This special issue highlights one of the important subjects of this journal, Japanese politics and international relations, as studied in Japan's neighbors, Korea and China, and Japan itself. The aim is to elucidate the angles taken by these three countries when examining Japan. Before going into the similar and different angles taken, it may be helpful to note two noteworthy features of their interactions and transactions. They are, first, the steady integration of these economies and societies; second, the tenacity of ill-feelings held toward Japan. First, if the lifting in 1991 of the embargo imposed on China for its Tiananmen massacre of 1989 is a key benchmark for the steady and swift regional integration in East Asia since, it did not take a dozen years before the intra-regional trade ratio over total trade went beyond 50%. As compared to parallell figures for Europe at various time points, say 1962 when the Rome Treaty was signed and 1990 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the number of years necessary for intraregional trade over total trade to exceed 50% are a dozen years for East Asia versus thirty odd years for Western Europe. It has a lot to do with the pattern of inclusion in East Asian regional integration. It includes China and the United States. In Europe regional integration was meant to enable Western Europe to stand alone. Both vis-à-vis the United States and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Western Europe wanted to band together and bind together those with shared values. East Asian regional integration differs from this European model. The East Asian model is first to strengthen themselves, while seeking opportunities regionally and globally to attain, as a result of their self-strengthening strategy, high regional strength and high regional integration.

How do contemporary publics understand happiness? What makes them experience it? Do conceptions and sources of their happiness vary across culturally different societies? This paper addresses these questions, utilizing the 2008 round of the AsiaBarometer surveys conducted in six countries scattered over four different continents. Analyses of these surveys, conducted in Japan, China, and India from the East; and the United States, Russia, and Australia from the West, reveal a number of interesting cross-cultural differences and similarities in the way the people of the East and West understand and experience happiness. Specifically, the former are much less multidimensional than the latter in their conceptions of happiness. Yet, they are alike in that their sense of relative achievement or deprivation is the most pervasive and powerful influence on happiness.

A growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

This article summarizes the findings of this special issue focusing on five questions: (1) who studies Japanese politics and international relations in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea?; (2) what is being studied in each of these countries?; 3) how are Japanese politics studied in each of these countries?; (3) what determines the nature of the study of Japanese politics and international relations?; and 4) what is the impact of the study of Japanese politics in each of these three countries? The findings on the first questions are that most scholars in each of these countries are concentrated in their forties and fifties, but their educational backgrounds are considerably varied. On the second question, the topics of study are becoming more wide-ranging in recent years, although in China, government policy still puts a constraint on the range of topics studied. Regarding the third question, the approaches that are used are becoming more varied, especially in Japan and South Korea. Concerning the fourth question, domestic politics in each of these countries matter, and financial constraints are a problem in China. Finally, it seems that Korean scholars in this area may have greater impact on the government than in the other two countries.

Globalization has led to a redefinition of the functions and roles of the state. Based on data drawn from a cross-national social survey, this article examines the influences of globalization on the public's attitudes towards their state in Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, by focusing on satisfaction with government performance and demands on the government. The six countries differ extensively in their sociopolitical and technological situations, as well as in the experiences of their people with globalization in terms of the following aspects: connectivity with the world through personal ties and digital means, English language capacity, and support for the forces of globalization. There are also huge disparities in the public rankings of government performance and demands for expanding government spending in a wide range of policy areas. Our analysis reveals that, although both intra- and inter-country variations in the influences of globalization on public attitudes towards the state are not particularly prominent, those who support globalization not only are more inclined than others to be satisfied with the government's performance, but also demand more government intervention.

This article analyzes the institutional patterns of eight young democracies in Asia. The analysis originates from Lijphart's majoritarian-consensus framework. It illustrates that neither Lijphart's two-dimensional democracy pattern, nor an alternative pattern exists in Asia. Instead, the review of possible causes for the lack of conformity between Lijphart's patterns of democracy and the reality of the situation in Asia support the criticism in existing research literature regarding some of Lijphart's main assumptions and major conclusions. Furthermore, Asian realities provide only partial support for Lijphart's advice that the consensus option is the more attractive option for countries that designed their first democratic constitutions.

