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Dissent on Japan's Northern Periphery: Nemuro, the Northern Territories and the Limits of Change in a ‘Bureaucrat's Movement’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2010

BRAD WILLIAMS
BRAD WILLIAMS*
Affiliation:
Visiting fellow, Department of Political Science, National University of [email protected]
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Abstract

This article sheds light on a relatively unexplored aspect of the Northern Territories dispute by examining the views of residents in Nemuro – the symbolic frontline in Japan's Northern Territories Reversion Movement (NTRM). The NTRM began in this northern periphery as a movement of divergent attitudes but was soon coopted by the Japanese government for political reasons. Local opposition to the government's four island en bloc policy existed in some quarters but was largely kept in check by state largesse. However, as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes, dissent is slowly emerging in Nemuro. There are signs of an emerging disjuncture between national policy and local aspirations. This disjuncture has both theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, this paper is congruent with politico-institutional arguments emphasizing the impact of the regulatory regime in shaping civil society organizations. From a policy perspective, public opinion in Nemuro indicates a potential avenue for compromise in Tokyo's negotiating strategy, although pressure for change is unlikely to emerge from the bureaucratized NTRM.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , August 2010 , pp. 221 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1 Irredentism is defined broadly here as ‘historical claim made by one sovereign state to land and/or people outside its internationally recognised boundaries, justified on the grounds that earlier separation was illegal or forced’. von Hippel, Karin, ‘The Resurgence of Nationalism and its International Implications’, Washington Quarterly, 17 (4) (1994): 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A territorial claim can therefore be based on historical, cultural or ethnic grounds.

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11 Ibid.

12 Suzuki distinguishes the phased return strategy from the ‘two islands first policy’ (nitō senkan henkanron), which he claims was a creation of his opponents in the Gaimushō and mass media. There is considerable speculation as to what Suzuki's policy actually entailed. According to sources in the Gaimushō, Suzuki's approach consisted of four elements: (1) seek from Russia confirmation of the 1956 Joint Declaration; (2) confirm that Habomai and Shikotan belong to Japan, but recognise Russian administrative rights (shiseiken) for the time being, then conclude an intermediate treaty that confirms the return of these rights to Japan; (3) continue negotiations over Etorofu and Kunashiri; and (4) conclude a peace treaty after ownership of the islands is decided. Yomiuri Shimbun. 8 September 2000, p. 2. This manifestation of the ‘two-islands first’ approach does not explicitly call for Russia to recognise Japanese sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri or return them to Japan. It is Suzuki's apparent preparedness to abandon these two islands that caused a backlash in Japan. Suzuki challenges this interpretation by claiming that seeking confirmation from Russia that sovereignty over the four islands rests with Japan is the starting point for territorial negotiations. He emphasizes flexibility regarding the timing and modalities of the islands’ reversion to Japan. See Muneo, Suzuki, Hanran (Tokyo: Bunkasha, 2004), pp. 154–5Google Scholar.

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16 Mainichi Shimbun, 7 March 2006, p. 21.

17 The Nemuro city website: http://www.city.nemuro.hokkaido.jp/dcitynd.nsf/doc/7B5835EEC46CE1A6492570D70025D38F?OpenDocument.

18 Personal correspondence with an official from Nemuro's Northern Territories Countermeasures Office, 23 June 2009; Hokkaidō Shimbun, 25 September 2007, p. 6.

19 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 28 June 2006.

20 Mainichi Shimbun, 28 June 2006.

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23 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 13 November 2005, p. 1. Ten percent of the respondents in the five Hokkaido cities were willing to forgo Etorofu and Kunashiri if Russia were to return Habomai and Shikotan.

24 It is Iwashita who first makes this observation. See Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, p. 183.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Questions 1 to 3 pertain to the respondents’ gender, age, and occupation. See ibid., pp. 186–90.

28 Ibid., p. 190.

29 Ibid., p. 191.

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32 John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, p. 232.

33 Between 1946 and 2007, 1,339 vessels and 9,489 fishers, were detained, respectively. Of this number, 31 fishers have been killed. Nemuro-shi and Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai Taisaku Kyōkai, Nihon no Ryōdo: Hoppō Ryōdo (Nemuro: Nemuro Insatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, 2008), p. 92.

34 Swearingen, Rodger, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 182Google Scholar.

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36 Nemuro-shi, Suisan Nemuro, 2006, pp. 2, 12.

37 The move towards decentralization in Japan could see local governments such as Nemuro given greater authority and financial resources as a means of revitalizing grassroots society. It is unlikely that decentralization would alter significantly Nemuro's relations with the disputed islands, which, given the sensitive nature of the territorial dispute, are heavily regulated by state authorities.

38 Honda Ryōichi, Mitsuryō no Umi de, p. 118.

39 Ibid.

40 The Nemuro city website: http://www.city.nemuro.hokkaido.jp/dcitynd.nsf/doc.

41 Asahi Shimbun, 15 December 1980, p. 3.

42 Iwashita Akihiro notes that Japanese and Russian authorities would subsequently need to demarcate a new boundary between Habomai and Etorofu. If Japan was able to negotiate a favourable outcome, its EEZ after the reversion of Habomai and Shikotan could possibly reach half the size of the total EEZ of the four islands. Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, p. 165.

