In the few “matrilineal” societies of Afikpo and Ohafia, women have full legal capacity to own land (insofar as land can be owned by anyone in these areas);.and to transmit their rights and interests to others either inter vivosor at death.3 The discussion which follows must, therefore, be understood as relating exclusively to the patri-lineal societies which in fact constitute the bulk of Iboland.

This article reports the results of a survey that the author conducted on procedures used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) to assess applications for asylum in Kenya. It focuses on some core challenges facing the regime. The article is divided into six sections. In the first, the procedures for seeking asylum are outlined. The second and third sections discuss issues relating to the financial situation of the UNHCR and, hence, its ability to process claims. The next section evaluates the contents of the letter that communicates an asylum decision and the extent to which it facilitates appeals. Questions regarding the removal of rejected claimants are examined in the penultimate section. In conclusion, the final section recommends that Kenya's refugee determination scheme needs to aim at realizing the standards set by UNHCR and international refugee and human rights laws. It also suggests that more efforts should be made at addressing the factors which produce refugees.

This article argues that the community of self-described human rights NGOs that are indigenous to and operate in Nigeria have, over the last fourteen years or so, exerted a modest yet significant level of influence on the behaviour of both the executive and legislative branches of government in Nigeria. This influence has been exerted despite the harshness of military regimes that ruled that country for most of the relevant period. The factors that have facilitated the modest impact that these NGOs have had within Nigeria include their ability (at times) to work in coalitions; the highly innovative ends-means calculations made by NGO activists; their virtual alliance with a wing of the Nigerian judiciary and an important section of the mass media; their ability to creatively deploy international texts, processes and pressure within Nigeria; the deep cleavages within the Nigerian state and its elite that have led to a political culture that is much more amenable to negotiated settlements than is commonly acknowledged in the literature; and the unrelenting disposition, remarkable tenacity, and courage of most of the activists that run and operate these NGOs. The factors that have limited the extent of the success that these NGOs have so far enjoyed are conceptual and institutional in nature. The conceptual factors are their (albeit changing) tendency in this context to treat socio-economic, gender-related, minority, and environmental rights work as more marginal than civil/political rights activism; and their failure to pay any appreciable attention to the aspects of the local cultures and pre-existing languages of dignity that might advance their work among Nigeria's majority rural population. The institutional factors include their excessive fragmentation and proliferation; the de-institutionalization of most of their organizational forms and resort to personal rule; their donor-dependence and consequent failure to canvass the local population for funds and resources; and the elite and urban-centred orientation of most of these NGOs. Each of these factors has affected negatively their ability to mass mobilize and connect deeply with the yearnings of the masses of ordinary Nigerians.

The conflict in northern Uganda presents a unique study in comparing international, domestic and traditional responses to justice and stability amid prolonged conflict. This article explains the colonial and political background of the country and the emergence of the parties to the fighting, and describes the violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by all armed groups. It examines the various responses to these violations, focusing on Uganda's Amnesty Act, International Criminal Court indictments, the Juba peace talks, and traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation ceremonies, and explores how these mechanisms for negotiating peace and instilling justice are facilitating or interfering with each other. Overall, it attempts to discover how this interplay between international idealism, regional and national politics, cultural influences and logistical feasibility not only presents important lessons concerning the conflict in Uganda, but also reflects and informs false dichotomies in international criminal law and transitional justice.

West Africa is a vast area consisting of many territories; of those five have come under the influence of the English law; four of these are within the Commonwealth, one is outside it. The four Commonwealth West African countries are: Gambia, Sierra Leone (which is to become independent early next year), the Republic of Ghana, and the Federation of Nigeria (which attained its independence on 1st October, 1960); the one non-Commonwealth country is the Republic of Liberia, the oldest independent state in West Africa.

In Malawi, Rastafari students are prevented from attending public schools on account of their dreadlocks. This article seeks to analyse a framework for assessing whether Rastafari qualifies as a religion under section 33 of the Constitution of Malawi. The article argues that Rastafari is a recognized religion and that its sincere adherents should have full protection under the Constitution of Malawi, as do members of other religious groups. The article discusses potential problems for Rastafari litigants in Malawi and proposes some solutions. It introduces a three prong balancing test, which has been applied in particular cases in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and makes recommendations about future interpretation of the Constitution of Malawi using this test. It examines the current interpretation of the freedom of religion in Malawi and concludes with an argument for Malawi to follow the approach taken in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

This article gives a general overview of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism known as “conciliation” and the legal framework relating to its practice in Nigeria. Using the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation as a normative framework, the article critically analyses the proposed reforms to the existing legal framework for conciliation in Nigeria which are contained in the Nigerian Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Draft Bill and exposes some of its deficiencies. It also investigates the effect of the statutes of limitation on conciliation proceedings. The article also suggests that the institutionalization of conciliation will enhance its viability as an ADR mechanism in Nigeria.

