A part from the surviving state papers (notably those of Lord Lieutenant Clarendon) one of the most important sources for the history of Ireland in the reign of James II is the ‘Narrative’ written in 1702 by Thomas Sheridan. Sheridan was appointed secretary to Lord Deputy Tyrconnell and first commissioner of the revenue at the end of 1686 and was dismissed, following allegations of corruption, early in 1688. Sheridan claimed that James had made him secretary against Tyrconnell’s wishes so that he could watch Tyrconnell’s behaviour on his behalf, and that Tyrconnell fabricated the charges of corruption in order to be rid of him. Most historians, especially those hostile to Tyrconnell, have accepted Sheridan’s account as accurate. Sir James Mackintosh, for example, wrote : ‘Clarendon and Sheridan’s MSS agree so exactly in their picture of Tyrconnell, have such an air of truth in their accounts of him that it is not easy to refuse them credit, though they were both his enemies’.

In recent years our understanding of the attempts of the Irish Protestant élite to convert and ‘civilise’ Ireland in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has increased substantially. Some historians have examined the various campaigns to convert the largely Irish-speaking Catholic native population to Protestantism, through schools, the employment of Irish-speaking clergy and the publication of key religious texts in Irish. Others have explored Protestant efforts to civilise Ireland by bringing its governmental and legal infrastructure into line with those of England and through the spread of English dress, language, industries and agriculture.

In historical treatment, as was the case in life, John O’Connor Power has been overshadowed by Charles Stewart Parnell, his political nemesis who campaigned successfully to destroy Power’s influence. However during the decade 1874–84, Power was the most enigmatic, controversial and divisive figure in Irish politics. His fellow parliamentarian T P. O’Connor called him ‘one of the few [Irish M.P.s] who stood out from the ruck of Irish placehunters’, whose ‘profound knowledge, his temper ..his profound contempt for ignorance and, as he thought, at the same time the insanity of Parnell made him a source of division’ O’Connor described him as having ‘a powerful but very ugly face, the ugliness accentuated by the marks of a severe attack in childhood of smallpox’ Tim Healy remembered him as ‘reeking of the common clay’ and remarked that ‘Parnell’s aristocratic sensitiveness recoiled’ in Power’s presence.

Paul Cullen (1803-78) became archbishop of Armagh in 1849, after long service as rector of the Irish College in Rome, returned to Ireland the following vear, was translated to Dublin in 1852 and created cardinal in 1866. The picture of Cardinal Cullen as a prelate whose brand of ultramontanism made him an inveterate opponent of Irish nationalism, both constitutional and revolutionary, ought not to have survived the work of Monsignor Corish, Fr Mac-Suibhne and Dr John Whyte. In fact, this caricature has been perpetuated by such established historians as Professor Dudley Edwards, Dr F. S. L. Lyons and others. They continue to reproduce the hostile view which several generations of nationalist writers have taken of Cullen’s actions and motives in Irish politics. Take the charge that in the 1850s he tried to put an end to the clerical participation in politics which had been so important in the national movement. ‘Archbishop Cullen of Dublin attempted to withdraw the clergy completely from politics’ —thus Professor Edwards in A new history of Ireland (1972), writing as if Dr MThyte had never examined this question with the compulsive impartiality typical of him.

Before considering the manner in which the house of lords handled Irish questions in the age of Peel a brief examination of the ties between the United Kingdom upper house and Ireland is necessary A striking fact that requires emphasis is the growth between 1783 and 1832 of the ‘Irish interest’ in the lords. In the eighteenth century, when the British house of lords was a relatively small body of little over 200 members, the number of peers with a stake in Irish land was only about one eighth of the whole body. Several of these, too, owned wide lands in England and their main interests lay there. But by the time the first reformed parliament was opened on 29 January 1833 the Irish interest’ in the lords had become a formidable body In a house that had doubled in numbers since 1783 virtually one peer out of every four had a stake in Ireland through the ownership of land, and the majority of these were men whose economic interests were exclusively centred on their Irish estates. Moreover this ‘Irish interest’ maintained its strength in the lords right down to the formation of Gladstone's first ministry as the table below makes clear.

This doggerel vindication of Fitzwilliam’s Irish viceroyalty of 1795 gave one contemporary interpretation of this controversial episode. Such a favourable verdict was far from universal at the time and subsequently has been seriously questioned by historians. In one respect, however, this verse succinctly highlighted one of the most striking features of the Fitzwilliam episode. It appeared that the lord lieutenant had been recalled before ‘he scarcely could explain himself’. The English minister principally responsible for initiating the swift recall was the home secretary, the duke of Portland. Since Portland was a close friend and longstanding political ally of Fitzwilliam, this seeming betrayal excited widespread comment and, in certain circles, gave rise to heartsearching consternation. Yet Portland’s motives have never been satisfactorily explained by historians. Attention has repeatedly been paid to the motives of Fitzwilliam himself, and the conduct of the prime minister, the Younger Pitt, has been carefully scrutinised. Explanations of Portland’s behaviour have been left rather on the sidelines. He is usually portrayed as a weak-minded dupe and traitor to his own avowed principles. A re-examination of the evidence permits a more rounded characterisation. Portland’s attitude was complex but coherent. Instead of the conventional picture of a weak man with weak views, Portland emerges as a man with strong views and some failings.