The aim of the article is to review Japanese Political Studies in Japan (JPSJ) circa 2000 for the purpose of identifying the trends of JPSJ and gauging its scope, subject areas, and methods. I then identify the key questions asked in JPSJ, i.e. for the third quarter of the last century: (1) What went wrong for Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, which had been seemingly making progress in the scheme of ‘enlightenment and entrepreneurship’ and was ‘a rich country’ with a ‘strong army’? (2) What is the secret of Western democracy in excelling itself in terms of keeping freedom and accumulating wealth? For the last quarter of the last century: (1) Why is Japanese politics shaped so heavily by bureaucracy? (2) Why are its citizens so weakly partisan in their voting choice? (3) How are politics and economics intertwined in policy making and electoral behavior? Following these trends in JPSJ in the latter half of the last century, I identify the three trends that have emerged in the first quarter of this century: (1) historicizing the normative and institutional origins of Japanese politics, (2) putting Japanese politics in comparative perspective, (3) the new self-conscious impetus for data collection and theory construction. Despite the steady tide of globalization and the strong influence of American political science, market size, long tradition, and language facility, lead political scientists in Japan to think and write more autonomously.

Assessment of the quality of governance has so far relied on socioeconomic statistics and expert opinions, while largely neglecting citizens’ perceptions. Using AsiaBarometer 2008 data, this paper examines the factors affecting citizens’ satisfaction with their government in six Asian-Pacific countries: America, Australia, China, India, Japan, and Russia. I found citizen satisfaction with the public services they receive, such as education, healthcare, and public safety, matters most in their assessment of government performance. Individual satisfaction with income, job, and housing also matters. The respondent will disapprove government performance if he or she thinks corruption is serious in government, or elected officials stop caring about citizens once voting is finished. In terms of macro variables, economic condition of a country seems to matters significantly. Especially, if a country's economy is growing fast, citizens are much more likely to be satisfied with government performance. Large within-country variations exist in countries such as China and India, where citizens of different cities or regions may give rather different assessments of government, suggesting many contextual variables not captured by this study. Lastly, citizens’ satisfaction with government performance seems to be highly divergent from international organizations’ evaluation of governance quality, such as the World Bank Governance Index. This raises both methodological and normative issues regarding the proper approaches to measuring good governance.

In this article, we have examined how Japan has supported ASEAN's economic integration through ODA and other diplomatic measures, and showed how Japan's engagements in ASEAN economic integration evolved over time. In addressing these issues, we took into account the growing influence of China's ascent in Southeast Asia, and assumed that Japan's China policy of mixed ‘accommodation and balance’ became explicit in Japan's ASEAN policy. The pronouncement of support for ASEAN integration, disbursement of aid to the region, forging of bilateral and regional FTAs/EPAs with ASEAN, and its recent initiatives and proactive involvement in the Mekong regional development are indicative of Japan's reactive posture on China's growing influence in the region. Japanese diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN are intended, in part, to accommodate and balance China's increasing prominence in Southeast Asia. This explains the simultaneous existence of competitive and cooperative initiatives of the two countries with ASEAN.

This article is an attempt to identify who's who and the whereabouts of Japanese political studies in South Korea. Previous studies suggest that South Korea made a delayed start in Japanese studies because of submerged anti-Japanese feeling among the general public, and that linguistic and humanistic studies were prevalent while social scientific studies lagged behind. The second generation scholars, who actively published their academic works on Japan between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, contributed to the development of objective, social scientific understanding of Japan. Their research interests included scrutinizing modern Japan, studying Korea-Japan relations, and analyzing Japanese foreign policy. The third generation scholars, which this article focuses on, have a few common characteristics: they began Japanese studies when Japan was rising; most of them were trained in Japan or the United States; most of them are fluent in Japanese; and they are publishing actively in major academic journals. The research interests of the third generation are categorized into four: (1) widening the research horizon; (2) inheriting the tradition of the previous generation; (3) synchronizing research agendas with the foreign scholarly community; and (4) opening up a new research horizon. After making a comprehensive content analysis of the works undertaken by third generation scholars, three major challenges are suggested for the upcoming generation of Japanese studies in South Korea: (1) globalizing the scholarly works with more theoretical analysis; (2) developing a uniquely Korean perspective about Japan; and (3) undertaking a systematic collaborative study with foreign scholars.

This article describes public attitudes toward government spending in Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, the six major economies of the Asia-Pacific region. An analysis of the 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey data shows that ordinary citizens of the sample countries favored increased, rather than reduced, government spending on a wide range of policy programs. It is also found that support for state activism was stronger in former state socialist countries than in market capitalist ones. Although economic interests, symbolic predispositions, and social positions influenced spending preferences to varying degrees, left–right ideology was particularly conspicuous in most countries surveyed. It is evident that the mass publics of the major economies of the Asia-Pacific region did not strongly endorse state contraction or retrenchment, even in the wake of economic globalization and the neoliberal reform movement.