This article considers assertions of the diminution of the monetary sovereignty of host states when they sign bilateral investment treaties. It discusses monetary transfer provisions in the model BITs of South Africa and Egypt and how their construction can affect states’ rights to regulatory autonomy in mitigating financial crises. This has become imperative in light of recent discussions on the possibilities for a systemic overhaul of BIT provisions, by pushing back against the diminution of host states’ sovereignty in order to respond to the force of globalization. Achieving this would require reform of existing model BITs to introduce appropriate exceptions in order to ensure policy space to protect the public interest.

Multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) are a strategically important group of multinational corporations (MNCs). There are now many MNOCs operating in both the private and public sectors with remarkably diverse characters, strategies and objectives. Handling large budgets, revenue and capital, and complex advanced technology, they are responsible for exploration, crude oil production, refining, and distribution. These very capacities enable MNOCs to make a number of positive contributions to the economic growth and development of the developing oil-producing countries in which they operate. In that regard, MNOCs engage extensively in joint marketing operations with their host countries in various parts of the world, and foreign funds injected by MNOCs' operations relieve the shortage of financial capital and make greater production possible.

This article explores the extent to which the right to basic education of learners with disabilities in South Africa was guaranteed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It uses the Centre for Child Law v Minister of Basic Education (Centre for Child Law) as the main canvas for discussion. It argues that, notwithstanding its normative compliance with the international regime of the right to an inclusive basic education, the government has failed learners with disabilities during COVID-19. An examination of Centre for Child Law reveals that, not only did the government's directions for the phased return to school exclude learners with disabilities, they also required the closure of special schools where compliance with social distancing rules was impossible. This violated the right to inclusive education and substantive equality of learners with disabilities and highlighted the need to advance these rights through reasonable accommodation initiatives.

Now that it has been in operation for 20 years, it is necessary to reflect on the impact the South African Domestic Violence Act has had on women's lives. This article analyses this key legislation and the police's duty to ensure its proper implementation. It focuses on the reports of the Independent Complaints Directorate and Civilian Secretariat of Police, the bodies responsible for measuring police compliance with the act. The reports identify serious transgressions, highlighting the police's perception that domestic violence is a private affair with which it should not interfere. This perception plays a particularly subtle and destructive role in legitimizing, supporting and permitting violence against women. In focusing on key court decisions in which the state (police) was held financially accountable for the failure to protect women against violence, the author highlights the importance of challenging the social and legal understanding of women's experiences with violence in promoting a system that takes account of those experiences.

The Nicholson judgment was clearly a precipitating factor in the resignation of former South African President Thabo Mbeki in 2008. Engaging with the judgment in its own terms, this note first puts forward a best legal interpretation of the judgment, covering the doctrines of prosecutorial independence and legitimate expectations. It then identifies the degree to which the comment in the judgment may be termed politically activist. In the authors' view, Nicholson tackled political issues in his judgment that he need not have: in particular, allegations of executive interference in the independence of the prosecutions authority. Assuming that Nicholson J's text may be read as an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of the judiciary, the note explores whether it succeeds on those terms and concludes that the judgment is ultimately an example of failed dramatic art.

The South African Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court have ruled that the employer is vicariously liable for sexual violence perpetrated by his employee on a co-employee or on a third party in the workplace or in what can be considered as an extension of the workplace. This is similar to the current position in the United Kingdom. This article questions the rationale of holding employers vicariously liable for intentional acts of employees such as sexual harassment. In a bid to justify their position, these courts have adopted a sort of vicarious liability with no outer limit that is both needless and tortuous. This article submits that the law imposes a duty on employers to protect their employees and that this unwarranted development of vicarious liability could be avoided if due regard is given to the prescribed direct (and strict) liability of the employer.

