In May 1992, Pedro Collor de Mello accused his brother and then-president of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, of involvement in an extensive corruption scheme operated and directed by his former campaign manager, Paulo César Farias. Pressured by opposition forces, the Brazilian Congress set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the widely publicized charges. Despite a combination of both passive resistance and active harassment on the part of government, the commission began a searching probe into Farias' diverse and shady dealings. Following leads uncovered by investigative journalists, the commission found conclusive evidence that Farias had, indeed, paid for many of the president's personal expenses, up to and including a $2.5 million landscaping job for the Collor mansion grounds. Much of this money came from the private enterprise sector in return for favors, like government contracts, which Farias was able to obtain by using his influence with the Collor administration.

The recent coups and attempted coups in Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru serve as a sobering reminder of the military's central role in the political life of Latin America. Earlier assessments of the prospects for democratic consolidation now seem overly optimistic in light of these events. At a minimum, they point up the need to focus on the role of the military during transitions from authoritarianism and the consolidation of democratic regimes. As Stepan has suggested, prolonged military rule can leave important legacies which serve as powerful obstacles to democratic consolidation (Stepan, 1988: xi-xii). Understanding these legacies and the problems they present is essential in developing strategies aimed at democratizing civil-military relations.

This is no less true in El Salvador, where the prospects for democratization are closely linked to the future of the country's armed forces.

There is a moment in “I, Claudius” where Claudius, the king, looks back at all that had happened during his lifetime and before and decides that it is all rotten and has to be destroyed. And he makes a statement. He says: “Let all the poisons that lurk in the mud hatch out.”

In a very real sense, Claudius’ curse sums up much of what has happened in Cuba during the last several years. All of the weaknesses and pathologies of the Castro regime, many of which had been hidden beneath its monolithic façade, have come to the surface. The revolution has soured. The situation has grown so bad that most political observers today assume that the regime is in its “final hour.” Cuba is “collapsing,” and the only real questions are when and how Fidel will go and what will replace him.

While Castro must leave sooner or later, reports of his impending demise have been much exaggerated. A golpe de estado is possible, but not probable.

The low-profile foreign policy of the Fernando Collor de Mello government remained faithful to the major outlines which had guided Brazilian diplomacy for the last thirty years. In fact, during the 1990-91 period, the administration reaffirmed — in both actions and words —its commitment to such basic principles of Brazilian policy as national sovereignty, socio-economic development, international cooperation, multilateralism, universalism, and devotion to peace.

In addition the government continued to pursue the twin goals of technological progress and regional integration, both tenets of Brazilian foreign policy since the 1950s which continued to rank high on the executive agenda in 1990-91.

In fact, some of the above-named principles had become so established as national articles of faith that they were incorporated into the Federal Constitution of October 1988.