We examine how shocks to the supply of credit impact corporate financing and investment using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989; and regulatory changes in the insurance industry as an exogenous contraction in the supply of below-investment-grade credit after 1989. A difference-in-differences empirical strategy reveals that substitution to bank debt and alternative sources of capital (e.g., equity, cash balances, and trade credit) was limited, leading to an almost one-for-one decline in net investment with the decline in net debt issuances. Despite this sharp change in behavior, corporate leverage ratios remained relatively stable, a result of the contemporaneous decline in debt issuances and investment. Overall, our findings highlight how even large firms with access to public credit markets are susceptible to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

Ample evidence points to a negative relation between internal funds (profitability) and the demand for external funds (debt issuance). This relation has been interpreted as evidence supporting the pecking order theory. We show, however, that the negative effect of internal funds on the demand for external financing is concentrated among firms that are least likely to face high external financing costs (firms that distribute large amounts of dividends, that are large, and whose debt is rated). For firms on the other end of the spectrum (low payout, small, and unrated), external financing is insensitive to internal funds. These cross-firm differences hold separately for debt and equity, and they are magnified in the aftermath of macroeconomic movements that tighten financing constraints. We argue that the greater complementarity between internal funds and external financing for constrained firms is a consequence of the interdependence of their financing and investment decisions.

Disagreement, a key factor inducing trading, has been receiving ever increasing attention in recent years. Most research has focused on disagreement about the expected returns. Several authors have shown that if the average belief coincides with the true expected return, in the portfolio context prices are unaffected by disagreement. In this paper we study the pricing effects of disagreement about return variances. We show that i) disagreement about variances has systematic and significant pricing effects—more disagreement leads to higher prices, and ii) prices are very sensitive to the degree of disagreement: Even if the average belief about the variance is constant, tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations. This second result may offer an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle: When small changes in the degree of disagreement occur, they induce relatively large price changes. Yet, the changes in disagreement may be hard to directly detect empirically, leading to apparent “excess volatility.”

The shape of the volatility smirk has significant cross-sectional predictive power for future equity returns. Stocks exhibiting the steepest smirks in their traded options underperform stocks with the least pronounced volatility smirks in their options by 10.9% per year on a risk-adjusted basis. This predictability persists for at least 6 months, and firms with the steepest volatility smirks are those experiencing the worst earnings shocks in the following quarter. The results are consistent with the notion that informed traders with negative news prefer to trade out-of-the-money put options, and that the equity market is slow in incorporating the information embedded in volatility smirks.

The decline of average stock return volatility in the 2001–2006 period provides an opportunity to test various theories on why the average return volatility increased in the pre-2000 period. This paper compares fundamentals-based theories with trading volume-based theories. While both fundamentals-based and trading volume-based theories explain the upward trend in the average volatility in U.S. stocks from 1976 to 2000 and international stocks from 1990 to 2000, only the fundamentals-based theories explain the volatility pattern for 2001–2006. Much of the variation in the stock return volatilities can be explained by the variation in the earnings volatilities and proxies for growth options, but not by trading-related variables. Evidence also shows that the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables is time varying.

The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.

This study develops an econometric model that incorporates features of price dynamics across assets as well as through time. With the dynamic factors extracted via the Kalman filter, we formulate an asset pricing model, termed the dynamic factor pricing model (DFPM). We then conduct asset pricing tests in the in-sample and out-of-sample contexts. Our analyses show that the ex ante factors are a key component in asset pricing and forecasting. By using the ex ante factors, the DFPM improves upon the explanatory and predictive power of other competing models, including unconditional and conditional versions of the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. In particular, the DFPM can explain and better forecast the momentum portfolio returns, which are mostly missed by alternative models.

Higher first-year post-issue returns are associated with a significantly higher probability of follow-on equity issuance over the next 5 years. This result holds when we control for pre-issue returns and other factors known to affect the probability of equity issuance. The result is most consistent with the market feedback hypothesis that a high post-issue return encourages managers to increase the firm’s investment because it implies that, in the market’s view, the marginal return to the project is high.

This paper reexamines, at a range of investment horizons, the asymmetric dependence between hedge fund returns and market returns. Given the current availability of hedge fund data, the joint distribution of longer-horizon returns is extracted from the dynamics of monthly returns using the filtered historical simulation; we then apply the method based on copula theory to uncover the dependence structure therein. While the direction of asymmetry remains unchanged, the magnitude of asymmetry is attenuated considerably as the investment horizon increases. Similar horizon effects also occur on the tail dependence. Our findings suggest that nonlinearity in hedge fund exposure to market risk is more short term in nature, and that hedge funds provide higher benefits of diversification, the longer the horizon.

This paper shows that prospect theory is unlikely to explain the disposition effect. Prospect theory predicts that the propensity to sell a stock declines as its price moves away from the purchase price in either direction. Trading data, on the other hand, show that the propensity to sell jumps at zero return, but it is approximately constant over a wide range of losses and increasing or constant over a wide range of gains. Further, the pattern of realized returns does not seem to stem from optimal after-tax portfolio rebalancing, a belief in mean-reverting returns, or investors acting on target prices.