This article considers the current sentencing purposes in Namibia. It discusses the legislator's failure to articulate these purposes, leaving this to the judiciary, and identifies the dangers that arise from this legislative lacuna. It establishes that current sentencing purposes are fundamentally premised upon a retributivist philosophy, transplanted into Namibia during the colonial period. The article thus advocates for sentencing reform, aimed at restoring a paradigm based on African values. It does so by analysing African indigenous justice systems, using Ubuntu as an Afrocentric value. The article establishes how Ubuntu is contemporarily mirrored by restorative notions of justice that prioritize victims, offenders and the community, thereby asserting sentencing purposes that promote reconciliation, reparation and offender re-integration. In juxtaposing this with other sentencing purposes, the article critiques comparable jurisdictions that have recently incorporated restorative justice and proposes a set of draft sentencing purposes in the appendix.

The constitutional and political negotiations in South Africa have reached an advanced stage and elections for a government of national unity might take place within the next twelve months. For the millions of South Africans who have waited, fought, sacrificed and suffered the end appears to be in sight. While they will have every right to celebrate the results of their hard-fought battles to achieve a democratic and just society, they equally have a solemn duty to ensure that they proceed to build the future on a solid base, not only to guarantee the protection of democracy and justice but more importantly to ensure that no other South African is ever again the victim of the types of human rights abuses that have for the past decades become synonymous with the country. There will only be one opportunity to rebuild the nation. If it fails it will be a great disservice to South Africa's countrymen and women and to the generations that will follow. Even as a South African one has difficulty in fully comprehending the enormity of the social and human destruction caused in the name of apartheid. It has brutalized and dispossessed its people; robbed children of their youth and their innocence; widowed and orphaned thousands and destroyed the dreams and hopes of decent men and women. The 18 million people gaoled in terms of the pass laws and the 15.5 million people uprooted by forced removals bear testimony to the brutality and savagery with which apartheid was applied. The legacy of those policies will remain for many years to come.

The legal profession occupies a strategic position in Nigerian society. In addition to performing the traditional function of protecting individual rights through litigation, lawyers actively involve themselves in the creation of legal institutions and concepts that promote development. Legal services profoundly affect and shape virtually all social, economic and political arrangements in the country. Nigerian society has become increasingly reliant on lawyers for its smooth functioning. The country anchors its hope for social and economic development on them.

The outbreak of further hostilities between Chad and Libya in August 1987 was occasioned by a dispute concerning sovereignty over the so-called Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. The extent of Libyan involvement in Chad is motivated to a large degree by this territorial claim. This dispute must be distinguished from Libya's wider ambitions for Arab unity or its involvement in Chad's civil war, although it would appear true to say that Libya was thereby seeking to consolidate its hold on the Aouzou Strip. Documentary evidence exists to support the contention that a genuine territorial claim exists. In addition, it is interesting to note that, while Libya appeared to have resigned itself to the victory of President Habre's forces in the civil war and the defeat and expulsion of its forces from the rest of Chad in the early part of 1987, the capture of Aouzou by Habre's forces in August 1987 resulted in an ongoing military response brought to a tentative conclusion in September 1987 by the OAU. Colonel Gadafi has been reported as saying that, if Chad ceded the Aouzou Strip, he would regard the war as over and would never again interfere in Chad's internal affairs. Moreover, Colonel Gadafi's support for the rival factions in Chad has wavered according to their position on the question of the Aouzou Strip. The purpose of this short article is to analyse Libya's territorial claim to the disputed territory.

The world currently has a profusion of intergovernmental organizations charged with various public functions previously reserved for states. The operations of these organizations affect the ordinary lives of individual citizens in the member states. Yet these organizations are not legitimate, based on the standard expected of a democratic state government. This article joins the chorus demanding the legitimization of international organizations that perform public functions, taking into account their peculiar circumstances and nature, and with specific reference to the East African Community. It sets out criteria for assessing legitimacy and examines the organs, functions and administration of the East African Community against those criteria. It argues that, as presently established and structured, the East African Community seriously lacks legitimacy. There is therefore an urgent need for reform, to avoid this body becoming yet another statistic of moribund regional integration schemes in Africa.

Transnational crime is a major problem for African states with corruption, trafficking of persons, drugs trafficking, environmental crime and the like posing a major threat to development and stability. This article examines three challenges that states must tackle in order to combat transnational crime effectively. The first is how to deal with criminals who operate outside the jurisdiction. The second concerns the investigation of crimes with a transnational element. The third challenge involves tracing and then recovering the proceeds of crime that have been moved out of the country where the crime occurred. Here the need for Western states to cooperate with those in Africa is highlighted. Drawing on examples from Lesotho and Nigeria in particular, it is argued that some progress is being made in meeting these challenges. However, the article notes that developing the political will to tackle transnational crime is fundamental to any lasting improvement.