43 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 20 October 1956, p. 3; Yukiko, Kuroiwa, ‘Nemuro ni Miru Hoppō Ryōdo: Reisengo no Paradaimu Tenkan o Ikiru Machi (jō)’, Sōgō Seisaku, 1 (1) (1999): 5Google Scholar.

44 Mainichi Shimbun, 13 November 2005, p. 23.

45 Honda Ryōichi, Mitsuryō no Umi de, p. 301.

46 Arai Nobuo and Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, ‘The Russian Far East in Russo-Japanese Relations’, p. 166.

47 Noriyuki, Ōtaishi and Hiroaki, Honma, Shiretoko, Hoppō Yontō: Ryūhyō ga Hagukumu Shizen Isan (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2008), pp. 157–8Google Scholar.

48 In August 2009, the Russian government announced that it would no longer accept Japanese humanitarian assistance for the South Kuril Islands. The ostensible reason for the aid cancellation is the recent improvement in socioeconomic conditions on the islands. However, the fact that the announcement came one month after Japan's Diet passed legislation recognizing the four islands as Japanese territory, which was criticized harshly in Russia – with some calling for the cancellation of the visa-less exchange program – suggests that it may have also been politically motivated. ‘Rossiya otkazalac' ot Yaponskoy gumanitarnoy pomoshchi Yuzhnym Kurilam’, RIA Novosti, 7 August 2009, http://rian.ru/politics/20090807/180086899.html.

49 Hokkaidō Sōmubu Hoppō Ryōdo Taisaku Honbu, Hoppō Ryōdo no Gaiyō, 1999, p. 1.

50 Nemuro-shi and Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai Taisaku Kyōkai, Nihon no Ryōdo: Hoppō Ryōdo (Nemuro: Nemuro Insatsu Kabushiki Kaisha, 2008), pp. 48–50Google Scholar; Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei, Omoide no Waga Furusato: Hoppō Ryōdo (Sapporo: Suda Seihan, 2006), pp. 38–9Google Scholar.

51 Kuroiwa Yukiko, ‘Nemuro ni Miru Hoppō Ryōdo,’ p. 55; Hokkaidō Shimbun, 17 April 1989, p. 1.

52 The Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei website: http://www.koueki.jp/disclosure/ta/chishima-habomai/0.pdf; Hokkaidō Shimbun, 25 September 2007, p. 7.

53 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 28 May 2008, p. 30. A recent membership drive in Nemuro, however, seems to have borne fruit, with numbers passing the 1,000 mark for the first time in six years. Hokkaidō Shimbun, 10 May 2007, p. 10.

54 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 28 May 2008, p. 30. In another sign of a lack of interest among the younger generation, only eight out of Chishima Renmei's 15 branches have a youth wing. Hokkaidō Shimbun, 29 May 2008, p. 32.

55 Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, pp. 226–27.

56 Williams, Brad, ‘The Russo-Japanese Visa-less Exchange Program: Opportunities and Limits’, East Asia: An International Quarterly, 20 (3) (Fall 2003): 109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Civil society is defined here as ‘that sphere intermediate between family and state in which social actors pursue neither profit within the market nor power within the state’. Schwartz, Frank J., ‘Introduction: Recognizing Civil Society in Japan’, in Schwartz, Frank J. and Pharr, Susan J. (eds.), The State of Civil Society in Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1, 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 See for instance, Hokkaidō Sōmubu Hoppō Ryōdo Taisaku Honbu, Hoppō Ryōdo no Gaiyō, 1999, p. 8; Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei, Omoide no Waga Furusato, p. 55; Nemuro-shi and Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai Taisaku Kyōkai, Nihon no Ryōdo, p. 74.

59 From the following website: http://www.ne.jp/asahi/cccp/camera/HoppouRyoudo/HoppouShiryou/19451201ANDO.htm.

60 Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, p. 201.

61 John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, p. 226.

62 Ibid.

63 Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, p. 204; Nemuro-shi and Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai Taisaku Kyōkai, Nihon no Ryōdo, p. 75.

64 See John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, p. 227. The Nemuro municipal government and Hoppō Kyōkai claim that the NTRM is now one in which the government works hand-in-hand with the private sector (kanmin ittai). Nemuro-shi and Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai Taisaku Kyōkai, Nihon no Ryōdo, p. 76. However, despite this claim, Chishima Renmei is still criticized for overly bureaucratic thinking. See Hokkaidō Shimbun, 31 May 2008, p. 32.

65 A number of other organizations are also active in the NTRM. These include a committee set up within the Hokkaido Fisheries Association in 1972 to provide financial support to those formerly possessing fishing rights in the Northern Territories’ fisheries is also active in the NTRM; two umbrella organizations, the Northern Territories Reversion Movement Liaison Council (Hoppō Ryōdo Henkan Yōkyū Undō Renraku Kyōgikai), which was established in 1977 and comprises youth, labour and women's groups and the Northern Territories Reversion Movement Prefectural Citizen's Council (Hoppō Ryōdo Henkan Yōkyū Undō Todōfukenmin Kaigi), which has a similar composition but also includes government agencies and has branches in each prefecture and; the Hokkaido Northern Territories Exchange Promotion Committee (Hoppō Yontō Kōryū Hokkaidō Suishin Iinkai), was created by the Hokkaido Prefectural Government in 1992 in order to provide institutional support for the visa-less exchange program between the former Japanese and current Russian residents of the disputed islands.

