This article is a theoretical exploration of the problem of explaining political instability in new states, especially those of Africa. It begins with a critical evaluation of current tendencies of interpretation, and then goes on to suggest how we might construct a more adequate theory.

Explanations of political instability in the new states usually stress one or more of five related factors: cultural heterogeneity, low regime legitimacy, lack of coercive power, economic backwardness, and structural simplicity. Let us examine each of these factors.

Up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia remained essentially what it had been for centuries – a highly isolated, thoroughly traditional, fervently Christian kingdom. During the closing decades of the last century, the kingdom was greatly enlarged through a vast territorial expansion southwards which created the Ethiopian empire as it is today, and established the Christian Ethiopians as the dominant group within the heterogeneous state. The expansion, and the contemporary appearance of European imperialism in the Horn of Africa, helped to break down the historic isolation of this ancient society. In the decades that followed, sporadic attempts to introduce modernisation in Ethiopia had only a superficial impact, and it was only after World War II, following a brief but painful experience with Italian colonialism during 1935–41, that this process commenced in earnest.

‘In the national interest we have decided to take 51% of the shares of the Standard Bank and Barclays Bank.’

THE objective of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the unemployment problem in Kenya through an analysis of trends in employment in both large- and small-scale agriculture. First, the major movements that have been occurring within agriculture are described, and the importance of investment in education is emphasised to explain movements out of this sector. Secondly, the effects of past government programmes on the employment capacity of small-scale agriculture are related to still outstanding problems of regional disparities resulting from differential access to knowledge, finance, and material inputs. Lastly, employment trends in large-scale agriculture are compared and related to the adoption of new technology and changing farm structures.

Concern with the social and economic consequences of inflation has induced the governments of most African states to introduce statutory price controls. Thus, of the 25 countries covered by the International Monetary Fund's Surveys of African Economies,1 all but four or five had introduced price-control legislation, and other important examples not covered by these volumes include Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia. Economists tend to be sceptical about the desirability and effectiveness of such controls, and this article attempts to throw some light on this issue, as it relates to the circumstances of tropical Africa, by examining the operation of price regulations in Ghana during the 1960s.

Numerous commentaries have been written on Frantz Fanon's theory of decolonisation in relation to the peasants, most of them focusing on his claim that they constitute the most revolutionary sector in the Third World. This article critically re-examines what Fanon said–and what others think he said–dealing specifically with generalisations based on his observations of the Algerian peasantry during the war of independence, November 1954 to July 1962.

Of all works of literature, the novel is the most referential, the most discursive, and the most elusive. According to Philip Stevick's analysis, the novel, more than any other genre, is capable of containing large, developed consistent images of people, and can give form to a set of attitudes regarding a particular society, history, or the general culture of which it is an important part.1 David Daiches is accurate in pointing out the closeness of this relationship between the novel and its milieu: ‘Civilization is the attitudes and actions of people, and fiction uses these… as the raw material out of which to construct the kind of pattern we call a novel. No other art does this quite so directly.2

The International Studies Programme of the University of Toronto sponsored a conference on this topic from 6 to 8 April 1973, with participants not only from Canada, but also from Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The main aim was to assess the extent to which both radical and liberal writers are correct in ascribing to the working class a fairly passive rôle in Africa's economic and political development. In selecting the 13 papers for presentation, an attempt was made to provide a balanced coverage of Africa south of the Sahara, although Nigeria justifiably received the greatest attention. The discussions were particularly rewarding because of the presence of seven scholars and trade union leaders from West and East Africa, as well as a number of Canadian union officials who had served as advisers in Africa. The attendance of such an array of expertise was only possible because of the generosity of the University of Toronto, the Canada Council, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Canadian National Office of the United Steelworkers of America.

Education for rural development in Africa is a sure-fire subject, but changes happen quickly, and sometimes disastrously for projects which looked like having a long life. Jennifer C. Ward's optimistic discussion of experiments in Botswana – in this Journal, x, 4, December 1972, pp. 611–20 – is unfortunately somewhat out of date. Both Swaneng Hill School and Shashi River School have almost ceased their old emphasis on involvement with practical village life and their possibilities of producing a new type of boy or girl. Under Government-appointed headmasters, both these schools are now back to standard examination-passing, with all the emphasis on classroom work and most pupils doubtless looking forward either to the whitecollar professions or to office jobs, both in the daily increasing ranks of the public and private sectors.

In a recent issue of this Journal, x, 2, July 1972, pp. 223–45, Dr E. Wayne Nafziger assessed ‘The Economic Impact of the Nigerian Civil War’. The article is, in general, an excellent summary and analysis of the available statistical information on the Nigerian economy for the war period, June 1967 to January 1970, as well as the years leading up to and immediately following the hostilities. However, the author has made an error in his interpretation of the Nigerian gross domestic product series which has led him to seriously understate the decline in aggregate economic activity associated with the war.

I am grateful to Dr F. S. O'Brien for pointing out my error in interpretation of Nigerian gross domestic product (G.D.P.) during the war. His correction also helps to resolve a contradiction between my treatment of Biafran territory and my statement that ‘Other factors accounting for the slow growth were the drop in oil and manufacturing output in the secessionist East.’

With the expulsion of Ibos from Northern Nigeria and Asians from Uganda, the intriguing question of ethnic commercial specialisation and adaptation has increasingly occupied the minds of many scholars. One aspect of economic continuity from the pre-colonial period onwards has been an ethnic dominance in certain occupations and enterprises. Although some groups have lost their traditional commercial specialities, others have continued to be disproportionately influential in a particular sector, and have often maintained an effective monopoly, despite major changes in commerce and local political control. During the November 1972 African Studies Association meeting in Philadelphia, these developments were analysed by a panel organised by Barbara Lewis of Livingstone College. As she pointed out in her paper on ‘The Adaptation of Commercially-Specialised Ethnic Groups to Colonial and Post-Colonial Political Economics’:

In almost any analysis of contemporary African society, ethnic affiliation is an important independent variable. A wide range of behaviour, particularly of a political nature, has been explained and understood in terms of presumed intra-tribal solidarity and inter-tribal tension. Most of the evidence of ethnically-oriented behaviour is drawn from the actions and public rhetoric of political and journalistic élites or, if concerned with the phenomenon on a mass level, is indirect – e.g. inferences from patterns of voting behaviour. There is relatively little in the way of‘hard’ data on the ethnically oriented perceptions of Africans, and it is important that we collect direct evidence of their existence, so as to confirm our inferences based on indirect and impressionistic methodological techniques. One method of obtaining such evidence is by survey research.