It is well known that stock returns, on average, are negative on Mondays. Yet, it is less well known that this finding is substantially the consequence of returns in prior trading sessions. When Friday's return is negative, Monday's return is negative nearly 80 percent of the time with a mean return of −0.61 percent. When Friday's return is positive, the subsequent Monday's mean return is positive, 0.11 percent. This relationship is stronger than for any other pair of trading days and is most acute in small- and medium-size companies. The trading behavior of individual investors appears to be at least one factor contributing to this pattern. Individual investors are more active sellers of stock on Mondays, particularly following bad news in the market.

New cross-sectional tests of the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis are presented. The tests assume that the distribution of the mixing variable (often interpreted as the daily rate of flow of information) is not identical for all securities. Cross-security differences in the mixing distribution cause cross-security differences in the joint distribution of returns and volume. The Hypothesis provides predictions about how these differences appear in the joint distribution. The predictions are confirmed in tests based on cross-security correlations among summary statistics that characterize shape and covariational attributes of the joint distribution of returns and volume. The results are consistent with the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis.

This paper establishes liquidity linkage between stock and Treasury bond markets. There is a lead-lag relationship between illiquidity of the two markets and bidirectional Granger causality. The effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity is consistent with flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity episodes. Monetary policy impacts illiquidity. The evidence indicates that bond illiquidity acts as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred into the stock market. These effects are observed across illiquidity of bonds of different maturities and are especially pronounced for illiquidity of short-term maturities. The paper provides evidence of illiquidity integration between stock and bond markets.

The estimation of dynamic no-arbitrage term structure models with a flexible specification of the market price of risk is beset by severe small-sample problems arising from the highly persistent nature of interest rates. We propose using survey forecasts of a short-term interest rate as an additional input to the estimation to overcome the problem. To illustrate the methodology, we estimate the 3-factor affine-Gaussian model with U.S. Treasury yields data and demonstrate that incorporating information from survey forecasts mitigates the small-sample problem. The model thus estimated for the 1990–2003 sample generates a stable and sensible estimate of the expected path of the short rate, reproduces the well-known stylized patterns in the expectations hypothesis tests, and captures some of the short-run variations in the survey forecast of the changes in longer-term interest rates.

In the linear market-index model of the return-generating process, return on security j is given by

where αj and βj are constants characteristic of company j, is return on a market index, and is the company-specific component of return such that and . The coefficient βj is given by . It is known as market responsiveness, volatility, systematic risk, and, more commonly, simply as “beta.” It has been widely accepted as a measure of nondiversifiable risk and incorporated in popular performance measures. Many stock information services now provide estimates of beta.

This paper attempts to characterize liquidity-driven noise in the CRSP Government Bond price data set by comparing these price records to the independently collected Shearson Lehman Brothers (SLB) Bond Data Base. We argue that discrepancies between the data sets are due largely to liquidity-driven price errors, and we show that they are systematically related to certain bond characteristics. On the other hand, these discrepancies are small in magnitude and are approximately mean zero. We examine data filters based on observable bond characteristics and show that these filters can reduce the noise in price records while preserving their mean zero nature. The effects of these errors on performance evaluation are investigated by comparing results using filtered and unfiltered data.

I test whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets by estimating the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. I find two main results. First, CEOs of emerging market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm's performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. Second, for the subset of firms with a large domestic shareholder, there is no link between CEO turnover and firm performance. For this subset of emerging market firms, corporate governance appears to be ineffective.

We analyze the intertemporal stability of excess returns to technical trading rules in the foreign exchange market by conducting true, out-of-sample tests on previously studied rules. The excess returns of the 1970s and 1980s were genuine and not just the result of data mining. But these profit opportunities had disappeared by the early 1990s for filter and moving average rules. Returns to less-studied rules also have declined but have probably not completely disappeared. High volatility prevents precise estimation of mean returns. These regularities are consistent with the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo (2004)), but not with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

This research develops and tests a model for the prediction of tender offer outcomes. Variables that increase the supply of “obtainable shares” (such as increased bid premiums or the payment of solicitation fees) are shown to increase the probability of success. Increased ownership of target firm shares by the bidder also increases the probability of success. Variables that impede the tendering of shares (such as target management opposition or a competing bid) decrease the probability of success. Tests of the model utilizing both linear and logistic analysis support the theoretical constructs and help resolve the paradoxical findings of previous research.

We integrate appealing features of Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio theory (MVT) and Shefrin and Statman’s behavioral portfolio theory (BPT) into a new mental accounting (MA) framework. Features of the MA framework include an MA structure of portfolios, a definition of risk as the probability of failing to reach the threshold level in each mental account, and attitudes toward risk that vary by account. We demonstrate a mathematical equivalence between MVT, MA, and risk management using value at risk (VaR). The aggregate allocation across MA subportfolios is mean-variance efficient with short selling. Short-selling constraints on mental accounts impose very minor reductions in certainty equivalents, only if binding for the aggregate portfolio, offsetting utility losses from errors in specifying risk-aversion coefficients in MVT applications. These generalizations of MVT and BPT via a unified MA framework result in a fruitful connection between investor consumption goals and portfolio production.

We study how securities analysts influence managers’ use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage loss by decreasing real earnings management while increasing accrual manipulation. These effects are significantly stronger among firms with less coverage and for firms close to the zero-earnings threshold. Our causal evidence suggests that managers use real earnings management to enhance short-term performance in response to analyst pressure, effects that are not uncovered when focusing solely on accrual-based methods.

