During health crises, misinformation may spread rapidly on social media, leading to hesitancy towards health authorities. The COVID-19 pandemic prompted significant research on how communication from health authorities can effectively facilitate compliance with health-related behavioral advice such as distancing and vaccination. Far fewer studies have assessed whether and how public health communication can help citizens avoid the harmful consequences of exposure to COVID-19 misinformation, including passing it on to others. In two experiments in Denmark during the pandemic, the effectiveness of a 3-minute and a 15-second intervention from the Danish Health Authorities on social media was assessed, along with an accuracy nudge. The findings showed that the 3-minute intervention providing competences through concrete and actionable advice decreased sharing of COVID-19-related misinformation and boosted their sense of self-efficacy. These findings suggest that authorities can effectively invest in building citizens’ competences in order to mitigate the spread of misinformation on social media.

Presidents possess vast authority over policies and outcomes. Recent studies suggest the public checks this unilateralism through expressive opinions and political participation. We reevaluate this accountability link with a preregistered panel survey that incorporates a number of design and conceptual improvements over existing experimental studies. Our findings reveal a more complex relationship between presidential actions and public opinion. We find no evidence that the public reacts negatively to unilateralism – and some evidence they react positively. Respondents, however, may punish an incumbent for failing to implement the proposed policy change. While such a result suggests that the public can hold presidents accountable, we close by discussing how a lack of information likely renders this check moot.

Survey experiments often yield intention-to-treat effects that are either statistically and/or practically “non-significant.” There has been a commendable shift toward publishing such results, either to avoid the “file drawer problem” and/or to encourage studies that conclude in favor of the null hypothesis. But how can researchers more confidently adjudicate between true, versus erroneous, nonsignificant results? Guidance on this critically important question has yet to be synthesized into a single, comprehensive text. The present essay therefore highlights seven “alternative explanations” that can lead to (erroneous) nonsignificant findings. It details how researchers can more rigorously anticipate and investigate these alternative explanations in the design and analysis stages of their studies, and also offers recommendations for subsequent studies. Researchers are thus provided with a set of strategies for better designing their experiments, and more thoroughly investigating their survey-experimental data, before concluding that a given result is indicative of “no significant effect.”

Scholars of International Organizations (IOs) increasingly use elite surveys to study the preferences and decisions of policymakers. When designing these surveys, one central concern is low statistical power, because respondents are typically recruited from a small and inaccessible population. However, much of what we know about how to incentivize elites to participate in surveys is based on anecdotal reflections, rather than systematic evidence on which incentives work best. In this article, we study the efficacy of three incentives in a preregistered experiment with World Bank staff. These incentives were the chance to win an Amazon voucher, a donation made to a relevant charity, and a promise to provide a detailed report on the findings. We find that no incentive outperformed the control group, and the monetary incentive decreased the number of respondents on average by one-third compared to the control group (from around 8% to around 5%).

This study adds to the analogic perspective-taking literature by examining whether an online perspective-taking intervention affects both antisemitic attitudes and behaviors – in particular, engagement with antisemitic websites. Subjects who were randomly assigned to the treatment viewed a 90-s video of a college student describing an experience with antisemitism and reflected on its similarity to their own experiences. In a survey, treated subjects reported greater feelings of sympathy (+29 p.p.), more positive feelings toward Jews, a greater sense that Jews are discriminated against, and more support for policy solutions (+2–4 p.p.). However, these effects did not persist after 14 days. Examining our subjects’ web browsing data, we find a 5% reduction in time spent viewing antisemitic content during the posttreatment period and some limited, suggestive evidence of effects on the number of site visits. These findings provide the first evidence that perspective-taking interventions may affect online browsing behavior.

We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information.

Despite broad adoption of digital media literacy interventions that provide online users with more information when consuming news, relatively little is known about the effect of this additional information on the discernment of news veracity in real time. Gaining a comprehensive understanding of how information impacts discernment of news veracity has been hindered by challenges of external and ecological validity. Using a series of pre-registered experiments, we measure this effect in real time. Access to the full article relative to solely the headline/lede and access to source information improves an individual's ability to correctly discern the veracity of news. We also find that encouraging individuals to search online increases belief in both false/misleading and true news. Taken together, we provide a generalizable method for measuring the effect of information on news discernment, as well as crucial evidence for practitioners developing strategies for improving the public's digital media literacy.

One European policy response to the so-called migration crisis is an accelerated implementation of information campaigns in potential origin countries. Whether and how these campaigns can influence decisions about irregular migration, however, remains under explored. I argue that information campaigns reduce intentions to migrate irregularly and expect the effects to be more substantial when anxiety-inducing messages are used. Based on a field experimental randomized control trial study (N = 1,500) of an actual European information campaign in Nigeria, I provide supportive evidence for this expectation: the information campaign reduced respondents’ intentions to migrate irregularly with a more decisive effect when using an anxiety-triggering campaign message.

Social scientists use list experiments in surveys to estimate the prevalence of sensitive attitudes and behaviors in a population of interest. However, the cumulative evidence suggests that the list experiment estimator is underpowered to capture the extent of sensitivity bias in common applications. The literature suggests double list experiments (DLEs) as an alternative to improve along the bias-variance frontier. This variant of the research design brings the additional burden of justifying the list experiment identification assumptions in both lists, which raises concerns over the validity of DLE estimates. To overcome this difficulty, this paper outlines two statistical tests to detect strategic misreporting that follows from violations to the identification assumptions. I illustrate their implementation with data from a study on support toward anti-immigration organizations in California and explore their properties via simulation.

