Probably no other aspect of the South African conflict has elicited more divergent explanations and misinterpretations than the ongoing political violence. It is variously attributed to (1) de Klerk's double agenda and unreformed police; (2) a ‘third force’ of right-wing elements in the security establishment, bent on derailing the Government's negotiation agenda; (3) Inkatha–A.N.C. rivalry, engineered by ambitious Buthelezi in danger of being sidelined as an equal third party; (4) the A.N.C.'s campaign of armed struggle, ungovernability, and revolutionary intolerance; (5) ingrained tribalism, unleashed by the lessening of white repression that merely resulted in ‘black-on-black’ violence formerly held in check; (6) the legacy of apartheid in general, a ‘lost youth’ generation. Helen Suzman, for example, singled out sanctions for at least ‘part of the blame’ in her 1991 presidential address to the Institute of Race Relations, while its director, John Kane-Berman, lists all parties as having ‘bloody hands’.