1. Makdisi, George, Ibn 'Aqil: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam 130 (Edinburgh U. Press 1997)Google Scholar; Crone, Patricia, God's Rule: Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought 263–264 (Colum. U. Press 2004)Google Scholar.

2. By “Positivist” I mean those intellectual movements mat give primacy to the text, and reject a foundational role for reason in law or theology. Positivists, therefore, would generally hold positions against the speculative rationalist Mu'tazilis. For a study that posits a debate between Positivists and speculative rationalists see Makdisi, George, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West 4–12 (Edinburgh U. Press 1990)Google Scholar.

3. See discussion on this point below.

4. See e.g. Abu al-Ma'ali 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd Allah b. al-Juwayni, Yusuf, al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh, ed. Muhammad, Salah b. 'Awida 2:13 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997)Google Scholar.

5. For a discussion of various issues discussed within the field of natural law theory, see Westerman, Pauline C., The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis 12 (Brill 1998)Google Scholar.

6. For his work of jurisprudence, see Ahmad, Abu Bakr b. al-Jassas, 'Ali, Usul al-Jassas: al-Fusul fi al-Usul, ed. Tamir, Muhammad Muhammad (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2000)Google Scholar.

7. In stating the death date of authors, I rely on both the Islamic and Gregorian dating system. The Islamic calendar started in 622 CE when Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina. The reference to the Islamic date is used to illustrate the extent of the elapsed time from the era of the Prophet.

8. Qur'an 2:29.

9. Al-Jassas, supra n. 6, at 2:100; al-Hasan, Al-Qadi Abual-Asad'abadi, 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Taklif of al-Mughni 27, 30 (Husayn, Taha ed., n.p.: n.p. n.d.)Google Scholar; Muhammad, Abu al-Husayn b. al-Basri, al-Tayyib, al-Mu'tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh 2:315–316 (Dar al-Kutub al-Tlmiyya n.d.)Google Scholar.

10. Crone, supra n. 1, at 263-264.

11. Reinhart, A. Kevin, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought 4–5 (SUNY Press 1995)Google Scholar.

12. For instance, the premodern positivist jurist Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) acknowledged that those issues addressed by text (al-mansusat) do not adequately address all possible situations (al-waqa‘i’) that could arise. Imam al-Haramayn Abu al-Ma'ali 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd Allah b. al-Juwayni, Yusuf, al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh 2:13 ('Awida, Salah b. Muhammad b. ed., Dar al-Kutub al-Tlmiyya 1997)Google Scholar.

13. Notably, the Mu'tazilite jurist Abu al-Husayn al-Basri argued that all acts are presumptively permissible as long as there is no indication or evidence of any evil in the act. Al-Basri, supra n. 9, at 2:316.

14. Al-Jassas, supra n. 6, at 2:99-105.

15. Id. at 2:100.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Shihab al-Din Abu al-'Abbas Ahmad b. Idris 'al-Qarafi, Abd al-Rahman al-Sanhaji, Nafa'is al-Usul fi Sharh al-Mahsul 1:138, 140 ('Ata, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2000)Google Scholar.

26. Id. at 1:140.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 1:138.

29. Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence 413–431 (3d ed., Islamic Texts Socy. 2003)Google Scholar.

30. Al-Qarafi, supra n. 25, at 1:138-139. Al-Qarafi took pains to describe the Mu'tazilite naturalist view accurately and in fact castigated those who, in their opposition to the Mu'tazilites, oversimplified or misrepresented Mu'tazilite theories. Id. at 1:140. He even argued that given the Mu'tazilite's premises, their naturalistic arguments were in fact coherent. Consequently, al-Qarafi spent much of his analysis attacking the premises upon which the naturalists relied. So for instance, he said that the Mu'tazilites used the notion of maslaha to ground their obligations with both objectivity and normativity. However they also relied on scripture as a basis for obligations. Al-Qarafi argued that it is possible that scripture may prohibit something that is rationally considered a maslaha, and as such the Mu'tazilite argument suffers from contradiction. Id. at 1:138-139. Furthermore, al-Qarafi contended that while the terms husn and qubh may anchor God's actions to a prevailing maslaha in theory, human rational speculation cannot necessarily identify with determinacy what that maslaha is in any given case. Id. at 1:148-149. Consequently, he later stated that husn and qubh do not capture the maslaha or mafsada of an act, but rather reflect God's determination of punishment and reward. Id. at 1:152.

31. 'Ali b. Hazm, Abu Muhammad, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 2:54 (Dar al-Hadith 1984)Google Scholar. al-Juwayni, Abu al-Ma'ali, Ghiyath al-Umam fi Iltiyath al-Zulam 85 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997)Google Scholar. Al-Juwayni argued that the purpose of law and government is in fact to keep people's desires (hawa) restrained. Consequently, such desires, for al-Juwayni, cannot be the basis for normative determinations of moral value.

32. al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad b. Muhammad, al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Usul 1:154–155 (Ramadan, Ibrahim Muhammad ed., Dar al-Arqam n.d.)Google Scholar. See also al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr Ahmad b. 'Ali b. Thabit al-Khatib, Kitab al-Faqih wa al-Mutafaqqih wa Usul al-Fiqh 193–194 (Zakariya 'Ali Yusuf 1977)Google Scholar; al-Shirazi, Abu Ishaq, Shark al-Lum'a 2:984 (Turki, 'Abd al-Majid ed., Dar al-Gharab al-Islami 1988)Google Scholar. Al-Sam'ani (d. 489/1096) challenged those who argued for rational permissibility and obligation on the grounds of a benefit found to reside in the act (manfa'a). He argued that the issue is not about whether there is benefit to an act, which thereby serves as the normative basis for the act's valuation. Rather what matters is whether there are indicators (imara) that the act contains some evil (qubh). In other words, one does not make affirmative rational presumptions of obligation. Rather one only negates obligation where there is an indication of evil. al-Sam'ani, Mansur b. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbar, Qawati 'al-Adilla fi al-Usul 2:49–50 (al-Shafi'i, Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Hasan Isma'il ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997)Google Scholar.

33. Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, supra n. 32, at 2:983-984.

34. Id.

35. Id. at 2:983-984.

36. Al-Juwayni, supra n. 4, at 1:10.

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. Id.

41. al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr Ahmad b. 'Ali al-Khatib, Kitab al-Faqih wa al-Mutafaqqih 192–194 (n.p.: Matba'at al-Imtiyaz 1977)Google Scholar; Hazm, Ibn, Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 1:52Google Scholar; Abu al-Muzaffar Mansur b. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Sam'ani, supra n. 32, at 2:46-47, 52 (Muhammad Hasan Muhamad Hasan Isma'il al-Shafi'i ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997); Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, supra n. 32, at 2:977; al-Qarafi, supra n. 25, at 1:173; al-Samarqandi, , Mizan al-Usul 1:314 (Lajnat Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi wa al-Islami 1987)Google Scholar. The Maliki al-Qassar wrote that some of his Maliki companions adopted this view, arguing that one needs proof (hujja) to establish something as either permissible or prohibited. Al-Qassar, , al-Muqaddima fi Usul 153–155 (al-Sulaymani, Muhammad b. al-Husayn ed., Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1996)Google Scholar. In other words, one cannot rely on reason to create obligations where there is no scripture. But for al-Qassar, there is no situation that is without a scriptural basis. The prophets after Adam have decided all matters of obligation, and as such there is nothing that has not been addressed. Muhammad Fayd al-Hasan al-Kankuhi said that where what is at stake is the question of reward and punishment, the Ash'arites argued that such determinations can only come from scripture. al-Kankuhi, Muhammad Fayd al-Hasan, 'Umdat al-Hawashi, in 'Ali al-Shashi, Abu, Usul al-Shashi 143 (Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi 1982)Google Scholar. 'Al Lamishi wrote that this position was held by the Maturidites, the positivists (ashab al-hadith), and some Mu'tazilites. Lamishi, Al, Kitab fi Usul al-Fiqh 105 (Turki, 'Abd al-Majid ed., Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1995)Google Scholar. For him, there is no room for reason to establish obligations (la hazz li ['aql] fi ma'rifa al-ahkam al-shar'iyya). In matters not addressed by scripture, there is no rale of law. Al-Farikan wrote that this is the position adopted by the majority of Ash'arites. Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman b. al-Farikan, Ibrahim Ibn, Sharh al-Waraqat 347–350 (al-Hajiri, Sarah Shafi ed., Dar al-Basha'ir al-Islamiyya 2001)Google Scholar. Interestingly, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali said that a group of Mu'tazilites adopted this view as well. Although their position of waqf was one that held that while there is no obligation without scripture, acts still have essential characteristics that reason can investigate. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:151, 153. See also al-Samarqandi, , Mizan al-Usul 1:314Google Scholar, who listed Mu'tazilites who adopted the position of tawaqquf. He also mentioned that the Positivists (ashab al-hadith) adopted this position as well.

