Does international law restrict the use of force by states in self-defense even when their survival is threatened? Should it? To answer these questions, I compare international law to domestic law and develop two ideal-types of emergency: in a ‘subject emergency’ law imposes absolute, justiciable limits on self-defense. In a ‘community emergency’ the sovereign, not law, determines what is necessary for the survival of the community and its legal system: sustaining the rule of law justifies its temporary retreat. I show that international law has elements of both ideal-types. It imposes some absolute limits on self-defense. However, international law also retreats, allowing the victim state to determine the (1) aims, (2) ad bellum proportionality, and (3) end of self-defense, as if armed threats triggered community emergencies. These three retreats serve the function of sustaining the rule of international law over the states at war. Retreats (1) and (3) also help sustain the rule of international law over the international community. That international law does and should not treat armed threats against states simply as subject emergencies, shows it can only sustain the rule of international law in an emergency by retreating. This is a negative litmus test for international law's ability to diffuse anarchy in International Relations.

In a dialogue discussing issues of the relation between empirical and normative theory, four contributors comment upon the edited volume by Richard Price, Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics, and Richard Price responds. The contributions principally revolve around the following themes: (1) whether a division of labor between normative and empirical theory can or should be overcome, which in turn presupposes notions of (2) just what constitutes normative and empirical international relations as such; and (3) the ethics of constructivism itself, including what if anything is distinctive about how constructivism might respond to the question of ‘how we should act’.

Hypocrisy, when addressed at all, is typically considered a functional, even valuable, aspect of international political practice within international relations theory. It is alternatively seen as necessary to the exercise of sovereignty and a rhetorical device used to seek pragmatic political change. Utilising insights from feminist, queer, and postcolonial theory, this article challenges this understanding of hypocrisy. The article demonstrates that hypocrisy is animated and elided by an investment in a particularly liberal vision of politics and international order (and concomitant obfuscation of the racialised, sexual, gendered, and colonial underpinnings of those same assumptions). The notion of hypocrisy relies upon a unitary and stable subject whose moral consistency is to be expected across time and space – a luxury less afforded to those disadvantaged within intersectional international hierarchies. Consequently, although the charge of hypocrisy appears to be about holding power to account, the article finds that it serves less to uphold normative principles than to re-centre the privileged and powerful subject – typically, the sovereign state of liberal international order – and its consistency with itself, as the unit and basis of moral concern. The article concludes by outlining the limitations of hypocrisy as a strategy of critique.

What is ontological (in)security? Recent scholarship on ontological security in International Relations has increasingly turned to the concept's theoretical origins in psychoanalysis and existential philosophy to address the field's (meta)theoretical limitations. This article argues that this development also necessitates an interrogation of the concept of ontological security itself to address the field's theoretical tensions. Further developing the nascent Kleinian approach to ontological security, this article conceptualises ontological (in)security as two distinct positions that denote the different ways in which subjects, be they individuals, groups, or states, manage anxiety. To develop this proposition, the article draws on Melanie Klein's work on the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions to elucidate these positions of ontological (in)security, their respective defence mechanisms against anxiety, and their socio-political implications. This Kleinian approach facilitates a clear theoretical distinction between security and insecurity, providing an analytical toolbox to differentiate the various ways in which anxiety is managed in different positions. This framework particularly underscores the ethical, reparative, and transformative potential of the position of ontological security, aspects that have received limited theoretical and empirical attention to date.

This paper advances and defends the overlapping consensus view of human rights (OCV) as a political conception of human rights most consistent with John Rawls's normative account of a realistic utopia at the international level. Although some clues exist in The Law of Peoples to support this view, an innovative reconstruction is called for to complete the picture. This paper aims to offer such a reconstruction, which is predicated on two premises: first, the parties to the international original positions, which include decent nonliberal peoples (DNPs), are reasonable and worthy of liberal toleration; and, second, the protection of human rights proper is a module that can fit into all acceptable comprehensive doctrines at the international level, including societal comprehensive doctrines in DNPs. The first premise has been subjected to vehement liberal critiques and left for dead, and the second premise has not been taken seriously and relatively neglected. This paper defends these premises in turn to justify the OCV as constitutive of Rawls's normative account of a realistic utopia at the international level.

As the origin story of the present world political order the globalization of international society serves as a unifying frame for the discipline of international relations. This paper considers the consequences of the shift from the ‘expansion’ to the ‘globalization’ of international society in relation to two main texts: Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society and Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit's The Globalization of International Society. The analysis shows that Bull's conception of world order depends on a key distinction between aggregate and system which marks the difference between an aggregate of local political orders and a systematically unified world political order (a global international system). Because recent histories of the globalization of international society remain guided by Bull's distinction, they are unable to explain this transition in historical terms without transforming the global international order from the explanandum of the globalization of international society to its explanans. As a result, global histories of the globalization of international society grant a global international system a structural permanence the original expansion story was meant to contest. In doing so they change profoundly the kind of questions that can be asked regarding the origins, character, and future of political order on earth.