The work of J. Murstfield and H. E. Sell hns directed the attention of historians to the importance of the English court of wards and liveries, both as an instrument of fiscal policy and as a welfare organisation for the children and widows of the king's tenants. In the Public Record Office, Lonclon, a great mass of material remains to throw light on every aspect of the court's activity. More recently Dr H. F. Kearney has published a uselul and suggestive paper on the Irish court of wards which was principally concerned with the reign of Charles I. A more detailed appraisal of the earlier period is not easy since the records of the Irish court of wards have, like those of other departments of state, suffered wholesale loss or destruction. It seems unlikely that the wards papers were ever placed in public archives: they apparently never reached the old Public Record Office in Dublin to be consumed in the holocaust of 1922. Consequently, the student has to work from public and private papers scattered throughout these islands in libraries, record ofices and private collections.

A list from September 1939 of files destroyed by the Department of External Affairs in the invasion scares of 1939–40 contains an intriguing reference to the possibility of dispatching Irish military forces to the Saarland on the Franco-German border in the winter of 1934–5. There they would serve as part of an international peacekeeping force while a plebiscite on the status of the territory was carried out under League of Nations auspices in January 1935. The context of this article is the events surrounding the creation of the peacekeeping force in December 1934.

That the Irish Free State should be mentioned as a possible contributor to the international force for the Saar is an illustration of the emerging mediatory role the state was to adopt after its three-year term on the League Council concluded in September 1933. With an Irish diplomat, Sean Lester, seconded to League service as High Commissioner in Danzig from 1934, and with Irish-born Edward Phelan, Assistant Director of the International Labour Organisation, being mentioned as a possible contender for the League post of Deputy Secretary-General in 1933, and with Eamon de Valera rising in importance as an international statesman and League supporter, Ireland’s involvement in the Saar was both an illustration and a result of the state’s prominent position in the League in the early to mid-1930s.

Ireland’s political and constitutional relationship to England remains a key theme of late medieval and early modern Irish history. Although it was a relationship in which Ireland was undoubtedly the subordinate kingdom, contemporary justifications for this subordination, and assertions of its basis, are often overshadowed by arguments directed against its validity. The text reproduced below is an assertion of that validity. It offers a highly selective analysis of English policy in Ireland from the twelfth century to the end of the seventeenth, based upon the assumption of Ireland’s legal and constitutional subordination to England. More particularly, it seeks to outline attitudes among the Protestant colonial community towards Ireland’s status, and does so at a precise juncture when such attitudes were deemed to be of imminent and crucial importance.

For long there has been accepted as genuine a charter, purporting to be issued by Henry III, which follows the text of his first reissue of the Great Charter in favour of his English subjects but which has been to some extent modified to adapt it to Irish conditions. This document, to which the title Magna Carta Hiberniae has been applied, has received an official cachet by its inclusion, with no mark of suspicion, in the first volume of the Early statutes of Ireland, edited by H. F. Berry. In undertaking a careful enquiry into the transmission of the text and its historical background, Dr. Dudley Edwards has performed a valuable service and, as a result, the authenticity of the supposed charter is, at least, very much open to question. He might, indeed, have gone further than he has done and have stated as a positive conclusion his tentative conjecture ‘ that Magna Carta Hiberniae is an adaptation of Henry's first charter, compiled in Ireland ’.

References in the consultas on Ireland in the Simancas archives continually remind the student of the larger background against which the invasion of 1601–2 took place. It was a background in which the emphasis insofar as Spanish foreign relations were concerned was on disengagement. But while Spain had concluded peace with France, sent out overtures to England, was seeking to extricate herself from the costly Dutch war and conducted negotiations even with Constantinople, she yet maintained a jealous care for her greatness. Thus war with France threatened to erupt over Savoy; Spain continued support to Archduke Albert, sovereign of the Netherlands, in his struggle against the United Provinces; she sought to support the emperor's eastern war against the Turk by attacking the Berbers in the Mediterranean; and she tried to extract better peace terms from England by creating a diversion in Ireland.

This article examines a letter from Cavan's political elite to the lord deputy and council in July 1629 in protest against the imposition of charges relating to the Graces. The letter, with its graphic description of a county gripped by famine, tells us much about conditions on the ground at this time. What is most interesting about this petition, however, are the more than one hundred signatures appended to it. The names include a mix of both Gaelic Irish and British settlers and indicate a plantation county whose two communities were prepared to work with each other, on this occasion at least, in order to achieve a common goal.

In December 1973, the British and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive designate agreed to the formal establishment of a ‘Council of Ireland’ as part of the historic Sunningdale Agreement. This council was to have executive functions and co-ordinate the provision of certain services on both sides of the border; it would have ‘executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions’. The Council of Ireland proposal was the British government's formal recognition of the ‘Irish dimension’ which it had accepted in the March 1973 White Paper, the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The proposed council was one of the most divisive issues in Northern Ireland politics during the 1972–4 period, and was strongly resisted by a majority of unionists. The council issue led to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive which had taken office in January 1974. Loyalist opponents of Sunningdale argued that the Council of Ireland, if allowed to operate, would be a stepping-stone to a united Ireland. Recently, some scholars have retrospectively endorsed this interpretation of the council, arguing that the Irish government, in concert with the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.), sought a particularly strong institution – with the goal of Irish reunification. But was the proposed Council of Ireland really intended as a vehicle for future Irish unity?

This article examines the memoirs written by Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, fourth earl of Carnarvon, concerning his period as lord lieutenant of Ireland between June 1885 and January 1886, in the brief Salisbury administration. Carnarvon inherited many of the problems of his Liberal predecessor, fifth Earl Spencer, telling Salisbury ‘the day of reckoning in this case will come very rapidly if any unwise promises are made or implied’. Nevertheless he was sympathetic to reform in many different fields, notably home rule, land reform, education and religion. A sensitive politician, Carnarvon penned this memorandum shortly after leaving office in an attempt to uphold his reputation. The memorandum gives a number of insights into Carnarvon’s manoeuvrings in cabinet, and demonstrates the workings of high politics in the late-nineteenth century. It was never published.