66 Schmitter's definition of corporatism is representative of the state variant:

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representative monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.

See Schmitter, Philippe C., ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, in Schmitter, Philippe C. and Lehmbruch, Gerhard (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979 [1974]), p. 13Google Scholar.

‘Societal corporatism’ is like state corporatism in that it is structured sectorally but unlike the state variant, it functions in a manner that represents grassroots interests. See Chan, Anita, ‘Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29 (1993): 43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Samuels, Richard J., The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan: Localities Incorporated? (Princeton, NJ.Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 256Google Scholar.

67 John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, p. 227.

68 Terumichi, Kuwabara, ‘Hoppō Ryōdo no Henkan Yōkyū Undō’, Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi, 60 (4, 5, and 6) (1961): 443Google Scholar; Hokkaidō Shimbun, 27 May 2008, p. 28.

69 The Shadan Hōjin Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei website: http://www.koueki.jp/disclosure/ta/chishima-habomai/0.pdf.

70 John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, p. 227.

71 Shadan Hōjin Hoppō Ryōdo Fukki Kisei Dōmei, Kaiin Meibo, 14 July 2008.

72 Pekkanen, Robert, Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

73 Ibid., pp. 17–18.

74 Ibid., pp. 61–4.

75 Ibid., p. 33.

76 Ibid., p. 75.

77 Shadan Hōjin Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei, Shadan Hōjin Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei Yakuin Meibo, 1 June 2008.

78 There is probably also a practical reason for this arrangement: regional organizations often lack sufficient human resources to undertake the requisite clerical tasks, making them rely to a certain degree on assistance from bureaucrats. I am grateful to two Hokkaido Shimbun journalists, Saitō Masaaki and Kobayashi Hiroaki, for providing this information. Personal correspondence, 28 and 29 May 2009.

79 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 31 May 2008, p. 32.

80 Shadan Hōjin Hoppō Ryōdo Fukki Kisei Dōmei, Shūshi Kessansho, 2008.

81 Many thanks again to Saitō Masaaki and Kobayashi Hiroaki for providing this information. Personal correspondence, 28 May 2009.

82 Frank J. Schwartz, ‘Introduction’, p. 10.

83 26.7% did not think the four islands had to be returned en bloc, as long as Japanese sovereignty over them was recognized. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 October 2006, p. 11.

84 Brad Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute, p. 51. Some foreign observers question the intensity of the Japanese public's demand. See Hellmann, Donald, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Nimmo, William, Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

85 Gilbert Rozman, Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, p. 103.

86 See Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai. This simulation was based on Iwashita's earlier work on the Sino-Russian border dispute. See Chū-Ro Kokkyō 4000 kiro (Tokyo: Kadogawa Sensho, 2003).

87 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 22 February 2007, p. 9.

88 Some suggested the arrest of Suzuki and his Gaimushō ally, Satō, on corruption charges might have been politically motivated. See Clark, Gregory, ‘Northern Territories Dispute Lives on Self-righteous Deadlock’, The Japan Times website: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20090512gc.html.

89 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 17 April 2009. Some (past and present) LDP politicians such as Kanemaru Shin, Nonaka Hiromu, Kōnō Yōhei, and Mori Yoshirō have also expressed support for a compromise solution to the territorial dispute. See Rozman, Gilbert, ‘A Chance for a Breakthrough in Russo-Japanese Relations: Will the Logic of Great Power Relations Prevail?’, The Pacific Review, 15 (3) (2002): 337CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Current Prime Minister, Hatoyama Yukio, made comments in an interview after his election victory suggesting he believed the four islands belong to Japan but would maintain flexibility over the timing and modalities of a return. See Hokkaidō Shimbun website: http://www.hokkaido-np.co.jp/news/2009syuinsen/188824_all.html.

90 Hokkaidō Shimbun, 23 May 2006, p. 20.

91 The Shadan Hōjin Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojūsha Renmei Nemuro Shibu Seinenbu website: http://www10.plala.or.jp/tisimaseinenbu.

92 I am grateful to Simon Avenell for pointing this out.

93 A senior official from Chishima Renmei's Nemuro branch revealed in a discussion with the author that he personally agreed with the two islands first position but as the organization also comprises members from Etorofu and Kunashiri its official stance has to be the four islands policy. 29 September 2008.

94 Many thanks again to Saitō Masaaki and Kobayashi Hiroaki for providing this information. Personal correspondence, 28 May 2009.

95 See Muneo, Suzuki and Masaru, Satō, Hoppō Ryōdo:‘Tokumei Kōshō’ (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2006), pp. 155–9Google Scholar.

96 Iwashita Akihiro, Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai, p. 227.