One of the main principles of corporate finance is that managers should maximize the market value of the outstanding securities. While it is realized that managers and security holders may have divergent objectives, it is generally assumed that various market forces keep managerial and shareholders' goals in line. Out of the extensive literature on this issue, three such market forces emerge. First, non-value-maximizing firms are prime targets for take-over bids (e.g., see [14]): bidding firms could acquire control over the shares of the target firm, replace the management, follow a value-maximizing strategy, and realize a profit from the resulting appeciation of the target shares. Second, outside shareholders may charge managers-owners ex ante by discounting stock prices for expected managerial expropriation, which may induce managers to accept various restrictions on their behavior (e.g., see [11]). Third, shareholders may charge managers ex post, indirectly via the discipline imposed by a competitive managerial labor market (e.g., [8]). Note the difference from the previous mechanism: Jensen and Meckling [11] assume that managerial wages are fixed so that all the adjustment for expected expropriation is reflected in stock prices (and, ultimately, in costly monitoring and bonding devices). In Fama's [8] model, all the adjustment occurs in the managerial labor market, so that the value of the firm remains unaffected by expected managerial expropriation.

A number of recent studies finds two asymmetries in dependence structures in international equity markets; specifically, dependence tends to be high in both highly volatile markets and in bear markets. In this paper, a further investigation of asymmetric dependence structures in international equity markets is performed by using the Markov switching model and copula theory. Combining these two theories enables me to model dependence structures with sufficient flexibility. Using this flexible framework, I indeed find that there are two distinct regimes in the U. S.-U. K. market. I also show that for the U. S.-U. K. market the bear regime is better described by an asymmetric copula with lower tail dependence with clear rejection of the Markov switching multivariate normal model. In addition, I show that ignorance of this further asymmetry in bear markets is very costly for risk management. Lastly, I conduct a similar analysis for other G7 countries, where I find other cases in which the use of a Markov switching multivariate normal model would be inappropriate.

The average relative profitability of different firms in the economy jumps erratically. Although investors are unable to observe these productivity switches, they continuously update their beliefs regarding high and low productivity firms by observing the total return on each firm, which consists of the average productivity plus noise. The portfolio choices, interest rate, and stock return processes are derived in a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985a) style general equilibrium model. Three stylized facts of stock market returns are addressed: negative skewness, excess kurtosis, and predictive asymmetry (excess returns and future changes in volatility are negatively correlated). To measure the last stylized fact, an EGARCH model is fitted to sample paths simulated from the model. Parameter values that permit faster learning fit the three facts better.

Mechanical trading rules seem to have more potential than previous tests found. Fama and Blume (1966), looking at the Dow 30 of the late 1950s, found no profits for the best (½-percent) rule after adjusting for transactions costs. Fifteen of these stocks looked profitable in their sample, however; for the same rule, the surviving fourteen show statistically significant profits for 1970–1982 for transactions costs obtainable by floor traders. The test used here assumes constant risk premia, or more generally, that risk premia are on average approximately the same on days “in” as for the total period.

This paper investigates whether the size and book-to-market factors of Fama and French (1993) proxy for the risks associated with business cycle fluctuations. We find that changes in default spread (Δdef) and changes in term spread (Δterm) capture the systematic differences in average returns along the size and book-to-market dimensions in the way that the Fama-French factors do: small stock portfolios have higher loadings on Δdef than large stock portfolios, while high book-to-market portfolios have higher loadings on Δterm than low book-to-market portfolios. Furthermore, in the presence of Δdef and Δterm, the Fama-French factors are superfluous in explaining the size and book-to-market effects. The results suggest that the size and value premiums are compensation for higher exposure to the risks related to changing credit market conditions and interest rates proxied by Δdef and Δterm.

Stochastic Dominance rules are playing an increasingly prominent role in the literature on choice under uncertainty. Their foundation is the mainstream VonNeumann-Morgenstern expected utility paradigm. Their essence is to provide an admissible set of choices under restrictions on the utility functions that follow from prevalent and appealing modes of economic behavior: The admissible sets generated are useful for a large group of individual decision makers and the optimal choice for an individual can then be obtained from among the smaller set of admissible choices.

How does trust affect business contracting at the firm level? We analyze the case of foreign high-tech companies investing in China, where the risk of expropriation of their intellectual property is high. We find that firms mitigate this type of risk by taking local trustworthiness into account when making investment decisions. Firms prefer to invest in regions where local partners and employees are considered more trustworthy; they are also more likely to establish joint ventures and to make greater research and development investments. We employ instrumental variable regressions and dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimators to alleviate endogeneity concerns and control for time-invariant heterogeneity.

We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.

Our objective in this paper is to examine whether one can use option-implied information to improve the selection of mean-variance portfolios with a large number of stocks, and to document which aspects of option-implied information are most useful to improve their out-of-sample performance. Portfolio performance is measured in terms of volatility, Sharpe ratio, and turnover. Our empirical evidence shows that using option-implied volatility helps to reduce portfolio volatility. Using option-implied correlation does not improve any of the metrics. Using option-implied volatility, risk premium, and skewness to adjust expected returns leads to a substantial improvement in the Sharpe ratio, even after prohibiting short sales and accounting for transaction costs.