In legislative bargaining, the proposer is often able to extract a greater proportion of the surplus. However, a higher likelihood of being selected as the proposer can backfire, as it may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to recognition probability in two-period legislative bargaining noted in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We find that higher recognition probability benefits subjects in all treatments, except one in which we automate the second period. It is because proposers often favor the member with the greater recognition probability as a coalition partner, and such tendency varies depending on the proposer’s recognition probability, counter to the theoretical prediction. In all treatments, a vast majority of subjects exhibit a strict preference for higher recognition probability.

We elicit social networks among students in an Italian high school either by measuring the complete network in an incentive-compatible way or by using a truncated elicitation of at most five links. We find that truncation undercounts weak links by up to 90% but only moderately undercounts the time spent with strong friends. We use simulations to demonstrate that the measurement error induced by censoring might be particularly significant when studying phenomena such as social learning which are often thought to operate along weak ties. We then discuss how a modified network elicitation protocol might be able to reduce measurement error.

I apply a new theoretical framework to voting to more cohesively bridge the economic cost-benefit model of voting with the psychology-motivated voting-as-a-habit literature. This new theoretical frame gives greater clarity as to how a vote in one election might beget a vote in another election, while yielding testable predictions as to which circumstances are more favorable for developing turnout persistence. To test these predictions, I make use of a novel dataset consisting of nine large-N, door-to-door voter mobilization field experiments in various election contexts (with ∼1.8 million voters in total). Consistent with prior empirical research, my analysis finds that being nudged to vote in one election leads to increased turnout four years later. But the main contribution of this paper is that the theoretical framework’s predictions and the corresponding empirical results make sense of turnout persistence heterogeneities that have been detected in certain prior empirical studies but not others.

Despite admonitions to address attrition in experiments – missingness on Y – alongside best practices designed to encourage transparency, most political science researchers all but ignore it. A quantitative literature search of this journal – where we would expect to find the most conscientious reporting of attrition – shows low rates of discussion of the issue. We suspect that there is confusion on the link between when attrition occurs and the type of validity it threatens when present, and limited connection to and guidance on which estimands are threatened by different attrition patterns. This is all exacerbated by limited tools to identify, investigate, and report patterns attrition. We offer the R package – attritevis – to visualize attrition over time, by intervention, and include a step-by-step guide to identifying and addressing attrition that balances post hoc analytical tools with guidance for revising designs to ameliorate problematic attrition.

Using an app for smartphones, we run an experiment among high-school students to study the pattern of aggregation of sparsely distributed information. Agents are randomly arranged in small networks and can share only non-verifiable pieces of information. Results show that while information exchange is high, the level and the distribution of centralities among network members are important to shape the overall level of information aggregation. A reduction in the asymmetry among agents’ network centralities is associated with an improvement in the performance of the group in terms of aggregation of information.

Does providing information about police shootings influence policing reform preferences? We conducted an online survey experiment in 2021 among approximately 2,600 residents of 10 large US cities. It incorporated original data we collected on police shootings of civilians. After respondents estimated the number of police shootings in their cities in 2020, we randomized subjects into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatments included some form of factual information about the police shootings in respondents’ cities (e.g., the actual total number). Afterward, respondents were asked their opinions about five policing reform proposals. Police shooting statistics did not move policing reform preferences. Support for policing reforms is primarily associated with partisanship and ideology, coupled with race. Our findings illuminate key sources of policing reform preferences among the public and reveal potential limits of information-driven, numeric-based initiatives to influence policing in the US.

Research on the link between education and political ideology is likely affected by biases common in conventional observational methods. A study by Rasmussen et al. (2021) addresses this problem by examining social and economic ideology in a Danish discordant twin design, finding that education shows positive causal effects on economic, but not social, conservatism. In this paper, I provide a set of replications of these results using a dataset of genotyped Swedish twins. I complement this by using random variation within fraternal twin pairs in a polygenic index of education. Results differ markedly from the original study, but are also shown to be sensitive to precise definitions of the ideological dimensions and which sub-dimensions or items are included. Overall, more care may be warranted when empirically defining ideology. Additionally, educational effects on ideology are likely to be sensitive to particular characteristics of the educational experience across time and space.

What are the relative contributions of stereotypes about the race and deservingness of welfare recipients to Americans’ opinions on welfare? A recent study employing a conjoint-experimental method finds that Americans’ stereotypes of welfare recipients as undeserving drive negative attitudes toward welfare, while stereotypes of welfare recipients as Black have little effect. However, this finding may be produced by the measure of welfare attitudes that includes questions implicating deservingness. We implement a conceptual replication of that study using different measures of welfare policy opinions that directly ask respondents about spending, both on welfare generally and on specific welfare programs. We show that when support for welfare is measured using the spending questions, stereotypes about race are significantly associated with opposition to welfare. These results have important implications for the debate on Americans’ opposition to welfare programs, as well as for the measurement of policy opinions in surveys.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether public discussion before a majority vote increases the saliency of minority interests and results in more egalitarian outcomes or whether voters use discussion to form majorities that benefit at the expense of minorities. When there are two alternatives, we find that public discussion increases the likelihood that individuals vote for equal allocations, but has little to no impact on the group outcomes. When participants choose among one equal and several unequal options, the multitude of unequal options creates a coordination problem, and we find that discussion decreases the frequency of egalitarian decisions. Our findings suggest that the effect of public communication on the fairness of majority voting outcomes depends on the strategic environment.