42. al-Baji, Abu Walid, Ihkam al-Fusul fi Ahkam al-Usul 2:700 (2d ed., Turici, 'Abd al-Majid ed., Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1995)Google Scholar.

43. Notably, the Hanafites argued that witr prayer is obligatory and based their ruling on traditions of the Prophet. But the Hanafites did not consider those who reject this obligation to be heretics. al-Marghinani, Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Abi Bakr al-Farghani, al-Hidaya: Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi' 1:80 (Darwish, Muhammad ed., Dar al-Arqam n.d.)Google Scholar.

44. Abu Walid al-Baji, supra n. 42, at 2:700.

45. Id.

46. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:585.

47. On the role of istishab al-hal for those who adopted the tawaqquf position of suspension, see al-Qassar, supra n. 41, at 157; al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, supra n. 41, at 191-192; Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, supra n. 32, at 2:986; al-Lamishi, , Kitab fi Usul al-Fiqh 188 (Turki, 'Abd al-Majid ed., Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1995)Google Scholar. The Andalusian Zahiri jurist Ibn Hazm presented a different way to deal with this situation. He questioned those who argued that in cases where there is no scripture, one must avoid such matters out of precaution (ihtiyat). But Ibn Hazm argued that this approach cannot be used as a basis for prohibition since it does not produce certain knowledge, but rather only probable knowledge (zann). Ruling by ihtiyat is to rule by zann, and ruling by zann is to rule by deceit (kadhb). For Ibn Hazm, the rule pursuant to ihtiyat seems to be based on a notion of piety rather than legality. Rather, since God has specifically stated that all of creation is for human benefit, the presumption of ihtiyat counters the very terms of scripture. Rather for Ibn Hazm, the existence of things in the world, coupled with God's permissive attitude toward utilizing them, constitutes the basis for what is effectively a freedom from liability for partaking in such matters. Ibn Hazm, supra n. 41, at 2:180-189.

48. For a discussion of the early Mu'tazilite debates on of God's justice and His persistence in doing the good, see Watt, W. Montgomery, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought 238–242 (1973; repr. Oneworld Publications 1998)Google Scholar.

49. Manzur, Ibn, Lisan al-'Arab 2:517 (3d ed., Dar Sadir 1994)Google Scholar; al-Zabidi, , Taj al-'Arus 4:125–126 (Shiri, 'Ali ed., Dar al-Fikr 1994)Google Scholar.

50. al-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq b. Ibrahim b. Musa b. Muhammad, al-I'tisam 2:608 ('Id al-Halali, Salim b. ed., Dar Ibn 'Affan 1997)Google Scholar.

51. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:636. Manzur, Ibn, Lisan al-'Arab 2:517Google Scholar, defined the term as the good or salah. For the same definition, see al-Zabidi, supra n. 49, at 4:125-126.

52. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:636.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 1:637.

55. Id.

56. Id.

57. Id.

58. Id.

59. Id.

60. Id.

61. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:634-635.

62. Qur'an 58:3-4. This verse actually addresses the expiation for illegitimately rejecting one's wife and marital union through the mechanisms of zihar. However as jurists such as al-Marghinani suggested, the expiation for violating the fast was the same as for engaging in zihar. Al-Marghinani, supra n. 43, at 1-2:150.

63. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:635.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 1:635-636.

66. Id. at 1:636.

67. Id.

68. Id. at 1:635-636.

69. Id. at 1:638.

70. Id.

71. Id.

72. Id. at 1:639.

73. Id.

74. Id.

75. Id.

76. Id. at 1:640.

77. Id. at 1:640-641. Notably, in his earlier work, Shifa' al-Ghalil, al-Ghazali stated that one could rely on both the haja and the darura for independent analysis, as long as they inductively pose a nexus to the body of Shari'a (kana mula'iman li tasarrufat al-shar'). However, the third weakest category could not be used for such analysis. al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Muhammad, Shifa' al-Ghalil fi Bayan al-Shabh wa al-Mukhil wa Masalik al-Ta 'lil 208–209 (al-Kubaysi, Muhammad ed., Ra'asa Diwan al-Awqaf 1971)Google Scholar.

78. Id. at 1:640-641.

79. Id. at 1:642.

80. Id.

81. Id. at 1:641-642.

82. Id. at 1:642.

83. Id.

84. Id. at 1:643.

85. Id. at 1:642-643.

86. Id. at 1:644.

87. Id. at 1:643-644.

88. Id. at 1:644.

89. Id.

90. Id. at 1:644-645.

91. Id.

92. See Qur'an 4:92-93, 5:32, 17:33.

93. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 32, at 1:647.

94. Id.

95. Id.

96. Id. at 1:652.

97. Id.

98. Id. at 1:652-653.

99. Id. at 1:652-654.

100. Al-Ghazali, supra n. 77, at 162-163 (emphasis added).

101. Ibn Manzur, supra n. 49, at 10:49-50, 52; al-Zabidii, Abu Fayd Muhammad Murtada al-Husayni, Taj al-'Urus min Jawahir al-Qamus 13:80 (Dar al-Fikr 1994)Google Scholar; Lane, E.W., Arabic-English Lexicon 1:607 (Islamic Texts Socy. 1984)Google Scholar.

102. Ibn Manzur, supra n. 49, at 10:50; Murtada al-Zabidi, supra n. 101, at 13:79.

103. Murtada al-Zabidi, supra n. 101, at 13:79-80.

104. Ibn Manzur, supra n. 49, at 10:51; Murtada al-Zabidi, supra n. 101, at 13:81; Lane, supra n. 101, at 1:605.

105. Murtada al-Zabidi, supra n. 101, at 13:81, 82.

106. For a discussion of the different kinds of claims captured by the term “right,” see Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Cook, Walter Wheeler ed., repr. ed., Yale U. Press 1964)Google Scholar (originally published 1919). For a discussion of Hohfeld's typology of rights see Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights 199–205 (repr. ed., Clarendon Press 1993) (originally published 1980)Google Scholar.

107. Qur'an 24:4-5.

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118. Ibn Qudama, supra n. 116, at 8:284-285.

119. al-Shabramallisi, 'Ali b.'Ali, Hashiya 'ala Nihayat al-Muhtaj, in the margins of al-Saghir, Muhammad b. Abi al-'Abbas Ahmad b. Hamza b. Shihab al-Din al-Ramli al-Shafi'i, Nihayat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj 7:423 (Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi 1992)Google Scholar.

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122. Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, supra n. 121.

123. According to the Shafi'ite al-Mawardi, this was an option allowed by the Malikites. Al-Mawardi, supra n. 108, at 11:9.

124. Rushd, Ibn (al-Jadd), al-Bayan wa al-Tahsil 16:290 (al-Hababi, Ahmad ed., Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1988)Google Scholar.

