Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
Probably no other aspect of the South African conflict has elicited more divergent explanations and misinterpretations than the ongoing political violence. It is variously attributed to (1) de Klerk's double agenda and unreformed police; (2) a ‘third force’ of right-wing elements in the security establishment, bent on derailing the Government's negotiation agenda; (3) Inkatha–A.N.C. rivalry, engineered by ambitious Buthelezi in danger of being sidelined as an equal third party; (4) the A.N.C.'s campaign of armed struggle, ungovernability, and revolutionary intolerance; (5) ingrained tribalism, unleashed by the lessening of white repression that merely resulted in ‘black-on-black’ violence formerly held in check; (6) the legacy of apartheid in general, a ‘lost youth’ generation. Helen Suzman, for example, singled out sanctions for at least ‘part of the blame’ in her 1991 presidential address to the Institute of Race Relations, while its director, John Kane-Berman, lists all parties as having ‘bloody hands’.
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11 See Amanda Gowes, ‘Political Intolerance’, and Schlemmer, Lawrence, ‘The Mind of the Townships’, in Vrye Weekblad/Sowetan, Quarterly State of the Nation Report (Johannesburg), Winter 1991.Google Scholar
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20 For a descriptive account of unofficial state violence, see Lawrence, Patrick, Death Squads: apartheid's secret weapon (Johannesburg, 1991). In light of the atrocities on A.N.C. activists, it is remarkable that the organisation has absorbed some of the chief perpetrators. It would seem to carry forgiveness to its extreme when cold-blooded murderers are accepted as legitimate members of the A.N.C. after undergoing a change of mind and exposing their masters.Google Scholar
21 No policeman likes to be attacked, no matter how close his beliefs are to his adversaries. Had the A.W.B. approched the police cordon in Ventersdorp with flowers instead of baseball bats, iron rods, and hunting rifles, the response might have been different. Steeled in vicious battles with the A.N.C., many of the 1,600 Afrikaner policemen were initially hesitant and confused but eventually let loose with Alsatian dogs, tear-gas, and live ammunition against half-drunken hordes led by respected elders. The scene became a village brawl, with the police claiming to defend freedom of speech and the right-wing the democratic right to voice protest.
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24 The Goldstone Commission has been informally criticised by the A.N.C. as ‘a captive of the structures of the state and the security forces’. See SouthScan, 10 July 1992, p. 208. The implied denial of the independence of a forthright judge, as well as most of the Commission's officials, seems hardly justified. Obviously, some of the staff had to be seconded from government departments and universities. However, the fair-minded Commission risked its legitimacy by being an entirely all-white and all-male affair.
25 ‘ANC Units Running Wild, Says Chris Hani’, in Sunday Times, 2 August 1992, p. 1.Google Scholar
26 In contrast to most A.N.C. activists, particularly in the Transvaal, Nelson Mandela always kept in polite contact with Chief Buthelezi both by telephone and mail. ‘Obviously, my fervent hope’, he wrote to the leader of Inkatha from prison, ‘is to see, in due course, the restoration of the cordial relations which existed between you and OR [Oliver Tambo, president of the A.N.C.] and between the two organisations in the Seventies’. Sunday Tribune (Durban), 16 04 1989.Google Scholar
27 The A.N.C. has engaged in mutual courtship not only with the military rulers of the Transkei, where Mandela, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, and many other A.N.C. leaders originate, but also with sympathetic smaller Bantustans. Venda's military chief addressed a conference organised by Umkhonto we Sizwe in August 1991 at the local University to wild cheers from former guerrillas in search of jobs and recognition.
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29 Dhlomo, Oscar, in Sunday Tribune, 26 August 1990.Google Scholar
30 Reported in The Guardian Weekly (London), 12 05 1991.Google Scholar
31 Front File (London), 09 1991.Google Scholar
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33 Die Suid-Afrikaan (Cape Town), 36, 1992.Google Scholar
34 The Star (Johannesburg), 20 12 1990.Google Scholar
35 As Steven Friedman pointed out in the Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 10–16 05 1991, the well-intentioned ‘phasing out’ of the hostels may well trigger greater violence, as long as those living there are not part of the agreements.Google Scholar
36 Ibid. 22–7 March 1991.
37 Friedman, loc. cit.
38 The ploy of forged leaflets has been extensively used at different times and locations in South Africa to fan inter-communal antagonism or to discredit activist groups. Port Elizabeth seems to have been a centre for fomenting anti-A.N.C. sentiment during the 1980s when forged U.D.F. and Cosatu leaflets stirred up trouble by demanding financial contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle from each household.
Usually such materials could be easily identified by the false ‘struggle language’ they attempted to imitate. Over time, however, the products of the hate-mongers became ever more ‘sophisticated’. For example, in early 1990, pamphlets distributed widely in Natal maintained that Indian women carried an antidote to AIDS– a pernicious call for racial rape that was repeatedly denounced by Mandela.
39 Webster, Eddie, inaugural lecture as Professor of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, published in Business Day (Johannesburg), 2 August 1991.Google Scholar
40 Rickard, Carmel, ‘When You See the Enemy's Shacks Blaze, You Can't Help Feeling Good’, in Weekly Mail, 23 February 1990.Google Scholar
41 Ibid.
42 Schlemmer, loc. cit. pp. 7–10.
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45 Buchanan, Allen, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sunter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, 1992), p. 161.Google Scholar