Because it is easy to dramatise the stuff of politics, Pan-Africanism is usually discussed only in terms of its political implications. But its protagonists justify their confidence in its value by their belief that functional co-operation on a regional and continental basis offers the best—perhaps the only—way of meeting the social and economic challenges facing the nascent modern African societies. For them, therefore, the real test of Pan-Africanism's success lies not simply in whether the independent African states can succeed in maintaining a single political organisation such as the Organisation of African Unity, but whether it is capable of making an effective contribution towards improving and strengthening Africa's economies and societies. The O.A.U.'s specialised commissions are, therefore, of crucial importance in evaluating the achievements, or potentialities, of Pan-Africanism.

The conflict in the Horn of Africa and its internationalisation since 1977 has stimulated many arguments in Amercian policy-making circles on whether the costs of expanded involvement in the region are coming to outweigh the strategic and other benefits. The most intense phase of this controversy has followed the post-1978 realignment of forces in the region, which transformed Somalia into an ally of the United States, and Ethiopia, long a close friend, into a Soviet ally.

In the early 1930S the then Southern and Northern Rhodesia were in the course of major programmes of building and construction, which required tremendous financial outlay, when the world depression broke out. The regions throughout southern Africa which were living primarily off the exports of their natural wealth were necessarily influenced by the depression, particularly as it was the prices of exported raw materials which suffered mostly from speculation on the world markets. During these years of depression—a period of surpluses of finished goods—the prices of raw materials, including those from colonial dependencies, were forced down.

The racial cleavage has understandably dominated most studies of Rhodesian politics. Cohn Leys claimed in the late 1950s that the European community maintained ‘a type of one-party system’ that sustained itself by uniting on race against all foes, rather than splitting along class or social lines.1 The centrality of race has been challenged recently by Giovanni Arrighi, who argued that the policies of consecutive Rhodesian Governments could be explained by orthodox Marxism,2 and by David Murray, whose study of the 1923–53 period revealed a classically pluralist model of competing economic groups.3

The creation of an international secretariat is ‘the innovation that transforms a series of conferences into an organization’1 The signing of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity by representatives of 30 independent states in the early hours of 26 May 1963 at Addis Ababa was certainly intended to transform a multiple series of international conferences—including rival meetings of the ‘Monrovia’ and ‘Casablanca’ states in particular—into a permanent regional organisation whose membership embraced all independent African states. To this end the O.A.U. Charter provided for a General Secretariat, to be directed by an Administrative Secretary-General and one or more Assistant Secretaries-General.

An underdeveloped country wishing to establish a fertiliser industry ought surely to begin by examining the locally available raw materials. In Tanzania, for example, a report in 1961 drew attention to an anhydrite deposit at Kilwa which could have been used to produce cement, gypsum, and sulphuric acid.2 The latter if combined with ammonia from the oil refinery would have given ammonium sulphate, the fertiliser most commonly used in Tanzania. The report also noted three deposits from which phosphatic fertiliser could have been made. However, the development of these local resources was rejected on the ground that for plants of an efficient size the local market would not be able to absorb all the fertilisers.

In Kenya, the Kuria, Suba, Meru, and Abagusii are among the contemporary cultural groupings which continue to believe in the importance of female circumcision. The ceremonies may have been partly abrogated or modified, but operations to cut off the tip of the clitoris of young girls are still carried out, not least in the expectation that the needed spirit of endurance will shape their character into adulthood. Although the primary objective of clitoridectomy is to initiate female children into womanhood, it is also performed in many African countries to ensure virginity, to enhance fertility and fecundity, and to promote cleanliness.

In a recent article in this Journal, Vol. VII, No. 4, December 1970, on ‘Developing Countries and International Trade’, Leslie Stein attempts to provide an alternative explanation of the international relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries. He asserts that I argued, in my earlier discussion of ‘International Trade and the Developing Countries’ in Vol. VII, No. 2, July 1969, that the existing trade relations between the centre and the periphery are ‘a major cause’ of the latter's poverty. Consequently, I was led to recommend measures leading to less reliance on the external sector and, more specifically, a programme of ‘heavy industrialisation’. Since Dr Stein feels not only that my policy proposals are detrimental to the interests of the periphery, but also that the statistical findings and the theoretical discussions from which they are derived contain both errors and omissions, he is led to propose an alternative formulation of the international division of labour, which, in his view, benefits the periphery.

Ghanaian novelists are notorious for their long absences from fiction, and the 1990s have seen the long-awaited return of some major talents. Kofi Awoonor and Ama Ata Aidoo allowed, respectively, 21 and 14 years to pass between the publication of their first and second novels, while 17 years separated the fifth and sixth works of Ayi Kwei Armah, the best-established writer of the three. Meanwhile, each has been active in other genres during the long intervals — poetry, short stories, essays – and none of them have fallen silent. Awoonor indicated, shortly after his experimental poetic first novel, This Earth, My Brother (1971), that he was at work on another, from which a lengthy extract was actually published in a journal in 1975,1 and advance notices of the full version continued apace, even though it did not appear until 1992. Armah allowed it to be known in 1989, in a rare interview, that since The Healers (1978) he had completed three more novels which, for want of a suitable African publishing house, remained in manuscript form.2 In the foreword to her 1991 novel, Aidoo refers to an interview in 1967 in which she stated that she ‘could never write about lovers in Accra because surely in our environment there are more important things to write about’. The very vehemence of the protest suggested at the time, however, that the author's mind was already running along the lines of this subject, which might at some future date receive full fictional treatment.

