Historically, lands of recent settlement have had a thirst for immigrants, but one that has been procyclical (negatively related to unemployment rates). For a period in the early 1980s, Australia's major political parties supported high immigration in spite of rising unemployment. This article explores the long-run relationship between immigration and local unemployment, posing the question, “Do migrants rob jobs?” It also seeks to apply long-run historical analysis to recent economic debate: would Australia's unemployment rate have been lower in very recent times without so many immigrants?

Many economic historians, like most economists, depend on standard growth accounts to provide some quantitative description of the proximate sources of growth, but this is misleading. American growth experience illustrates the difficulty. The seeming major contribution of tangible capital accumulation to nineteenth-century growth was the consequence of scale-dependent and capital-using technological progress. The large twentieth-century contributions of education and R&D conceal technology's new intangible capital-using bias. Additionally, reverse forces run from capital accumulation to technological progress. Without a greater understanding of these interactions, our knowledge of even the proximate sources of growth is incomplete.

Was eighteenth-century London's financial market linked to domestic real capital markets? When did English capital markets cease to be regionally segmented? We compare London interest rates with annual registered property transactions in Middlesex and in West Yorkshire. This evidence, though tentative, suggests that London financial markets were weakly linked to local real capital markets in the mid-eighteenth century. By the late eighteenth century those links were strong. Regional markets were still segmented in the mid-eighteenth century but were integrated by the time of the Napoleonic War.

Indians depleted the beaver, yet we do not understand why. We analyzed the pattern and determinants of beaver exploitation in the hinterlands of three Hudson's Bay Company posts. Simulating beaver population, we found declining beaver stock within each hinterland, but overharvesting in only two. Central to this process was the Company reaction to French competition. Managers raised prices in the Albany and York hinterlands, and in response the Indians increased their harvests. Churchill, which did not experience French competition, had more stable fur prices and showed no evidence of overexploitation of the beaver.

It is generally recognized that the Dutch played a major part in financing British government deficits from the 1720s to the late 1770s. This article argues that even though the Dutch continued to hold large amounts of British debt after 1780, they stopped supplying new capital to the British and started a modest repatriation of some of their previous investments. A comparative econometric study of 3 percent consol yields during the two deficit-inducing wars Britain fought between 1750 and 1795 shows that as a result British interest rates became much more sensitive to increases in government borrowing.

Population growth in eighteenth-century England was due mainly to a fall in mortality, which was particularly marked during the first half of the century. The fall affected all socioeconomic groups and does not appear to have occurred for primarily economic reasons. In addition to an explanation involving the introduction of smallpox inoculation, the major hypothesis considered in this article is that the significant improvement in domestic hygiene associated with the rebuilding of housing in brick and tile brought about a major reduction in mortality.

Distinct diffusion curves are identified by model type and significant differences in regional motor car ownership in the interwar U.K. economy. We assess the viability of applying mass production strategies such as Ford and General Motors pursued in America. Given the demand-side constraints present in the U.K. market, the price reductions made possible by the exploitation of economies of scale were insufficient to create a mass market. Hence, the relatively low levels of ownership achieved can be seen as a rational response to the constraints perceived by firms.

Antebellum judges played crucial roles in resolving conflicts between slaveowners and common-carrier owners. Because courts could easily quantify the value of a slave's life, they were quicker to compensate slaveowners for slaves injured or killed by a common carrier than to award damages to an injured free person or his estate. Yet judges also had to craft rules governing the behavior of the slave property itself. By the 1860s, Southern courts had established law that encouraged parties with legal standing to act efficiently. Strikingly, tort doctrines developed in slave cases foreshadowed the evolution of law for free accident victims.

Historians of the period have generally played down the debasement of France's coinage to increase crown revenues during the Hundred Years' War or treated it as a last resort and an inept one. Based on archival data and an analytical framework drawn from the modern literature on inflation tax, this article supports challengers of that view, showing that debasement was an effective instrument of public finance.

This article re-examines the secular improvement in human heights in France. Adult heights reflect consumption as children, so the distribution of resources between children and adults, determined primarily within households, should have influenced heights. The intrahousehold distribution of resources was influenced by the level of income and by the calorie demands of working adults. Results show that the early decline of marital fertility in France was accompanied by a small but significant increase in expenditures on child quality as measured by heights. Reductions in mortality, independent of the level of food intake, also contributed to improved heights.