The European Union (EU) and the antebellum US represent attempts to overcome anarchy without substituting hierarchy. Understood as ‘states unions’, these two systems are shown here to share foundational indeterminacy over sovereignty and the constitution of the people (i.e. the boundaries of the political community). Existing scholarship appreciates the EU's resulting democratic deficit but fails to problematize how dual ambiguity is sustained. The contrast between both states unions is used to probe this mutually constitutive relationship between sovereignty and democracy in an anti-hierarchical order. Defining the boundaries of the people by invoking popular sovereignty led in the antebellum, the paper argues, to a bifurcated debate over where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resided, destroying ambiguity. The contrast further shows that the EU has avoided the development of such rival, mutually exclusive constitutional visions that seek to make the people and sovereignty congruent at either the unit or union level. Instead, the EU has sustained dual constitutional ambiguity by allowing for multiple accountability claims reliant on overlapping notions of the people. Democratizing international cooperation thus should focus on the form democratic accountability can take rather than seeking to use popular sovereignty to establish some decision-making level where sovereignty and the people are congruent.

Throughout the 20th century, women were leading intellectuals on International Relations (IR). They thought, wrote, and taught on this subject in numerous political, professional, intimate, and intellectual contexts. They wrote some of the earliest and most powerful theoretical statements of what would later become core approaches to contemporary international theory. Yet, historical women, those working before the late 20th century, are almost completely missing in IR's intellectual and disciplinary histories, including histories of its main theoretical traditions. In this forum, leading historians and theorists of IR respond to the recent findings of the Leverhulme project on Women and the History of International Thought (WHIT), particularly its first two book-length publications on the centrality of women to early IR discourses and subsequent erasure from its history and conceptualization. The forum is introduced by members of the WHIT project. Collectively, the essays suggest the implications of the erasure and recovery of women's international thought are significant and wide-ranging.

A diverse range of actors, from practitioners and academics to civil society groups and activists, appear to see hope in international law for the advancement of their causes. This paper examines whether this optimism is well-founded. It explores whether international law can serve as an agent of social change, and whether it can accommodate radical changes in social order. It begins by exposing a formalist stance that is immanent to much ‘legal activist’ discourse. It then explores links between this mode of jurisprudential thought and idealist epistemology. Drawing from the philosophy of Theodor Adorno, and in particular his notion of ‘identity-thinking’, it uncovers structural connections between formalism, idealism, law, and economy that call into question international law's socially-transformative potential. The perspective advanced in this paper falls somewhere between the polarities of opportunity and impasse, seeking to acknowledge the importance of legal strategies in safeguarding the disenfranchised, while remaining alive to their potential dangers and limitations.

The Status of Law begins with the suspicion ‘that “law” might have become the problem rather than the solution, and this problem requires further analysis’. Given that law is a social construct, Kratochwil invites us to turn to the sites where this construction takes place. To bring the many constitutions and contestations of law to the fore, he conjures theoretical sparring partners to engage in nine meditations. The genius of this Symposium consists of inviting nine colleagues, each engaging with a different meditation, and inviting a tenth colleague to add this introduction as a way to engage the engagement. By doing practice on practice the Symposium does full justice Kratochwil's move towards looking at the practice ‘in the middle of things’. The resulting field day with Fritz is a piece of intellectual mastery compiled by ‘spirited members of the republic of letters’ that carries the reader along on a journey that reveals and addresses Kratochwil's suspicions about the problem with law. In the end, we know more through sharing the problem and partaking in the joy of addressing it.

Transnational altruism comes in many forms, prominently among them private giving through charitable NGOs. This paper focuses on the altruistic actions of those giving to charitable organizations and especially on the subsequent altruistic choices of those second-order, donor-organizations. Leaving choices about how donated money should be used exclusively in the hands of donors is morally problematic in various ways. This is why transnational relationships that involve private giving from rich to poor should be democratized. We propose thus a new moral principle for guiding altruistic behavior: democratic altruism. We develop our argument by focusing on the moral powers and formative agency that donors exercise through their charitable behavior, in particular through their choice to support particular types of aid or organizations. We argue that if and when donors give, they should do so in a way that allows the poor to exercise formative agency as well, in decisions over how donated resources should be used on the ground.

Foreign exile has often served as an important solution to high-stakes standoffs between opposition forces and beleaguered autocrats. I assess the moral status of autocratic exile, by focusing on the tension between exile's contribution to domestic peace and its threat to global deterrence against autocracy. I begin by contending that transitioning societies normally have the moral prerogative of accepting an exile arrangement for their autocrat, even though such an arrangement harms global deterrence against autocracy. I then suggest that, in the absence of clear evidence of majority opposition to an exile arrangement within the transitioning society, foreign countries who have been entangled in an autocrat's rule will normally have a decisive duty to facilitate his exile, despite exile's repercussions for global deterrence. I explain why such foreign entanglement, particularly on the part of affluent Western democracies, is inevitable in the case of kleptocrats. But I also show that the entanglement argument for exile extends even to murderous autocrats, whose crimes fall under the purview of the International Criminal Court. Countries entangled in a murderous autocrat's rule ought to prioritize their particular duties toward his victims over their general moral reasons to advance international criminal justice.

I challenge a recent trend in just war theory – that civilians might be complicit with terrorists and lose non-combatant immunity – by reversing the gun sights and asking whether colonizing populations complicit with empire might compromise their non-combatant status. Employing colonial settlers as a thought experiment, I demonstrate the logic of expanded civilian culpability that has been proposed in the wake of the War on Terror would be unacceptable in other scenarios, and that these revisionist proposals are in service of ends incompatible with just war. In the process, I identify an important ambiguity regarding the performativity of non-combatant status, and show how this is used to aggressively expand civilian culpability for violence.