From the ancient Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta to twentiethcentury Bolivia and Zaïre, from theories of development and underdevelopment to models of civil-military relations, one is struck by the enormous literature on armed intervention in the domestic political arena. In recent years, a veritable rash of material on the subject of military politics has appeared – as much from newspaper correspondents reporting pre-dawn coups from third-world capitals as from the more rarefied towers of academe. Yet looking at the subject from the perspective of how régimes mobilise resources and mechanisms to protect themselves from their own security forces, one is struck by the paucity of empirically-based evidence on the subject.1

Soviet relations with the countries of black Africa have been of considerable interest to many western scholars. They have examined extensively the history of these relations, their shifting doctrinal bases, and the many formidable problems Soviet policy-makers have encountered in the pursuit of their stated objectives.1 A frequently overlooked aspect is the scholarly research of a group of Africanists whose activities appear to be inextricably linked with overall Soviet efforts in Africa.

Israel shares the distinction, together with only a handful of other nations, of being a ‘newsworthy’ country. Even before the recent war, hardly a week passed without at least a reference to Israel in either the daily or periodical press. Various American, British, and European weeklies consistently carry articles on Israel. On a per capita basis, probably no other country receives as much world press attention as Israel. Yet, despite this profuseness of printed material, very few articles and fewer books present competent analyses of the Israeli polity and foreign policy.

Although the number of Africanists in Poland has never been large, a scholarly interest in Africa has long existed in this country. Among the scholars of the older generation, the most prominent were: L. Krzywicki, a sociologist with a wide interest in social change and development, who published several studies on the transition from traditional to modern societies, with special attention to Africa; J. Czekanowski, who was among the first explorers of Rwanda and other Interlacustrine kingdoms, publishing several extensive studies both in German and Polish; and B. Malinowski, who later established himself in Great Britain.

How sensibly can one talk of industrial sociology in a non-industrial continent? Industrial sociology has been called the ‘special’ sociology whose task should be to carry through scientifically the analyses of the social relationships and interactions present within the industrial organisation in all its theoretical depth and breadth.1 Raif Dahrendorf, for instance, in Industrie und Betriebssoziologie (Berlin, 1962), whilst accepting industrial sociology as one of the ‘special’ sociologies, makes the reservation that it is concerned with the industrial society. But since the whole process of industrialisation was a historical one, the limitation of industrial sociology to any specific period must be an open question, especially since every kind of society requires the production of goods and services through industrial organisation. Elsewhere I have questioned the premises and validity of Dahrendorf's assertion;2 but it must be admitted that in its present form this special sociology has little or no meaning for the pre-industrial societies largely because they have not yet been exposed to it as a scientific tool. Nevertheless, sociological researches in pre-industrial societies can demonstrate the operational use of industrial sociological categories, such as performance efficiency and incentives, managerial techniques, industrial commitment, and the effect of industrial work on personality, as will be shown below by surveying the work of C. H. Northcott, W. Elkan, and Y. Glass in pre-industrial societies of Africa.

The connection between economic growth and population growth has been considerably played down by economists in the last hundred years, whereas eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economists seldom discussed development without considering the effect of population growth. The earlier writers were not unanimous – as they are not today – on the optimum size and rate of growth of population and its effect on the gross national product per capita.

The Recent resumption of popular protest signals a new phase in South Africa's internal opposition, characterised notably by the rising political engagement of black labour unions and their federations. Membership in these unions has reached over a million workers, reflecting the dramatic expansion of South Africa's industrial manufacturing sector in the last 20 years. With severe restrictions placed on the leading national and local political organisations since 1985, the unions have developed beyond their initially narrow concerns for their members into the forefront of opposition to established economic and political order. As a result, class consciousness and working-class organisation have increasingly been combined with, and taken precedence over, previous conceptions of opposition based on racial and national identity. This development has exacerbated both remaining ideological divisions and pressures for united action within the union movement.

Integragation has been a topical issue in inter-state relations in post-independence Africa.1 The most radical of the three suggested strategies is to bid for immediate continental economic and political integration.2 A more popular view is to seek a gradualist approach to pan-African unity via regional economic co-operation;3 this could range from a free trade area, customs union, common market, and economic community, to ultimate political fusion.4 The third, less-studied strategy is for African states to lay the basis for regional economic integration, and even ultimate continental unity, through functional co-operation, for example, in transport, industrial development, trade, and monetary policy.5 This article examines the prospects and problems of co-operation on a regional basis, with particular reference to West Africa, in a specific economic field – namely, seaport development. See Map I, page 399, below.