entities declined immediately after the Directive’s implementation, whereas that of non-EU-owned entities remained stable. We observe the substitution of EU ownership for non-EU ownership, as well as the substitution of cooperative for non-cooperative offshore jurisdictions. This calls for anti-evasion policies that are broader in scope and scale.

This article challenges Paul Pierson's account on the (supposedly declining) role of labor unions in the ‘new politics of the welfare state’. More specifically, the text compares labor's influence on the French and the American politics of pension reform since the 1980s. The analysis of recent reforms undertaken in both countries demonstrates the impact of institutions and managerial settings on labor's political strategies. These institutional variables explain the fact that French unions have a much more direct influence on public pension reform than their American counterparts. In France, labor unions have an ideological ‘veto point’ derived from their integration into the management process. Their strong influence on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ is undeniable: labor still matters.

This paper contributes to our understanding of why delegitimising focusing events, combined with the mobilisation of policy losers, does not always result in major policy change by undermining a monopolistic policy image and policy subsystem. Based on a close enquiry of American biofuel policy development, it argues that we can make headway in this endeavour by focusing on three factors: first, the congruence of a policy image with core values of the polity; second, the multidimensionality of a policy image; and third, policy image management strategies that maintain cohesion among coalition supporters and respond to outside criticism. In understanding better why some policy images (and policy monopolies) prove resilient when they come under assault, this paper offers a single case plausibility probe supported by indicative evidence from other policy studies.

In the early 1990s the Danish Ministry of Finance initiated an experiment where a few ministerial departments negotiated performance agreements with their agencies. Since then internal contracting has spread and is now nearly universally used in central government. However, a close study demonstrates that in this process contract content has changed dramatically. The early contracts were quid-pro-quo agreements. Agencies committed themselves to improve efficiency but contracts at the same time admitted them increased managerial discretion. The mature contracts are quite different. Departmental ministries have exploited their considerable autonomy to set demands that are related to policy and service levels rather than internal management. Here ministries have adapted to the characteristics of their policy tasks and to the presumed concerns of the target groups dominating their political environment. Building on an analysis of all contracts in force in 1995, 2000, and 2005 the paper sees this change as a transformation of an ideal type NPM-instrument into a managerial tool adapted to a system where highly autonomous ministers act as unquestioned political executives.

At its Lisbon Summit in March 2000, the European Council decided to apply the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to innovation policies. The aim is to establish a European Research Area, in which the OMC shall increase the coherence of regional, national and European policies. Until now, however, the OMC has only been applied to a very limited extent. We argue that this development is due to the fact that there are specific conditions for policy coordination in the emerging European multi-level innovation system that have hardly been mirrored by late EU initiatives for a more coherent European Research Area and its new open method of coordination.

Although governments worldwide are increasingly choosing to deliver services through organisations with greater autonomy than traditional bureaus, the implicit assumption that such agencification contributes to long-run efficiency remains largely untested. Agencification gives agency managers more autonomy and access to incentive mechanisms that lead to greater efficiency if they are not offset by inefficiencies resulting from managerial discretion. We test the hypothesis that agencification improves efficiency by examining the longer-run performance of 13 agencies in the province of Québec, Canada over approximately 10 years. We find that these agencies experienced long-term productivity gains, but that these gains reached a plateau over the time period studied. In addition, we describe changes in several measures of performance. A survey of the managers of these agencies indicates that they perceive agencification as having a substantive impact, but worry about the sustainability of autonomy and their capacity to show continued gains in measured performance over time.

Poverty analysis is currently undergoing a multidimensional turn, increasingly focusing on the many ways in which human life can be impoverished and not just on material poverty. In this paper, we present an analysis of material poverty and multiple deprivation in Britain, which is inspired by the capability approach. We argue that the additional complexity of multidimensional analysis requires that it provides some insight not achieved by a more straightforward approach focusing on material poverty alone. Our findings indicate that whether a multidimensional assessment identifies different people as being in poverty depends on whether our interest is in identifying vulnerable individuals or in identifying vulnerable groups and whether we focus on dimensions in aggregate or disaggregate forms. We find that, although material poverty and multiple deprivation identify very different individuals, they display greater congruence in terms of identifying vulnerable groups, especially where aggregate measures are used.

