Manufacturing firm data for 1820 to 1850 are employed to investigate the role of women and children in the industrialization of the American Northeast. The principal findings include: (1) Women and children composed a major share of the entire manufacturing labor force; (2) their employment was closely associated with production processes used by large establishments, both mechanized and non-mechanized; (3) the wage of females (and boys) increased relative to that of men with industrial development; and (4) female labor force participation in industrial counties was substantial. These findings bear on the nature of technical change during early industrialization and why American industrial development was initially concentrated in the Northeast.

Official tax records and other documents provide the sources for an estimation of wool exports overtime. Four main points emerge: after a peak circa 1550, exports stagnated and declined for over a century before rising again strongly; political and economic developments in Spain and the rest of Europe affected both the volume and the direction of wool exports; most exports went to Flanders before 1550, then to Italy for a time, and finally to northern Europe again from about 1650 onward; and Spanish merchants controlled most of the trade until the mid- sixteenth century but lost dominance thereafter, retaining control only over the internal market supplying wool for export.

The railroads in the American West were constructed in a few concentrated building booms. This timing of construction resulted from the alternate creation and collapse of imperfect property rights to rights of way in partially settled areas. These “property rights” arose from strategic behavior within the railroad oligopoly. When enforcement costs of cooperative action were low, the railroads were able to create rents by avoiding construction ahead of demand. When enforcement became difficult, however, construction was the only way to capture rents on unbuilt lines so a construction boom ensued.

Late nineteenth-century immigrants tended to concentrate in large cities despite the fact that they experienced less occupational mobility there than they did in small cities. This paper suggests that variation across cities in labor management systems and in the associated froms of discrimination may help to explain this apparent paradox. Analysis of data from Michigan's agricultural implements and iron-working industries in 1890 indicates that discrimination in hiring made it more difficult for immigrants to break into the small-city labor force. But in large cities, immigrant mobility was restricted by discriminatory barriers to entry into higher level jobs.

Multiple regression analysis reveals that work in New England cotton textile mills during 1905–1912 raised age-adjusted mortality rates over those of non-mill- workers, and that worker mortality increased with years of mill experience. Mortality varied among groups because of differential self selection. Central age group native males with broad occupational choices had lower mortality rates than control groups. Young males, women, and the foreign born had restricted occupational choices. Hence they were less self selected and experienced higher mortality. Death rates were highest among married women workers who bore children. The combination of homework and millwork worsened their health and raised their mortality rates.

The different rates of technical progress in Western Europe and the United States, exemplified by the motor industry, created a problem of adjustment in international payments by the 1920s. American direct investment in manufacturing in Europe was a manifestation of technological superiority and a partial solution to the payments problem. The scale of their operations gave the American motor vehicle firms an advantage even in foreign production. An alternative way of closing the technological gap, the transfer of machine tools and trained men from America to Europe, allowed the European motor vehicle producers to compete without becoming entirely American-owned.

This paper describes two contrary developments in corporate finance during the Great Depression. In 1930s downswings the top one percent of firms acquired unusually high rations of liquid assets to receipts, thus withdrawing funds from the spending stream. Smaller firms, however, were forced into highly illiquid positions (by postwar standards) by episodes of monetary restriction in 1931 and 1937. It is argued that both developments made the Depression more severe. A structural change is found after 1945 in the financial behavior of large firms. This is attributed to a new cyclical pattern of price change and lower business uncertainty during postwar recessions.