The purges of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou, and the former head of the Central Committee Office Ling Jihua in 2014 re-excited a long-standing debate in the field of elite Chinese politics: how contentious is politics at the elite level? On the face of it, these purges, as well as the arrests of ninety nine senior officials associated with these three individuals and with other cases, seem to prove that elite politics remains highly contentious at the top (People's Daily 2015). This outcome was surprising considering that decades of institution building had taken place after the Cultural Revolution. However, proponents of institutionalized politics in the CCP argue that the leadership had a genuine desire to clean house, and that these arrests, even if politically motivated, instilled a renewed discipline in the party. Once the “bad apples” were eliminated, the leadership under Xi Jinping would have continued on the road of institutionalization (Li 2014). Cadre promotion institutions, regular meetings of the Politburo and its standing committee, party congresses, and retirement rules remain largely unaffected by the purges and will continue to ensure relatively harmonious decision making and predictable successions in the foreseeable future.

Since decentralization in 2001, Indonesian local governments have acquired a key role in poverty alleviation and social service delivery. The extent to which they have been able to meet this challenge is subject to debate, however, and systematic analysis of policy outcomes remains scarce. This paper contributes to the literature with a study of the district-level implementation of Jamkesmas, Indonesia's free healthcare program for the poor. Using original data on policy implementation, I show that local government is to some extent responsive to the needs of the most vulnerable. In years when local elections (pilkada) are implemented, low-income households are targeted more accurately, suggesting that electoral incentives for local elites may increase access to social services among the poor. However, I also show that the positive effect of local direct elections is limited to districts with electorally competitive politics.

The last decade has witnessed an extraordinary spate of scholarship on the ethno-communal violence that swept through Indonesia following the collapse of the Suharto regime. Yet we know very little about how these large-scale violent conflicts subsided and the patterns of post-conflict violence that have emerged since. We introduce evidence from an original dataset to show that the high violence period lasted till 2003, after which violence declined in intensity and scale. Despite this aggregate decline, we find that old conflict sites still exhibit relatively high levels of small-scale violence. We conclude that Indonesia has moved to a new, post-conflict phase where large-scale violence is infrequent, yet small-scale violence remains unabated, often taking on new forms. Finally, we propose that effective internal security interventions by the state are a key reason, although not the only reason, why large-scale violence has not emerged again despite the continued prevalence of low-level violence.

This article presents evidence that factors in rural areas influence migrant integration into China's cities. We argue that the value of the rural registration influences migrants' decision-making and identities by creating a cost to registration transfer to the city, and that the rural land system interacts with the household registration system to inhibit migrant integration. We test novel hypotheses derived from a simple model of migrant integration, finding connections between rural sending area factors and migrant integration in the city. We test these hypotheses using survey data from two surveys of rural-to-urban migrant workers and publicly available economic data. We find that migrants from areas with higher levels of economic development are less likely to desire registration transfer to the city. We also find that landholding and weaker rural and rights are associated with lower levels of social integration in the city.

Extant literature on democratization documents that ordinary citizens’ unconditional support for democracy is indispensable to democratic consolidation. Yet observers of nascent democracies have repeatedly witnessed that such support often hinges upon their economic conditions. This article argues that income levels have a conditioning effect on this relationship; the Korean poor see democracy as a tool for income redistribution and are less likely than the rich to support it when economic hardships appear to close windows of opportunities for such redistribution. Using survey data from the first round of the Asian Barometer Survey on South Korea, I find strong empirical support for this argument. The implication of this finding for broader literature on democratization is that the weakening of young democracies can be attributed to the poor in times of trouble, or the “weak link.”

Informal connections play an important role in regimes all across the world, but among China's political elite, it is particularly factional affiliation that is said to structure contention over who will rule and who will fall victim to a purge. This article identifies two approaches to measuring factional ties in the literature: the exploratory approach traces alliance ties through qualitative assessment of insider sources, while the structured approach uses publicly available data to infer factions from shared characteristics. The article combines the two by arguing that informal politics is better conceptualized as a process of alliance formation shaped by an underlying social (network) structure. Among the structured approaches, coworker networks best capture the latter, but this can be further refined by noting the number of instances of working together, or by taking into account promotions that have occurred while the two individuals were coworkers.

Regional bloc voting in South Korea has been ascribed to voters’ psychological attachments to birthplace. This article seeks to expand the existing discussion of regionalism by showing that economic conditions in voters’ places of residence affect vote choices at the individual level and produce clustering of votes at the aggregate level in South Korea. While the idea of residence-based regionalism has previously been suggested, empirical scrutiny of the idea has been limited. Exploiting a Bayesian multilevel strategy, this article provides evidence that short-term economic changes at the province level affected voters’ choices in the 2007 presidential election in South Korea, independent of the long-term political affiliation between regional parties and their constituents. The positive association between local economic conditions and vote choices remains significant, controlling for perceptions of national economic conditions and other individual level covariates such as age and political attitudes.

The literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place and school ties into their factions. To investigate this, we first derive four reasonable ways of measuring factional ties as suggested by the literature. We then explore the factional recruitment strategy pursued by each reform-era (1978–present) party secretary generals of the CCP by evaluating the measures of factional ties which predicted their clients’ promotions to full Central Committee membership. Our results show that Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping pursued broadly based factional recruitment strategies, while Hu Jintao recruited faction members mainly from work colleagues. We further uncover signs that the party institutions may allow deposed secretary generals some measure of influence over promotions even after their political demise. At the same time, strict retirement rules on lower level officials gave rise to a cohort effect that gave the general secretary greater influence over the promotion of alternate Central Committee members to the full Central Committee during their first term than in subsequent terms.