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127. Al-Qaffal, supra n. 112; al-Mawardi, supra n. 108, at 11:9.

128. Ibn Rushd (al-Jadd), supra n. 124.

129. Ibn Nujaym, supra n. 108, at 5:61.

130. Ibn Hazm, Abu Muhammad 'Ali b. Ahmad b. Sa'id, al-Muhalla bi al-Athar 12:256 (al-Bandari, 'Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya n.d.)Google Scholar.

131. al-Kasani, 'Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr b. Mas'ud, Bada ‘i’ al-Sana ‘i’ fi Tartib al-Shara ‘i’ 9:249 (Mu'awwad, 'Ali Muhammad & al-Mawjud, 'Adii Ahmad 'Abd eds., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997)Google Scholar.

132. Al-Qaffal, supra n. 112; al-Mawardi, supra n. 108, at 11:9. The Hanafite jurist al-Sarakhsi suggested that Abu Hanifa's other disciple, Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 189/805) also held the view ascribed to Abu Yusuf. Al-Sarakhsi, supra n. 125, at 9:107.

133. Al-Marghinani, supra n. 43, at 1-2:402.

134. For works that accept the positivist description of Islamic law, see for instance, Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (repr. ed., Oxford U. Press 1997) (originally published 1964)Google Scholar; Coulson, N.J., A History of Islamic Law (repr. ed., Edinburgh U. Press 1997) (originally published 1964)Google Scholar; Weiss, Bernard G., The Spirit of Islamic Law (U. Ga. Press 1998)Google Scholar. For studies that attempt to identify some theoretical flexibility in a legal system otherwise beset by scriptural positivism, see Hallaq, Wael B., Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge U. Press 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dutton, Yasin, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qur'an, the Muwatta', and Madinan 'Amai (Curzon 1999)Google Scholar.

135. See Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion, Section I: Introduction and Structure (available at http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf (accessed Oct. 2005)).

136. For discussions on this distribution of rights scheme concerning the right of divorce, see Spectorsky, Susan, Introduction, in Chapters on Marriage and Divorce: Responses of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Rahwayh 27–39, 50–52 (Spectorsky, Susan trans., U. Tex. Press 1993)Google Scholar; Jawad, Haifaa A., The Rights of Women in Islam: An Authentic Approach 79–82 (St. Martin's Press 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a survey of how modern Muslim states deal with divorce right schemes, see Na'im, Abd Allah Ahmad, Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book (An-Na'im, Abdullahi A. ed., Zed Books 2002)Google Scholar. Notably, a woman may reserve for herself in her marriage contract the power to unilaterally divorce her husband. But this must be negotiated with her husband, and is not the default position.

137. Qur'an65:1.

138. Al-Mawardi, supra n. 108, at 10:111.

139. Id. at 10:113.

140. Id.

141. Id. at 10:114, quoting Qur'an 2:228, which states in full:

Divorced women shall wait concerning themselves for three monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for them to hide what God has created in their wombs. If they have faith in God and the Final Day. And their husbands have the better right to take them back in that period, if they wish for reconciliation. And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable. But men have a degree over them. And God is exalted and wise (emphasis added).

142. Id. at 10:114.

143. Id.

144. Notably, Muslim governments such as Egypt have arguably adopted a similar conception of both men and women to justify their unequal distribution of divorce rights, despite the fact that their respective rights schemes contravene the express provisions of CEDAW, which many of them have ratified with reservations. For Egypt's reservation to Article 16 of CEDAW, which relies on a presumed Islamic distinction between men and women see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty10.asp (accessed Nov. 4, 2005)).

145. Many Muslim countries that apply Islamic marriage and divorce law have restricted a husband's unilateral right to divorce by requiring him to petition a court for divorce. Others such as Egypt require the husband to provide his wife a notarized document indicating that she is divorced. See Ahmad Na'im, supra n. 136, at 87-186.