A paradox of Italian colonial policy was the striking contrast between the main aims and the actual results of its overseas initiatives. The Mediterranean with its familiar towns, harbours, and cultures, and plenty of Italians transplanted from the poor overpopulated countryside of the Peninsula, was the main area of desirable expansion, but historical circumstances forced Italy to divert her attention towards the faraway and unknown Horn of Africa. The Foreign Minister, P. S. Mancini, in January 1885 adroitly formulated a bizarre aphorism in a bid to convince a disoriented public opinion and doubtful parliamentarians: ‘The Red Sea is the key to the Mediterranean’. So from the outset of Italian colonialism, dreams competed with interests almost making the authorities lose a sense of proportion.

[Peacekeepers] should not… have the obligation, the soldiers, or the equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning them into a fighting force erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts them into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival internal factions.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of many authoritarian régimes, some observers suggest that we are in the midst of what can be called a worldwide democratic revolution. Although questions remain as to the durability of these changes, particularly in Africa, it is clear that we are at a cross-roads. Nations are considering what kinds of political institutions they want to replace those they are trying to dismantle. What, at this historical moment, is the special appeal of democracy in the non-Western world? Is it the promise of individual freedom? or popular elections designed to give all citizens a say in who governs? or the prospect of guaranteed individual and group rights?

As many as seven Conférences nationales (CNs) took place in French-speaking Africa between February 1990 and January 1993, all against the background of the apparent ‘wind of change’ which is sweeping across the continent where democratic governance is eventually to replace authoritarian rule. In Benin, the assembly of delegates that met during 19–28 February 1990 was supposed to be representative of all social, religious, professional, and political interest groups whose aim was to introduce a constitutional liberal democracy. This CN managed to gain acceptance of the sovereignty which it had declared on the second day — namely, that all its decisions would be legal and binding. The authority of President Matthieu Kérékou was thus effectively emasculated, whilst the elections which were timetabled and held a year later, finally unseated him after 20 years in power. In Togo, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma was able to reject the sovereignty claimed. by the CN, held from 8 July to 28 August 1991, as the balance of power was firmly in his favour.

Most African states have been engaged in market-oriented economic reforms for the better part of a decade, if not longer. One characteristic of their liberalisation efforts that stands out in empirical studies is the unevenness with which measures have been agreed and implemented. But how do we understand what has been proposed and pursued? Who have been the principal players, what have been their motivations and strategies, when have they been able to influence the choices to be made, and have these conditioned the environment for successive proposals? In short, what are the dynamics of economic liberalisation in contemporary African economics, and what are the prospects for the durability and extension of market-oriented reforms? These questions motivate reflections on the checkered history of agricultural liberalisation in Madagascar.

In May 1994 the Life President of Malawi, Dr H. Kamuzu Banda, the world's oldest Head of State, was peacefully defeated in the country's first multi-party elections after having been in power since February 1963. During that 31 year era his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) régime had been characterised by a remarkably high degree of legitimacy. It can of course be argued that this was simply based on political repression, which certainly existed, notably during periods of excessive sensitivity to various criticisms and actions that were interpreted as threats to the prevailing stability. This could be seen in the activities of Banda's strong-arm organisations (such as the Young Pioneers and the Youth League), and in the omnipresent secret police, who did their best to identify dissidents and rebels. Punishments included detention without trial, or much worse, and disloyalty was often vaguely and broadly defined.

Independent Botswana has developed on three main pillars: rapid and sustained economic growth (over the decade to 1992, for example, at 8.4 per cent a year, third-highest among all developing countries, and far in excess of any other in Africa); multi-party or liberal democracy; and an efficient central state, the main features of which have been identified and praised by observers. With growth, an accompanying build-up of a relatively strong governmental system took place, with activities especially focused on finance and planning. The civil service was maintained at a high level, according to Ravi Gulhati, by avoiding rapid localisation, by providing high compensation for officials, and by keeping well-defined lines of authority and accountability. Able people were placed in key positions and kept there for extended periods. The political elite fairly consistently sought expert advice from leading bureaucrats, and the two groups have displayed a closeness and mutuality of interest built upon their common involvement in cattle and commerce, and the not uncommon tendency for cabinet ministers to arise from the ranks of the senior bureaucracy.