This article sheds light on a relatively unexplored aspect of the Northern Territories dispute by examining the views of residents in Nemuro – the symbolic frontline in Japan's Northern Territories Reversion Movement (NTRM). The NTRM began in this northern periphery as a movement of divergent attitudes but was soon coopted by the Japanese government for political reasons. Local opposition to the government's four island en bloc policy existed in some quarters but was largely kept in check by state largesse. However, as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes, dissent is slowly emerging in Nemuro. There are signs of an emerging disjuncture between national policy and local aspirations. This disjuncture has both theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, this paper is congruent with politico-institutional arguments emphasizing the impact of the regulatory regime in shaping civil society organizations. From a policy perspective, public opinion in Nemuro indicates a potential avenue for compromise in Tokyo's negotiating strategy, although pressure for change is unlikely to emerge from the bureaucratized NTRM.

This paper presents a country profile of the United States using data from the AsiaBarometer (2008) survey. I first examine how citizens see themselves, their government and big business. My findings show that Americans remain ambivalent toward politics, their government, and big business. Citizens overwhelmingly support democracy as a political system and are satisfied with a broad range of specific democratic rights, but, at the same time, they complain about the workings of their democratic system, policy output, and many distrust government and big business. I then examine the role citizens play in politics, analyzing who participates and why.

Granting foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan was one of the Clean Government Party (CGP)'s major policy priorities during its 11 years governing in coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). While the CGP proposed several bills that would have done this, none of those bills came close to passing. Why not? Conventional wisdom about Japanese conservatism suggests that the LDP would not support such a bill because the party is uniformly committed to the idea that Japan is a one-ethnicity country, and thus the party is hostile to proposals that would grant those without Japanese ethnicity a role in Japanese society. However, I argue that Japanese conservatives in general, and LDP politicians in particular, have major disagreements about the appropriate role of foreign residents in Japanese society. Moreover, I argue that LDP politicians did not support the CGP's proposal to grant foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan because this proposal did not appeal to politicians from either of the dominant conservative schools of thought about foreign residents in Japan.

The quantity and quality of Japanese political studies in China are influenced by political developments in China and Japan, Sino-Japanese relations, and academic development of political science. After the collapse of Japan's bubble economy and the end of the LDP's long rule in the early 1990s, many Chinese scholars diverted their attention from economic issues and took more interest in Japanese political studies. Political issues such as the resurgence of nationalism, the rise of right-wing forces, the end of the ‘1955 system’, the political origin of long and heavy recessions, the ‘normal state’, national strategy, and foreign policies have been discussed and debated. New approaches and perspectives such as the political pluralist approach, the new institutional approach, the ecological approach and the political process approach have been used. It is imperative to overcome the institutional, political, and financial problems in order to improve the state and raise the quality of Japanese political studies in China.

This paper aims to examine the evolution of Japanese studies of international relations since the end of World War II. In so doing, in particular, this paper first looks at the dominant trends and characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field, and, second, the correlations between the scholarship and Japan's experiences in real international relations. In discussing the evolution of Japanese studies of international relations, I shall divide the years since 1945 into three separate periods: (1) 1945–60, (2) 1961–89, and (3) 1990 and after. Then, taking the current US–Japan relationship as a case study, I will examine the contemporary characteristics of Japanese scholarship in this field.

The September 2006 military coup against the Thaksin government in Thailand has had a profound impact on Thai politics. It has arrested the process of democratic consolidation that was set in motion in the country in the 1990s. Although many of Thaksin's policies lacked the spirit of democratic governance, he was democratically elected and was ousted from power unconstitutionally. The entire tenure of Thaksin has brought to the fore two deep cleavages in Thailand. The first of these is the deep divide between the rural and urban electoral constituencies. The former provided a major vote bank with little bearing on the dispersion of power and resources that was effectively dominated by the latter. Thaksin and his populist policies effectively undermined the urban electorate and strengthened the rural constituency. The second and perhaps structurally more significant tension is that which has developed between the new business elite and the old establishment elite that comprise the monarchy, military, and the bureaucracy. This old elite has been at the forefront of displacing Thaksin through its fear of loss of control over the domestic political process. The drawn out confrontation that has spawned two social movements has significantly raised the country's political temperature and there is the real potential for the situation to deteriorate into violence. Despite these changes, a number of continuities unique to the Thai political situation continue to obtain as well.