What drove the East Asian tide of democratization during the “Third Wave?” Instead of focusing on a single-factor explanation, we perform qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on fourteen cases in the region of East Asia from 1980 to 2000 and find three parallel pathways: (1) overthrow model, which features the positive effects of mass mobilization against authoritarianism under a deinstitutionalized authoritarian regime; (2) urban pressure model that works under an institutionalized authoritarian regime; and (3) inside-out model, in which democratization is triggered by the joint forces of domestic and international conditions under both types of regimes. These results demonstrate that the authoritarian status quo ante is an important determinant of democratic transitions.

This study explores collaboration between state actors and non-state specialists in the market for coercion. We focus on the case of forced evictions in South Korea, where violence carried out by private companies has occurred with the implicit, and at times explicit, sanctioning of the state. This level of government–private security cooperation has traditionally been explained by various hypotheses, including arguments about the weak capacity of a state to enforce compliance, trends in the neo-liberal marketization of state power, or as the outcome of a state being captured by the capitalist classes. Documenting the history of urban redevelopment projects and changes in government responses to major protest incidents in Korea, we instead argue that this niche market for private force is an observable implication of a shift in state–society relations in the wake of democratization. This phenomenon is, in effect, a very undemocratic response to democratization, by state elites.

Diffusion studies have rightly emphasized external ideas and resources that propel liberalization in the developing world. There remain two gaps: first, the literature has not covered the types of diffusers and the ways diasporas may shape liberalization in their homelands; second, it pays little attention to internal diffusion after national adoption within a country. This article explores the utility and conditions of diffusion by diasporas and examines the roles of diasporas and internal diffusion in China and India's FDI liberalization. In both countries, diasporas were main diffusers that led national adoption of liberalism at home. In China, however, entrepreneurial diasporas' networks with local governments helped expansive internal diffusion. India's professional diasporas did not strongly engage local governments or domestic companies. National adoption in India was followed by reversal and partial internal diffusions. India's software services provide a similar diffusion by diasporas to that in China.

Term limits that effectively govern leadership transition play an important role in authoritarian power sharing. A fixed term and a pre-appointed successor – two crucial components of term limits – credibly commit the incumbent ruler to share power with other elites, and also allow the elites to monitor and coordinate against the ruler's transgression of the power-sharing agreement. While the successful adoption of term limits often requires an even balance of power among the ruling elites in the first place, once adopted it initiates an evolving bargain over allocation of political power among multiple generations of leaders that further keeps any one faction from dominating the others. I corroborate this argument using a biographical dataset of elite members of the Chinese Communist Party from 1982 to 2012. The findings suggest that the Party's incumbent leaders and their rivals (i.e., predecessor and heir-apparent) shared equal chances in promoting their associates—which proxy their political influence—and this pattern has become more salient since the 16th party congress, when the term limits that currently govern China's leadership transition became fully fledged. This result also sheds light on the role of informal, patronage-based promotion in the institutionalization of authoritarian politics.

Studies on Chinese politics frequently utilize the safety valve analogy to describe various political decisions that allow space for feedback and challenges. Drawing upon these empirical studies and the theoretical literature on institution, authoritarianism, and democratization, this review essay delineates the logic of the safety valve strategy and how it fits into the scheme of prolonging authoritarian rule. It identifies the use of informal and temporary measures to appease aggrieved citizens as the central feature of the safety valve strategy, complementing formal means such as institutional reform. The informal and temporary measures are different from the patronage system, and credibility is not necessarily a prerequisite for effectiveness. The safety valve strategy contributes to authoritarian resilience by relieving public frustration, reducing the propensity to contentious politics, and in some cases enabling the government to collect information on potential opposition groups or emerging problems.

During recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. Amidst a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite–mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when individuals become exceptionally well known they become threats to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China's 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam's 11th Party Congress in 2011, using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.

Nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations have erupted in China periodically in recent years. This study investigates what factors make university students more motivated to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations. We collected original data on 1,458 university students in Beijing in June 2014, inquiring about both actual and possible future participation. We find that students are more willing to participate in future demonstrations (1) when they believe that anti-Japanese demonstrations benefit China's diplomacy (instrumentality), and (2) when they have prior demonstrators in their social networks (diffusion). However, when it comes to actual participation, only diffusion plays a significant role while instrumentality does not. While students claim that they are motivated by beliefs that demonstrations will matter for China's diplomacy, they actually turn out only when networks operate. In addition, membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not affect prospective participation but deters actual participation. The CCP actually discourages participation in recent anti-Japanese demonstrations.

We focus on the elite decision-making process in China, analyzing the formation of coalitions around particular policy options. We apply a framework that simulates collective decision-making processes (CDMP): the KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB). KTAB facilitates the application of a Spatial Model of Politics, an open source model similar to Bueno de Mesquita's (1997) Expected Utility Model and the Senturion model (Abdollahian, et al 2006). KTAB provides a framework to understand logical consequences of subjective data inputs, enabling contrasting scenarios to be analyzed. We examine the interactions of actors' interests that drive China to reform its energy sector policies, in particular the structure of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). In the case of private companies' entry into energy markets in China, we find that little reform is likely. The inertia of key actors holds back the potential for a significant opening of the energy sector. Despite the erosion of CNPC's political clout, there is little consensus for major reform to China's market position.