A growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

This article analyzes the institutional patterns of eight young democracies in Asia. The analysis originates from Lijphart's majoritarian-consensus framework. It illustrates that neither Lijphart's two-dimensional democracy pattern, nor an alternative pattern exists in Asia. Instead, the review of possible causes for the lack of conformity between Lijphart's patterns of democracy and the reality of the situation in Asia support the criticism in existing research literature regarding some of Lijphart's main assumptions and major conclusions. Furthermore, Asian realities provide only partial support for Lijphart's advice that the consensus option is the more attractive option for countries that designed their first democratic constitutions.

In this article, we have examined how Japan has supported ASEAN's economic integration through ODA and other diplomatic measures, and showed how Japan's engagements in ASEAN economic integration evolved over time. In addressing these issues, we took into account the growing influence of China's ascent in Southeast Asia, and assumed that Japan's China policy of mixed ‘accommodation and balance’ became explicit in Japan's ASEAN policy. The pronouncement of support for ASEAN integration, disbursement of aid to the region, forging of bilateral and regional FTAs/EPAs with ASEAN, and its recent initiatives and proactive involvement in the Mekong regional development are indicative of Japan's reactive posture on China's growing influence in the region. Japanese diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN are intended, in part, to accommodate and balance China's increasing prominence in Southeast Asia. This explains the simultaneous existence of competitive and cooperative initiatives of the two countries with ASEAN.

This article sheds light on a relatively unexplored aspect of the Northern Territories dispute by examining the views of residents in Nemuro – the symbolic frontline in Japan's Northern Territories Reversion Movement (NTRM). The NTRM began in this northern periphery as a movement of divergent attitudes but was soon coopted by the Japanese government for political reasons. Local opposition to the government's four island en bloc policy existed in some quarters but was largely kept in check by state largesse. However, as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes, dissent is slowly emerging in Nemuro. There are signs of an emerging disjuncture between national policy and local aspirations. This disjuncture has both theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, this paper is congruent with politico-institutional arguments emphasizing the impact of the regulatory regime in shaping civil society organizations. From a policy perspective, public opinion in Nemuro indicates a potential avenue for compromise in Tokyo's negotiating strategy, although pressure for change is unlikely to emerge from the bureaucratized NTRM.

Granting foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan was one of the Clean Government Party (CGP)'s major policy priorities during its 11 years governing in coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). While the CGP proposed several bills that would have done this, none of those bills came close to passing. Why not? Conventional wisdom about Japanese conservatism suggests that the LDP would not support such a bill because the party is uniformly committed to the idea that Japan is a one-ethnicity country, and thus the party is hostile to proposals that would grant those without Japanese ethnicity a role in Japanese society. However, I argue that Japanese conservatives in general, and LDP politicians in particular, have major disagreements about the appropriate role of foreign residents in Japanese society. Moreover, I argue that LDP politicians did not support the CGP's proposal to grant foreign permanent residents the right to vote in local elections in Japan because this proposal did not appeal to politicians from either of the dominant conservative schools of thought about foreign residents in Japan.