This paper offers sectoral evidence in support of the argument that a partial transference of sovereignty has occurred within the EU with the gradual shift in regulatory authority from national capitals to Brussels. This transfer of policy competence is evident even in politically sensitive areas such as civil aviation. However, whilst Europe's supranational institutions have gained in de jure power, they often remain lacking in de facto authority. Democratic legitimacy ensures that nation-states retain real authority in areas such as air transport. This authority is nonetheless being steadily challenged by Brussels and a genuine balance of power is emerging. This has been evident in the development of air transport liberalisation, where a Commission-led coalition of interests ensured that deregulation occurred – despite the resistance of several influential national governments. State aid regulation has been more contentious, with EU rulings frequently encountering resistance from governments seeking to preserve perceived national interests.

The economic content of security, i.e. to what extent security is influenced by economic variables, is a difficult and widely debated one. There has been a tendency, to broaden the concept of security to include certain purely economic interests. The paper is concerned with a precise understanding of the difference between a narrow and territorial definition of security, and a broader definition of security encompassing economic interests. The first section defines security and its economic ramifications and the second discusses the subject within the context of a general equilibrium model. The policy dilemmas of security are then considered at the conceptual level, including the dilemmas in the general equilibrium model.

Many countries have experimented with decentralization and privatization policies in hopes of increasing public sector efficiency. This article explores the impact of decentralization and privatization of education in Chile. Decentralization did have some benefits such as improved administrative efficiency and greater productive efficiency. However, government size, as measured by the total personnel working in the education sector, increased under decentralization. Privatization of education in Chile created a type of voucher system. Although educators are more accountable to parents who compare products, the greatest problem is that schools do not necessarily respond to competition by promoting better quality education. Comparisons of student performance in public and private schools in Chile is not conclusive, but national average scores have not risen even though private provision of education has expanded dramatically while public education has waned. Finally, both decentralization and privatization resulted in greater inequity in expenditures and in the performance of students from different income groups.

This paper addresses two related questions: How has the transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy affected the second economy and how has the second economy influenced the transformation? The existence of a second economy compensating for some faults of the planned economy has been a contributing factor in the non-violent transformation of the Hungarian economy. Transformation is making the concepts of a first and second economy obsolete. The informal economy, which is replacing the second economy, differs from the latter in its degree of internalization, and in relying upon fulltime rather than part-time work. It is also increasing in size. The social impact of the informal economy is also different, increasing income inequality and regional disparities, thus replacing the gradations of social differences found in the multi-coloured activities of the second economy with sharper black and white differences. The analysis is illustrated with data from Hungary before and after the transformation.

Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a data set of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority.

In policymaking, actors are likely to take the preferences of others into account when strategically positioning themselves. However, there is a lack of research that conceives of policy preferences as an interdependent system. In order to analyse interdependencies, we link actors to their policy preferences in water protection, which results in an actor-instrument network. As actors exhibit multiple preferences, a complex two-mode network between actors and policies emerges. We analyse whether actors exhibit interdependent preference profiles given shared policy objectives or social interactions among them. By fitting an exponential random graph model to the actor-instrument network, we find considerable clustering, meaning that actors tend to exhibit preferences for multiple policy instruments in common. Actors tend to exhibit interdependent policy preferences when they are interconnected, that is, they collaborate with each other. By contrast, actors are less likely to share policy preferences when a conflict line divides them.

This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

Why do countries move from public to private financing of healthcare? This paper explores this issue by looking at the divergent reform trajectories of three postcommunist countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. While existing accounts emphasize veto points to explain changes in healthcare systems, the present analysis finds that moves towards private financing can be better explained by differences in access to the policymaking arm of the state. Specifically, a penetrable single-party government and weak bureaucratic capacities allow physicians to capture the reform process and implement their preferred policies. The results suggest that scholars of health policy should focus more attention on the actors seeking change and their access to policy makers.