Analyses of European integration processes are still dominated by the dichotomous debate between intergovernmentalism and suprana-tionalism. Sides are often taken in this debate based on very case-specific empirical findings. An analysis of two cases, European telecommunications and electricity policy, illustrates how misleading such generalisations can be. The former case is often used to support supranational claims, while the latter highlights the importance of intergovernmental vetos. However, further analysis reveals the very parallel supranational policy approach of the European Commission to both sectors and the resulting weakness of the dominant interpretation. An analysis using a multilevel governance approach to European integration can avoid these difficulties.

Although new institutionalism has long been criticised for presenting overly static accounts of social reality, that critique is becoming increasingly unwarranted. In recent years, historical, ideational and rational choice institutionalists have produced a rich body of literature on mechanisms and processes of institutional change. This article reviews this emerging literature and concludes that the most promising avenue for future research is to further explore the potential for combining insights from the three subtypes of institutionalism. In the hopes of encouraging future studies of institutional change to engage more explicitly in theoretical integration, this article proposes a sequential approach to combining insights from different traditions and providing comprehensive accounts of exogenous and endogenous processes of institutional change.

Recent decades have witnessed the remarkable rise of a kind of market authority almost as centralized as the state itself – two credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's. These agencies derive their influence from two sources. The first is the information content of their ratings. The second is both more profound and vastly more problematic: Ratings are incorporated into financial regulations in the United States and around the world. In this article we clarify the role of credit rating agencies in global capital markets, describe the host of problems that arise when their ratings are given the force of law, and outline the alternatives to the public policy dilemmas created when ratings receive a public imprimatur. We conclude that agencies designated for regulatory purposes should be required to provide more nuanced ratings exposing their perceptual and ideological underpinnings (especially for sovereigns), and facilitating consideration of alternatives to ratings-dependent regulation.

The introduction of the euro is accompanied by an independent European Central Bank (ECB) which is solely responsible for monetary policy in the euro zone. No European institution will be introduced to flank the ECB. This particular institutional design is problematic. This article argues that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) suffers moderately from a democratic deficit. However, the case of Germany illustrates that it is not the independence of the ECB that should be cause for concern, but the absence of specific domestic features and a government. It is unclear which political authority will be held responsible if EMU leads to an uneven distribution of costs and benefits across the euro zone. Economic literature suggests that under EMU distortions could well occur and that a different design could deal better with these imperfections. The historical process leading to EMU explains the reasons for its particular design. Although imperfect, EMU is an improvement over the pre-EMU status quo in which Germany de facto dominated monetary policy. Nevertheless, the design of EMU remains suboptimal.

The article deals with the questions of the emergence, persistence and change of policy paradigms. It focuses on the role that policy networks play in this process and draws on the literature of problem definition to explain this role. The paper investigates water policy in Israel in the years 1948–1997. The paper distinguishes among two water policy paradigms that have prevailed: the earlier paradigm was one of expanding water resources and agricultural production, followed by a paradigm of priority of agricultural expansion over water conservation. The paper also distinguishes among periods of anticipatory and reactive water policy and highlights the role of policy networks in formulating public policies.

This paper seeks to assess how far local business organisations, such as Chambers of Commerce, are maintained chiefly by the factors hypothesised by Mancur Olson as the forces being behind collective action: the costs and benefits of business services. The paper reviews the theoretical arguments to support this hypothesis and then assesses the case of UK Chambers of Commerce using empirical evidence from surveys of businesses and Chambers. The UK Chambers are a purely private law voluntary structure, unlike many European counterparts. The analysis demonstrates that in such a system the overwhelming motive for business membership is to access services with specific rather than collective benefits. In turn Chamber managers tend to respond by financing services chiefly through service fees rather than flat rate subscriptions. In an Olsonian world with purely voluntary Chambers, few businesses will pay for general collective goods (such as lobbying, representation or support to government) that others can consume at no cost. The paper also demonstrates strong differences between types of Chambers: large Chambers being largely service and fee oriented, small Chambers being more often collective action bodies. Overall, however, local Chambers have features common to other business organisations of being variable in size and resources, most are small, and the structure is fragmented. Conclusions are drawn from these findings for government policy.

