1 See Coleman, James A. and Almond, Gabriel (eds.), Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Karl W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review (September, 1961), pp. 493-514; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review (March, 1959), pp. 69-105; Pye, Lucien, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

2 See Germani, Gino, Político y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1963)Google Scholar; George I. Blanksten, “Politics of Latin America” in James A. Coleman and Gabriel Almond (eds.), op. cit., pp. 455-531; K. H. Silvert, “National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers,” International Social Science Journal (1963), pp. 550-70.

3 See William S. Stokes, “Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics,” Western Political Quarterly (September, 1952), pp. 445-68; Merle Kling, “Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” Western Political Quarterly (March, 1959), pp. 21-35.

4 Article 25 of the Chilean Constitution of 1925.

5 For a graphic description of present voting procedures, see Charles H. Dougherty, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Comparative Political Systems, 1964), pp. 30-31.

6 The larger, traditional political parties are the Conservative, Liberal, Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties.

7 Voting procedures under the joint list system, used prior to 1961, can be found in Mario Bernaschina Gonzales, Cartilla Electoral (Santiago: Editorial Juridica, 1958), pp. 142-53.

8 For the procedures involved in the cumulative vote system in Chile, see Carlos Estévez Gazmuri, Elementos de derecho constitutional (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica, 1949), pp. 159-60.

9 Until the 1965 congressional election, large landholders had been able to send Conservatives and Liberals to Congress, and through their trade association, the National Agricultural Society, they had been able to achieve some cohesion and agreement on policies affecting their economic and social interests.

10 The urban working class of Santiago, Valparaíso, and Conceptión have often supported Socialist and Communist candidates. However, the emergence of the PDC indicates that urban workers are a less enduring base of electoral support for Socialists and Communists than had been supposed. Although women voters more consistently favored President Frei than men voters in the working class communes of Santiago in the 1964 presidential election, there was majority male support for the Christian Democrat against Socialist Salvador Allende of FRAP in some but not all working class communes. See Orville G. Cope, “The 1964 Presidential Election in Chile: The Politics of Change and Access,” Inter-American Economic Affairs (Spring, 1966), pp. 25-29.

11 The Congress, constitutionally deprived of censuring a cabinet, has threatened, brought accusations, or demanded impeachment proceedings against ministers, forcing appointment of a coalition party member or an independiente. For accounts of congressional and ministerial conflict from 1936 to 1958, see John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942); Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitator y demoledor, Vol. II (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1952); Ernesto Wiirth Rojas, Ibáñez, caudillo enigmático (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1958.

12 At times, when a national crisis has occurred, the Congress has acted to advance legislation that would have some long-range development effect on the national economy. For an account of how the tragic earthquake of 1939 led political parties to support enabling legislation to establish FOMENTO, see Herman Finer, The Chilean Development Corporation (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1947).

13 The president has three kinds of emergency power: (1) extraordinary powers, expressly specified and granted by Congress for six months with possible time extension; (2) declaration of a state of siege declared by the president when Congress is not in session, but Congress, after reconvening, must reject declaration to end state of siege; (3) state of assembly declared by the president in case of war to place a specific area under military command.

14 Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Estatutos del Partido Demócrata Cristiano, 1963 (Santiago: Impresores “El Imparcial,” 1964).

15 The new election law also strengthened penalties for non-registration, created permanent voter lists, and stipulated that juridical recognition of a political party must be contingent on at least one elected representative in Congress. See Elecciones: Ley No. 14.852 (Santiago: Ediciones Gutenberg, 1963).

16 A second constitutional amendment sought to “decentralize” the administrative subdivisions of the state by allowing new regional juntas to disperse state public services and allow new local leaders to aid in resolving of local problems.

17 Ercilla, March 3, 1965, pp. 16-18.

18 Fully aware that the “Chileanization Bill” would be rebutted by the Liberal-Conservative-Radical coalition in Congress, President Frei and the PDC were able to use it as a plank in their congressional election platform. The “mixed corporation” idea has some currency in Chilean politics. As an ideological tenet of the “communiterium values” of Chilean Christian Democracy and when exploited in terms of “Chileanization,” it has considerable nationalistic appeal since it represents an assertion of the power of the national public government over foreign private enterprise. From an economic standpoint, the “mixed corporation,” by providing a method to promote continued capital investment in a prime industry and to permit government to control production levels, would aid in expanding foreign markets for copper goods in order to aid in balancing Chile's external debt.

19 Ercilla, March 3, 1965, pp. 11, 16.

20 Those members of the electorate who cast ballots in 1965 represented 32 per cent of the population (1960 census). Voter registration amounted to 39.8 per cent of the population.

21 The election of Juan Montedonico, a Christian Democrat representing Valparaíso and Quillota in the by-election of March 6, 1966, increased the number of Chamber seats held by the PDC to 83. The seat was formerly held by a Radical.

22 While the First and Second congressional districts of Santiago province consist of varied residential and commercial communes composed of upper middle and working class voters, the most populous electoral district, the Third District, includes such diverse inhabitants as the upper and middle classes in the communes of Las Condes, Providencia, and Nuñoa, and working classes (including the unemployed) in the communes of San Miguel, La Cisterna, and La Granja. Numerous callampas exist in the latter three communes.

23 During the 1964 presidential election, President Frei received voting support from members of some of the traditional parties. See Cope, op. cit., pp. 21-29. Whether this pattern was sustained in March, 1965 is open to question, but PDC candidates scored heavily in the central valley provinces where both Liberals and Conservatives have maintained support. At times, party nomenclature and allegiances have been relative in Chilean politics. For example, during the 1965 campaign a Conservative deputy from Concepción, Ruffo Ruiz-Esquide, decided that rather than continue to run for re-election he would support a cousin, Mariano Ruiz-Esquide, who ran on the PDC list in Concepción and won a deputy seat. Ercilla, March 3, 1965, p. 17.

24 Post election conflict within the PDC was evident during the meeting of the National Junta in July, 1965. Senator Patricio Aylwin, with the support of President Frei, defeated Deputy Alberto Jerez for the Party Presidency. Although Aylwin was reelected in 1966, Senator Rafael Gumucio was elected President in 1967, as a result of the decline in the PDC's popular vote in the 1967 municipal elections, and sustained criticism by younger deputies of the slowness of the Party's leaders to develop reform legislation.