In 1920 James Brown Scott, the celebrated teacher, international law scholar and practitioner, published his pioneering book The United States of America: A Study in International Organization. His underlying thesis was that the historic evolution of the United States provided a model for the development of international organizations in which local sovereignty and autonomy are preserved but “a more perfect union” is sought. Scott made the distinction that the delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 did not merge the States in a union, “but formed a union of States.” One of Scott's goals was to provide the delegates who would be convening at The Hague the imagination to consider a “Society of Nations” as a frame of reference that could guide their post-Great War deliberations. As he said:

To even begin suggesting that a natural law tradition exists in Islamic law, one has to overcome the hurdles set by those who avowedly deny that such a tradition exists. Respected Islamicists such as Patricia Crone and the late George Makdisi have stated in no uncertain terms that there is no natural law tradition in Islam. Presumably what they mean by this claim is that there is no “orthodox” tradition whereby premodern Muslims (e.g. ca. ninth-sixteenth century CE) allowed human beings to speak on behalf of the divine without recourse to scripture. Reason does not assume any ontological authority akin to that of scripture that would justify using it as a basis for finding, determining and constructing obligations that emanate from the divine.

In a sense, they are right. The dominant Positivist thesis, as expressed in premodern usul al-fiqh or legal theory, holds that where there is no scripture on a matter, one is left in a state of legal suspension (tawaqquf); there is no epistemically coherent way to determine the divine law on that matter, and consequently no one is in a sufficient epistemic position to attribute to God a ruling of any normative force. Fundamentally, this position enshrines within Islamic law a strict scriptural positivism. Jurists argued that all determinations of God's law must find expression, either directly or indirectly, from scripture. Extrascriptural indices, whether in the form of rational proofs or references to nature, do not provide a proper basis or foundation for asserting the divine law.

On January 27, 2003, amid much publicity, a path-breaking agreement was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Central Council of Jews in Germany. The historical background to, and the historic nature of, such an agreement needs no explanation. This agreement is worthy of scholarly review not only because of the manner in which the agreement came about, its provisions, and its place in the German legal system, but also because of critical assumptions it makes about what it means to be Jewish from the perspective of a modern secular nation-state attempting to respond to the aftermath of the Holocaust.

Because it sheds light on the difficulty of framing Jewish identity for purposes of secular law, however, I will first evaluate litigation currently in progress under a different but related agreement with the German State of Saxony-Anhalt. This litigation was brought by a liberal Jewish religious community that claims it has been unjustly excluded from the distribution of state subsidies made available to Jewish organizations under an agreement between that State and the Central Council of Jews. The litigation forces answers to difficult questions: what is the legal status of such agreements, who has the right to decide who counts as Jewish under them, and who speaks for the Jewish community in Germany?

Since the mid-1990s the debate over the teaching of evolution in public schools has acquired new life, largely as a result of a new generation of critics of evolution. In comparison to their predecessors, today's critics are better credentialed, have published works with respected academic and university presses and periodicals including peer-reviewed ones, and offer much more sophisticated arguments. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to engage the scientific merits of the arguments offered by these maverick scholars. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to explore a problem of jurisprudence, raised by philosopher Alvin Plantinga and responded to by philosopher of science Robert T. Pennock, whose resolution has relevance to the constitutional question of whether the teaching of evolution along with the works of its critics is permissible in a society whose citizens embrace contrary philosophical and religious points of view.

Suppose for a moment that you have been wrestling with the question of religious liberty in American history and contemporary life. You begin to see that it is a multi-layered concept, not easily captured in one attempt. Suppose further, then, that you could gather together in one place some of the people who have made a significant contribution to the discussion. Who would you invite to speak? How would they respond to each other? In light of what they said, how willing would you be to re-examine your own assumptions, your most cherished conclusions?

In a dream, anything can happen. The most unlikely people may find themselves in agreement, while longtime friends may find themselves at odds with one another. Our interlocutors might be acquainted with unfolding events beyond the boundaries of their historical careers, or they might confess that their knowledge is still limited to their own historical horizon …

The belief exists among certain circles that arguments based on religious convictions are innately flawed. At a minimum those who accept this doctrine believe that religious arguments are improper and should be avoided or go unheeded; at the extreme they propose a reworking of legal and social principles to exclude religious arguments. This article will discuss two arguments frequently advanced as evidence of the unacceptability of religious arguments in the United States of America and, after a short exposition of each position, will engage in a critical examination of the theories. This is a theoretical exercise and, as such, will not involve the separate question of what actual legal limits may or may not exist on the inclusion of religious arguments.

Increasingly, the historical significance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is becoming globally apparent. Within South Africa, debate about this imperfect but undeniably productive, transformative institution continues, long after the TRC formally shut its doors. The design of the many truth-seeking, reconciliatory mechanisms to emerge in Africa and elsewhere in recent years has been informed by comparative discussion in which the South African experience features prominently.

The TRC has been viewed as a groundbreaking confrontation with the challenges facing any transitional society: to discover the truth about the past, to account for it in ways that promote justice, and to develop reconciliation strategies that enable previously divided people to look forward, together. It represents an historic moment in which humane ways of dealing with an atrocious past have been cultivated.