Fiscally pressured local governments face the same basic choices in both the United States and the United Kingdom: whether to increase locally raised revenues in order to maintain existing services or to reduce local services. The article first posits a model of local government decision-making in response to fiscal pressure drawn primarily from organizational and systems theory. Local governments are viewed as organizations concerned with maintaining their equilibrium relationships with their external environment (public employees and their unions). The model suggests a series of hypotheses about how local government will respond to fiscal pressure. Case studies of fiscally pressured local governments in both the United States and the United Kingdom are then utilized to describe actual local responses and to assess the usefulness of the model. The article concludes by setting forth a rough hierarchy of preferred local responses.

The main question raised in this article is how educational reforms reflect convergence or divergence between the English, the Norwegian and the Swedish educational systems. We claim that the answer depends on how convergence is conceptualised. At the level of decisions on tools, the countries seem more similar than two decades ago. However, to explain policy changes our analytical perspective must be broadened. We demonstrate how values based on different welfare state models, political economies and different types of institutional evolution can explain processes of change in education over the last decades. In paying attention to broader processes of change, a certain degree of variation occurs. The countries seem to develop according to nationally specific trajectories: England has strengthened the liberal and elitist values of education while social democratic values of comprehensiveness and equality have impact on the aims and effects of policy tools in Norway and Sweden.

This paper focuses on the circulation of policy ideas within international administrations. Based upon a study of UNAIDS, the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, it shows how bureaucracies can capitalise on policy-oriented information and knowledge to strengthen their influence within their own environment. Using a policy transfer approach as its analytical framework, the paper draws particular attention to the UNAIDS Secretariat, considered as a “transfer entrepreneur”. It argues that, in the 2000s, the Secretariat has demonstrated a capacity to collect, develop and disseminate policy ideas and, consequently, has gradually participated in UN policy development on AIDS. It thus suggests that the Secretariat has extended its authority within the UN system despite limited resources. In conclusion, the paper points out the need to examine policy transfer among international administrations through actors, interests and strategies, as a complement to holistic approaches.1

In considering issue expertise in policymaking, we unpack differences in the supply and types of expertise with attention to the presumed privileged role of the bureaucracy. Our empirical investigation is based on witness testimonies of congressional hearings for a policy area involving various forms of expertise – critical infrastructure protection policymaking. Three sets of findings stand out. One set substantiates the role of the bureaucracy as an important information conduit while also showing it is not a primary source of issue expertise. A second set shows how differences in issue maturity and salience affect the demand for and supply of expertise. A third set illustrates the influence of a small cadre of hyper-expertise in drawing attention to problems and solutions across different venues. These findings challenge the conventional view of the bureaucracy in policymaking while expanding the understanding of different sources of information and types of issue expertise in policymaking.

Blame avoidance has often been claimed to be an important rationale behind changes in the organisation of the public sector, but very few studies have examined whether and how public attribution of responsibility is actually affected by such reforms. For instance, how do changes in the formal allocation of authority affect public attribution of blame when things go wrong? Is the effect immediate or delayed? To advance our understanding of such questions, this paper presents an analysis of blame and credit attribution in more than 1,200 newspaper articles about health-care-related issues in Norway before and after the major Norwegian hospital reform from 2002. The central empirical finding of the article is that central state-level authorities in Norway were attributed less blame in media coverage of health-care problems after the reform than before the reform. The shift is delayed, but substantial and robust to various modifications in model estimations.

This paper investigates the conditions under which political framing can render welfare restructuring more palatable. I start by asking two research questions. What are the necessary (albeit perhaps insufficient) conditions that allow leaders successfully to frame welfare reform? To what extent are these conditions evident across welfare regimes? I identify four variables that affect leaders' opportunities for framing social policy: (1) extant frames, (ii) actors, (iii) institutions and (iv) policy arena. After examining the four dominant types of frames found across affluent societies, I review the discursive politics surrounding The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as a case where all four conditions for framing welfare reform coalesced.

It has long been recognised that interstate diffusion of policy innovations is comprised of distinct decisions including adoption, reinvention and amendment. Interstate influences are an important driver of these diffusion processes, but studies to date have not investigated the degree to which external influences vary across these decisions. We theorise that geographical peers will have the largest impact in adoption decisions; that ideological peers are an important source of policy information when states make decisions about “reinventing” innovations adopted by others; and that internal factors will drive the decision by a state to amend a policy. We test these expectations for renewable portfolio standards in the American states between 1996 and 2009. Results suggest that state policymakers emulate peers in adoption or policy design choices, and that internal influences have a stronger influence on amendment decisions than do external influences. These findings further our understanding of policy diffusion and state-by-state relations.

