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A Requiem for Provocation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

E. O. Isedonmwen
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Provocation is dead! It died at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The funeral oration was read by Kazeem J.S.C., while the funeral dirge was chorused by four other judges of the same court. The case was Ganiyu Olatokunbo Oladiran v. State The facts of the case were as follows. The appellant was a secretary of Design Group Ltd., a firm of chartered architects based in Ibadan. His marriage with the deceased came to be as a result of a pregnancy presented to him by the deceased. Their matrimonial history was one of intermittent quarrels, accusations and counter-accusations of infidelity against the appellant and insubordination against the deceased. The deceased had always accused the appellant of showing interest in their maid, a girl of about 13 or 14 years of age. The appellant had on the other hand accused the deceased of smoking cigarettes which he disliked.

The climax to their matrimonial squabble came, to a head on the 21 September, 1982. On that day, there was as usual a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. There was an abortive attempt at settlement by the deceased's parents. Later that day the deceased refused to cook for the appellant and told him to ask his “second wife” (the house-maid) to cook for him. She also abused him. Thereafter the appellant got a knife and stabbed the deceased to death. The appellant subsequently made an abortive attempt at committing suicide.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , Autumn 1988 , pp. 194 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 1988

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References

1 Irikefe C.J.N., Aniagolu, Coker and Oputa, JJ.S.C.

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