^{Page 405 note 1} Published by the I.M.F., Washington, in four volumes, dated 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971.

^{Page 405 note 2} The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa has provided comparative enrolment ratios in primary and secondary education for 13 West African states, relating to the late 1950s, which showed Ghana's primary-school ratio to be double that of the next-highest ranking country, and three times the unweighted mean for the other countries. The secondary-school ratio was also the highest, even after correcting the erroneously high figure shown for Ghana. See U.N.E.C.A., Economic Survey for Africa (Addis Ababa, 1966),Google Scholar table 9.

^{Page 406 note 1} Parliamentary Debates (Accra), 1st Series, XXVI, 12 02 1962, cols. 300–1.Google Scholar

^{Page 406 note 2} Under the Control of Prices Act, No. 113 of 1962, the maximum penalty was a fine of ¢1,000 or two years imprisonment, or both. The Price Control Decree, 1972, provides for a fine of ¢1,000 or five years imprisonment, or both. On spare parts, see Ministry of Trade and Tourism, , Controlled Prices: motor vehicles spare parts (Accra, 1972).Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 1} Some corroboration that this may have happened in Ghana is to be found in the report of the Commission of Enquiry which examined the operation of the distributive system at that time: ‘One noticeable effect of the existing price control lists is that uncontrolled commodities have gone up in price. Traders seem to be retaliating against price control by gaining from the sale of uncontrolled commodities more than they have been restrained from profiting through certain items being controlled in price. In this way, they have fairly succeeded in defeating the general aims of the control system.’ Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malpractices in Ghana (Accra, 1965), p. 54,Google Scholar known locally as the Abrahams Report.

^{Page 408 note 2} I have estimated – from the national consumer price index data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics – that imports comprise about 15 per cent and local foods 51 per cent of the total consumption expenditure of low-income families.

^{Page 408 note 3} It has been calculated, on the basis of a 1962 national household expenditure survey, that the expenditure elasticity of demand for local foods was 0.64, as compared with 1.30 for imported food, and 1.24 for drink and tobacco; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Ghana: Projected Level of Demand, Supply and Imports of Agricultural Products in 1965, 1970, and 1975 (Edinburgh, 1964),Google Scholar table V. I. To give specific examples, it was found that urban households with total weekly expenditures of 50–100 pesewas per person spent 70 per cent of the total on local foods, whereas those with comparable expenditures of 350 pesewas or more spent only 46 per cent on local foods. Ibid. table C. 2.

^{Page 409 note 1} This article does not investigate another aspect which should, nevertheless, be mentioned – namely, the effect of price controls on economic growth and development. The main considerations here are that they are likely to reduce saving, and hence investment and growth, if they succeed in preventing a redistribution of income in favour of corporate profits (although that may be a price worth paying), and that controls will provide a distorted set of price signals as to the most profitable objects of investment. Specifically, if controls are effectively enforced on ‘essential’ consumer goods they are liable to discourage investment in the production and distribution of these, which is probably the opposite of what the authorities would like to do.

^{Page 409 note 2} Price Control (Maximum Prices) Order, 1969.

^{Page 411 note 1} See Szereszewski, Robert, ‘Regional Aspects of the Structure of the Economy’, in Birmingham, W., Neustadt, I., and Omaboe, E. N. (eds.), A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol. I, The Economy of Ghana (London, 1966), ch. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 412 note 1} I checked the permitted margins on sales in Accra of various ‘essential’ goods with the following results: cube sugar 5·0%, sardines 2·8%, pilchards 2·4%, imported corned beef 7·0%, evaporated milk 2·5%, and cement 1·7% A spot check of other items revealed similar magnitudes. All the margins referred to above relate to the difference between wholesale and retail prices, and the evidence provides no way of assessing the adequacy of the mark-up permitted to importers and local manufacturers. To judge from the permitted retail margins, however, the controllers presumably also sought to keep the profits of wholesalers and manufacturers down to a minimum.

^{Page 413 note 1} Sources: various Price Control (Maximum Prices) Instruments of the Government of Ghana. 1962, No. 344; 1963, Nos. 35 and 146; 1964, No. 84; 1966, No. 112; 1967, Nos. 11 and 100; 1969, No. 135; 1970, No. 19; 1971, Nos. 40, 62, and 65; 1972, No. 17.

^{Page 414 note 1} Seasonally corrected data indicate that the turnover of major trading companies was normal in March 1970, import levels had previously been somewhat above average, and the national consumer price index for that month was about ‘on trend’ – although the index for items other than local foods did fall several percentage points in April.

^{Page 415 note 1} Source: the data for this table can be provided by the author, upon request. A dash (—) indicates that the commodity in question was not in stock at the time of the price enumeration. A cross (+) indicates that there were an insufficient number of observations to warrant the calculation.

^{Page 416 note 1} The detailed examination of a sample of field sheets which this study involved left the impression that the C.B S enumerators mostly did a conscientious and accurate job. Only a few returns appeared questionable.

^{Page 416 note 2} A general tendency for the median values in Table 3 to be smaller than the corresponding means, indicates that the enumerations have a positively skewed distribution. I have employed the means in the text because they make fuller use of the data, but medians are also shown in Table 3.

^{Page 418 note 1} Most traditional markets in Ghana are overwhelmingly dominated by women traders, known popularly as ‘market mammies’.

^{Page 418 note 2} In his researches into politics in a small town in southern Ghana, Maxwell Owusu found that the G.N.T.C. store was used as an instrument of party patronage, with scarce goods being sold to political favourites at controlled prices who then resold them at a handsome profit. See his Uses and Abuses of Political Power: a case study of continuity and change in the politics of Ghana (Chicago, 1970), pp. 272–3.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 3} In his report to an annual general meeting of a U.A.C. subsidiary, Kingsway Stores of Ghana, on 7 June 1972, the Chairman said: ‘Prices will continue to rise and unless a realistic view is taken on those commodities subject to price control, profit margins are likely to fall… too rigid an approach to price control can result in a severe reduction in the revenue which we pay to Government, uncertain employment prospects for our staff and a reduction in the ability of the business to provide for future development and to provide an adequate return to shareholders.’ The Echo (Accra), 11 06 1972.Google Scholar

^{Page 419 note 1} The equation was Y = 6·58 + 1·012X, where Y was an index of the price charged on the markets, and X an index of the price charged in the stores, with the control price = 100. The standard error of b was 0·265, with a t value of 3·823, also significant at the 0·1 per cent level. An alternative regression, confined to cases in which the stores were exceeding the control price, yielded the similar equation Y = 8·39+0·99X, with an R² = 0·67, again significant at the 0·1 per cent level.

^{Page 420 note 1} Matches were excluded because the control price was completely inoperative, being above the recorded price in every case.

^{Page 420 note 2} The equation was Y = –45·15+ 1·092X, with a t value for b of 2.55, significant at the 5 per cent level.

^{Page 421 note 1} The commodities for which the control price was being charged in 20 per cent or more of the observations had an average of 1.9 nil returns per line; the commodities for which the control price was being exceeded in all observations had an average of 3.8 nil returns per line.

^{Page 421 note 2} Government of Ghana, , Annual Estimates for Ministry of Trade, 1966/67 (Accra, 1966).Google Scholar

^{Page 421 note 3} Abrahams Report, p. 56. On behalf of the Opposition, Jatoe Kaleo made what proved to be a very perceptive contribution to the debate on the 1962 Act. He asked for assurances that ‘unemployed ex-convicts’ would not be employed as voluntary price inspectors, adding: ‘I suspect that if these people are going to work voluntarily and not paid they will find a way somehow to meet their expenses.’ In reply the Minister of Finance and Trade assured him that ‘we shall try as much as is possible within the realm of human capability to see that the best men are recruited for this job’. Parliamentary Debates, 12 02 1962, cols. 307–8.Google Scholar However, it seems that the ‘realms of human capability’ proved too restrictive, for three years later the Abrahams Report (p. 53) had this to say: ‘The procedure for appointment of price inspectors initially included public advertisements. Subsequently, however, A. Y. K. Djin, when he was Minister of Trade, assumed personal responsibility for engaging them. It is known that he made it possible, no doubt inadvertently, for even ex-convicts to be so appointed. Indeed, one of them had nineteen previous convictions for various breaches of the law when he was made price inspector.’

^{Page 422 note 1} See my chapter 6 in Birmingham, Neustadt, and Omaboe, op. cit. esp. pp. 127–47.

^{Page 423 note 1} Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra. The index applies to those male Africans working in establishments employing ten or more persons.

^{Page 424 note 1} The observed pattern also had implications for the distribution of profits within the distributive system. With controls ignored except in urban stores, the system tended to disfavour the latter while allowing other distributors, on the markets and in the rural stores, to enjoy their monopoly profits almost unimpeded.

^{Page 424 note 2} See I.M.F. op. cit. The references to Zambia, the Ivory Coast, and Mauritania that follow are culled from vol. 3, p. 258 and vol. 4, p. 401. See also Kimble, Helen, Price Control in Tanzania (Nairobi, 1970).Google Scholar

^{Page 425 note 1} Lewis, A. Olu in West Africa (London), 14 and 21 01 1972.Google Scholar