Some research has posited that while initially damaging to the environment, continued economic growth eventually leads to superior environmental quality. This relationship is often described as an ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ (EKC), after a similar hypothesis regarding income inequality made by economist Simon Kuznets. Following such findings, the EKC is sometimes offered as a rationale for encouraging economic growth as the best environmental policy option. This paper reconsiders the policy-relevance of the EKC idea, drawing on a wide range of international data collected in the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) project. Specifically, it tests the theoretical arguments advanced by Arrow and others (1995) that EKC relationships are unlikely to hold for environmental problems that are intergenerational in time or spread across national boundaries. The results of this research substantially confirm those arguments, providing more evidence that the EKC idea is an inadequate guide for environmental policy makers around the globe.

Framing plays an important role in lobbying, as interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. However, due to methodological difficulties, we have remarkably little systematic data about the framing strategies of interest groups. This article therefore proposes a new technique for measuring interest group framing that is based on a quantitative text analysis of interest group position papers and official policy documents. We test this novel methodological approach on the basis of two case studies in the areas of environmental and transport policy in the European Union. We are able to identify the frames employed by all interest groups mobilised in a debate and assess their effectiveness by studying to what extent decision-makers move closer to their policy positions over the course of the policy debate.

This paper presents data on the size and growth of general government expenditures and receipts relative to GDP in OECD countries over the 1960–81 period. A feature of these trends is the widespread appearance of budget deficits in the mid-seventies, following the sharp increase in government expenditures relative to GDP in the two years immediately after the first oil shock in 1973. Having presented these data, the paper tests several hypotheses relating the size and growth of government to macroeconomic performance using an international cross-section framework. The economic performance indicators used are the rate of economic growth, the rate of consumer price inflation and private sector employment growth. Overall, the results provide little evidence that government size and growth have been detrimental to economic performance, particularly in the period since 1975, although an inverse relation existed in the sixties between government size and economic growth.

Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner. Although female participants altered their behaviour as expected and complied somewhat more, men strongly reacted in the opposite manner: they evaded a much higher percentage of taxes than under the baseline. Apparently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to boost tax compliance.

Spain's newspapers are characterised by strong partisan identities. We demonstrate that the two leading newspapers nonetheless show powerful similarities in the topics of their coverage over time. The media system is strongly related to the policy process and it shows similar levels of skew (attention focuses on just a few topics) and friction (attention lurches rapidly from topic to topic) as others have shown for policy processes more generally. Further, media attention is significantly related to parliamentary activities. Oral questions in parliament track closely with media attention over time. Our assessment is based on a comprehensive database of all front-page stories (over 95,000 stories) in El País and El Mundo, Spain's largest daily newspapers, and all 7,446 oral questions from 1996 to 2009. The paper shows that explanations of friction and skew in governmental activities should incorporate media dynamics as well. Political leaders are clearly sensitive to media salience.

Although policy entrepreneurs are assigned an important role in crossing policy boundaries and addressing complex problems, our understanding of the process is limited. This article systematically reviews 51 studies on conditions, strategies and implications of crossboundary entrepreneurship. Findings show that (1) the literature predominantly mentions issue promotion and coalition-building as crossboundary strategies; (2) vertical boundary-crossing is discussed more frequently than horizontal boundary-crossing; (3) the most reported boundary-crossing function is to expand issue arenas; (4) conditions that enable crossboundary strategies include institutional overlap, issue interpretation, power vacuum, overruling policies and lacking resources; and (5) implications of entrepreneurship include raised opposition, increased competition over leadership, augmented complexity hindering collective action, raised costs and resources, and issues regarding trust, legitimacy and authority. Policy entrepreneurship allows for micro-level insights in the emergence of crossboundary processes. We suggest future research to focus on causal processes between conditions, strategies and implications to better understand their interplay.

Studies examining the policy implications of elite polarisation usually concentrate on policy formulation and change, but neglect the impact of polarisation on the day-to-day application of policies. Applying the method of causal process tracing to the Swiss “Carlos” case, a blame game triggered by the reporting about an expensive therapy setting for a youth offender, this article exposes and explains a hitherto neglected, but highly important, mechanism between political elites engaging in blame generation and changes in policy practice. A policy’s distance and visibility to mass publics, as well as the incentives and resources of elites to engage in blame generation, explain the dynamics within blame games, which, in turn, effect organisational and behavioural changes that help institutionalise a more politicised policy practice. Politicised policy practice can make an important difference to policy target populations, as well as damage output legitimacy and undermine democracy.