The commonly accepted chronology for comparative productivity levels, based on GDP data, does not apply to the manufacturing sector, which shows evidence of a much greater degree of stationarity of comparative labor productivity performance among the major industrialized countries of Britain, Germany, and the United States. These results for manufacturing suggest that convergence of GDP per worker must have occurred through trends in other sectors and through compositional effects of structural change. The persistent, large labor productivity gap between the United States and Europe cannot be explained simply by differences in capital per worker, but is related to technological choice.

New evidence based on census data indicates that output per agricultural worker grew faster between 1860 and 1870 than during any other decade of the nineteenth century. Although this evidence seems to support the traditional view that the Civil War was a catalyst for an increasingly productive agricultural sector, we contend that this apparent robust performance results from a measurement problem that afflicts census-based labor force series. An alternative estimate of labor force performance during the decade reveals the importance of increased labor inputs of women and children, in numbers, effort, and—especially—time.

The labor markets in the railroad industry went through extensive institutional changes between 1890 and 1945. Federal laws increased railroad employers' liability for workplace accidents in several stages. Unions expanded to cover more occupations. The federal government set railroad wages during World War I and then mediated and arbitrated a large number of collective bargaining disputes between 1920 and 1945. We examine how these changes in institutions affected compensating differentials for fatal and nonfatal accident risk. The increasing role of unionization and government intervention coincided with a decline in the size of compensating differentials.

A politicoeconomic model of the relationship between economic and structural variables and government popularity is developed and applied to the Weimar Republic. We obtained data from decentralized election results in the 1924 to 1933 period, using a weighted panel estimation method. Parameter estimates show a strong relationship between the development of economic variables and the decline in electoral support that confronted every government in this period. We link this finding to existing historiographie theories and extrapolate from it to estimate the effects of the economic recovery in the first years of the Nazi regime.

In contrast to historical accounts of the boom and crash of the 1929 stock market, recent econometric studies have concluded that there were no bubbles in the American stock market over the past one hundred years. Examining the pricing of loans to stock brokers, we find information on the lenders' perceptions of the future course of stock prices in 1929. From this market, we extract an estimate of the bubble in stock prices. This bubble component contributes significantly to explain stock price behavior, even though standard cointegration tests suggest that there was no bubble in the market.

Women engaged primarily in the provision of domestic services for family members make important contributions to total output. This article provides estimates of the size and sectoral allocation of the nonmarket household work force in the United States between 1800 and 1860. Those estimates are then used as a basis for several alternative imputations of the value of these women's work, which modify the historical picture of economic growth over this period.

The introduction of mass production transformed many skilled tasks into repetitive and monotonous jobs. In industries such as automobiles, the workforce remained predominantly male despite contemporary assessments that women could efficiently do many of these jobs. This article explores why. It is argued that employers such as Ford concluded that the conversion of labor time into effort would be more difficult in a mixed-gender workforce. The paper shows how Ford developed a fraternalist labor strategy, a men's club, whose objective was to accommodate men to monotony and maximize labor productivity.

From 1847 to 1853 New Yorkers built more than 3,500 miles of wooden roads. Financed primarily by residents of declining rural townships, plank roads were seen as a means of linking isolated areas to the canal and railroad network. A broad range of individuals invested in the roads, suggesting that the drive for bigger markets was supported by a large cross section of the population. Considerable community spirit animated the movement, indicating that New Yorkers used the social capital of the community to reach their entrepreneurial aspirations.

This article examines the determinants of emigration from post-Famine Ireland. As Irish real wages rose relative to those in destination countries, the emigration rate fell. We argue, from time series analysis, that much of the secular fall in the rate can be explained by that narrowing of the wage gap. County-level, cross-sectional analysis of emigration rates indicates that poverty and low wages, large family size, and limited opportunities to acquire smallholdings all contributed to high rates of emigration. Changes in those variables over time reflect the rise in living standards, consistent with time series evidence.

The growth in inventive activity during early American industrialization is explored by examining the careers of 160 inventors credited with important technological discoveries. Analysis of biographical information and complete patent histories through 1865 indicates that these “great inventors” were entrepreneurial and responded systematically to market demand. Their inventions were procyclical and originated disproportionately from localities linked with extensive markets. Although unexceptional in terms of schooling or technical skills, they vigorously pursued the returns to their inventions, redirected their inventive activity to meet emerging needs, and were distinguished by high geographical mobility toward districts conducive to invention and its commercialization.