The law relating to the adoption of children in Tanzania has, since its inception, remained obscure. It has neither received judicial interpretation comparable to other branches of family law nor has it been a subject of academic discourse. This is so despite the fact that the first adoption legislation was introduced in colonial Tanganyika as early as 1942, was repealed and re-enacted in 1953 and has remained in force ever since.

Some statistical information regarding how this legislation has been utilised by the population would assist in further elaboration of the above contention. During the first 18 years of the operation of the Ordinance, i.e. from 1944 to the end of the British colonial era in 1961, the High Court of Tanganyika, which under the Ordinance had exclusive jurisdiction to hear adoption applications, made a total of 130 adoption orders. This works out to an average of seven adoption orders per year. With regard to the cultural background of the applicants, so far as this could be ascertained, Europeans formed the majority accounting for about two thirds while members of the Asiatic communities accounted for about one third of the total number of adoption orders granted by the High Court. The number of African applicants was comparatively insignificant.

After independence, the picture changed considerably, both in terms of volume of adoption applications and the cultural background of the leading applicants.

Although the judiciary is the weakest branch of the government and must depend on the executive branch to enforce its judgments, it is not the integrity, or prestige of the judiciary that is at stake when the executive fails to comply, or to comply satisfactorily with court orders and judgments. In such situations, the authority of the state is called into question.

Clearly, where private persons are unable to concretise their remedies by enforcement, the relevance of the whole judicial process is called into question. In this regard one may say that the existing rules of enforcement are sufficiently geared to prevent that anomaly.

In actions involving private parties the judiciary is an impartial arbiter and it is up to the party aggrieved to pursue his claim to the logical conclusion. The Sheriffs and Civil Process Laws are designed to facilitate this. Not only are officers of state placed at his disposal but he has the ultimate weapons, in an action for committal of an irresponsible judgment debtor. Yet, the formalities appurtenant to the issuance and execution of the various writs have appropriately built in devices, that allow the respondent to comply at any stage and thus save himself financial loss, or loss of his liberty.

In the field of enforcement of non-money judgments the ultimate weapon is an action for committal initiated at the suit of the plaintiff. The same safety devices are available. In particular, where possible, the Court will employ another means of enforcing the judgment, or order.

Although, there is provision for the appointment of commissioners (eg. in sequestration proceedings) and referees (in enquiries) there is little resort to these provisions, not only because sequestration proceedings are extremely rare but probably also because there is seldom need for the appointment of referees in our courts.

It is in the enforcement of judgments against the state and government functionaries that rapid changes have occurred. Although, injunctions and mandamus will still not lie against government, it can now be sued and indirectly be made to obey court orders through actions directed against state functionaries. There is increasing willingness on the part of the courts to subject judicial, or quasi-judicial actions of government to judicial review. The problem remains as usual that of giving teeth to such orders since the very executive against which orders are made, is depended on to enforce such orders. Hence the judiciary has developed safety valves in actions for judicial review to prevent collision with the executive. Utmost discretion is exercised by judges in granting orders for review and they will generally do so only as a last resort

In 1981, after nearly three years of drafting and deliberations, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) at its 18th Session adopted a regional human rights instrument— The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Recent documentation indicate that an adequate number of ratifications have been received to bring the Charter into force. There has so far however not been any test of its provisions. Nevertheless this article will be devoted to a legal examination and in other ways to a speculative analysis of an aspect of one of the human and/or peoples' rights sought to be guaranteed in the Charter—the right to political self determination. This of course means that the very narrow scope of this paper will hardly touch on the economic aspects of self determination, which is also provided for in the Charter.

Provocation is dead! It died at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The funeral oration was read by Kazeem J.S.C., while the funeral dirge was chorused by four other judges of the same court. The case was Ganiyu Olatokunbo Oladiran v. State The facts of the case were as follows. The appellant was a secretary of Design Group Ltd., a firm of chartered architects based in Ibadan. His marriage with the deceased came to be as a result of a pregnancy presented to him by the deceased. Their matrimonial history was one of intermittent quarrels, accusations and counter-accusations of infidelity against the appellant and insubordination against the deceased. The deceased had always accused the appellant of showing interest in their maid, a girl of about 13 or 14 years of age. The appellant had on the other hand accused the deceased of smoking cigarettes which he disliked.

The climax to their matrimonial squabble came, to a head on the 21 September, 1982. On that day, there was as usual a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. There was an abortive attempt at settlement by the deceased's parents. Later that day the deceased refused to cook for the appellant and told him to ask his “second wife” (the house-maid) to cook for him. She also abused him. Thereafter the appellant got a knife and stabbed the deceased to death. The appellant subsequently made an abortive attempt at committing suicide.

The main object of the National Office of Industrial Property (NOIP) Act 1979, is the regulation of all contracts and agreements for the transfer of technology to Nigeria. It attempts to achieve this by requiring all such contracts and agreements to be registered with the NOIP and for their terms to be predicated upon state or judicial consent.

In Beecham's case, the Court of Appeal decided that failure to register relevant contracts or agreements with the NOIP does not affect their validity. It is the submission of this note that the decision of the Court of Appeal was wrong: such contracts or agreements become tainted with illegality and, therefore, should be null and void.

Although this was an action for infringement of the plaintiff's (Beecham Group Ltd), registered trade mark “Lucozade”, this note will concentrate on the point of law (raised for the first time at the appeal), that non-registration of the transaction whereby the proprietorship of the mark was transferred to the plaintiff, rendered the transaction void. The defendant's argument was that the plaintiff had no locus standi to institute the action or use the trade mark, because it had failed to register a transaction that was registrable within the context of section 4(d) of the NOIP Act.

The Court of Appeal disagreed: