Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor-market competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant sentiment, in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages. We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey. In contrast to predictions based on conventional arguments about labor-market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question. Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants. These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force (that is, those competing for jobs) and those not in the labor force. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market competition. This finding is consistent with extensive economic research showing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small. We find that a large component of the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs. More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole.The authors would like to thank Beth Simmons, Shigeo Herano, Mike Tomz, James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Ron Rogowski, Ken Scheve, Torben Iversen, Andy Baker, and Peter Gourevitch for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

What makes international threats credible? Recent theories point to domestic audience costs—the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down. This article provides the first direct evidence of audience costs. The analysis, based on experiments embedded in public opinion surveys, shows that audience costs exist across a wide range of conditions and increase with the level of escalation. The costs are evident throughout the population, and especially among politically active citizens who have the greatest potential to shape government policy. Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that audience costs arise because citizens care about the international reputation of the country or leader. These findings help identify how, and under what conditions, domestic audiences make commitments credible. At the same time, they demonstrate the promise of using experiments to answer previously intractable questions in the field of international relations.I thank Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), the National Science Foundation (CAREER Grant SES-0548285), and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for financial support. Colleagues at Knowledge Networks provided invaluable assistance in fielding the surveys. For helpful comments I am grateful to Jim Fearon, Page Fortna, John Freeman, Jon Krosnick, Skip Lupia, Helen Milner, Diana Mutz, Ken Scheve, Ken Schultz, Jas Sekhon, Alastair Smith, Paul Sniderman, Rob Van Houweling, Jonathan Wand, Jessica Weeks, and the anonymous referees. I also thank seminar participants at Berkeley, CASBS, Columbia, Duke, NYU, Rice, and Yale, and conference participations at the International Studies Association and the TESS meetings at the University of Pennsylvania.

This article examines the factors that led to the end of the Cold War from the perspective of the most important U.S. decision makers in both the Reagan and Bush presidencies. The centerpiece of the analysis is a longitudinal study that compares the timing of U.S. decision makers' assessments of the nature of the Soviet threat with changes in Soviet power, foreign policies, and domestic ideology and institutions. This research design allows one to determine if America's key leaders were basing their foreign policies primarily in response to reductions in Soviet power (as realists assert), to more cooperative international policies (as systemic-constructivist and costly signals arguments claim), or to changes in Soviet domestic politics (as democratic peace theories argue). I find that American leaders' beliefs that the Cold War was ending corresponded most closely with Soviet domestic-ideological and institutional changes. As soon as America's most important leaders believed both that Gorbachev was dedicated to core tenets of liberal ideology, and that these values would likely be protected by liberal institutions, they believed the Cold War was ending. These findings help to both illustrate the key determinants of leaders' perceptions of international threats and explain why outstanding Cold War disputes were resolved so smoothly, with the Americans primarily attempting to reassure the Soviets rather than coercing them with America's power superiority.I wish to thank the following people for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article and related projects that led to it: Cliff Bob, Steve Brooks, Dale Copeland, Robert Jervis, Mark Kramer, Jeff Legro, Jack Levy, Allen Lynch, Sean Lynn-Jones, Kimberly Marten, Rose McDermott, Steve Miller, Kevin Narizny, John Owen, Steve Rosen, John Sawicki, Monica Duffy Toft, Steve Walt, and especially Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers at International Organization. I also thank the participants in the seminars on international security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, both at Harvard University, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. For generous financial and institutional support, I remain grateful to the Olin Institute and the Belfer Center.

Why do some issues but not others galvanize transnational advocacy networks? To gain insight into this question, I studied how advocates in the human rights sector think and talk about an issue that has received little advocacy attention to date: stigma against children born of wartime rape. Focus groups with humanitarian practitioners were coded and analyzed for evidence of a variety of explanations for issue adoption drawn from the literature on advocacy networks. The analysis suggests that the conditions for issue adoption are constituted by dynamics across, rather than primarily within, issue networks.This project was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES 0432488 and by a Hewlett Research Grant from University of Pittsburgh's University Center for International Studies. I am deeply indebted to Stuart Shulman and University of Pittsburgh's Qualitative Data Analysis Program for assistance with Atlas.ti software, and to Laurel Person, Abbie Zahler, Betcy Jose-Thota, Vanja Lundell, Rachel Helwig, and Justin Reed for assistance in coding and data analysis. Vera Achvarina, Lisa Alfredson, David Bearce, Clifford Bob, Daniel Chong, Jack Donnelly, Michael Goodhart, John Mendeloff, Joel Oestreich, Simon Reich, Stephen Rothman, Ben Rubin, Nita Rudra, Laura Sjoberg, Dan Thomas, and participants in Yale University's Genocide Studies Seminar Series provided helpful feedback on earlier drafts. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.

One of the most important developments in the world economy during the past three decades has been the willingness of governments in emerging markets to liberalize controls over international capital movements—a process known as capital account liberalization. What accounts for this trend? While existing research highlights a number of important factors, it neglects the role played by the rise and spread of neoliberal ideas that prioritized liberalization as a policy choice. Extending the literature on epistemic communities, I argue one critical mechanism shaping policy decisions is the formation of a coherent team of neoliberal economists. Using a new data set that codes the professional training of more than 1500 policymakers in emerging markets, I assess the relative importance of this argument quantitatively on a sample of twenty-nine emerging markets from 1977 to 1999. In order to assess the independent effect of neoliberal economists, I also take into account the endogeneity of the appointment process, assessing whether appointments are driven by credibility concerns, political interests, or economic conditions. I also stress that a fuller understanding of the appointment process necessitates a focus on the social environment in which appointments are situated.Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Program on International Politics, Economics and Security (PIPES), University of Chicago, 28 April 2005; the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28–31 August 2003; and the Meeting of the Working Group on Political Economy, European University Institute (EUI), San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, 29 October 2003. The author is grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts provided by David Andrews, Benjamin J. Cohen, Scott Cooper, Garrett Glasgow, Lloyd Gruber, Emilie Hafner-Burton, Bob Hancke, Joseph Jupille, Ralf Leiteritz, Charles Lipson, Layna Mosley, Lou Pauly, Andy Sobel, Duncan Snidal, Lora Viola, and participants in the PIPES workshop. The author would also like to thank Lisa Martin and the anonymous reviewers for their many suggestions and insightful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. Research support provided by the Department of Political Science at Syracuse University and a Jean Monnet Fellowship from the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EUI is also gratefully acknowledged.

A central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility. Based on this assumption, scholars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis, which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated economic instability. The openness-volatility link is dubious, however, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. In this study, I revisit the volatility assumption, focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatility. My statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries (1950–2002) finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates, but a largely insignificant effect of openness. These findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness-spending nexus, calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, and at the 2004 Ph.D. Colloquium of the Interdisciplinary Studies Program, Florida Atlantic University. My deepest thanks go to the late Michael Wallerstein whose insights, guidance, and encouragement were indispensable for this research. I also thank Stephen Haggard, Dukhong Kim, Jeffrey Morton, Edward Schwerin, Yumin Sheng, and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias for their invaluable support and thoughtful comments. Finally, I would like to appreciate the editor-in-chief and two anonymous reviewers for their perceptive criticisms that greatly improved this article.

Does institutional variation have implications for questions of conflict and peace? Theory indicates that it does, but extant studies that address this question treat such institutions as homogenous. Building on recent theoretical advances, I argue that cooperation on a wide array of economic issues and regular meetings of high-level officials provide member-states with valuable information regarding the interests and resolve of their counterparts. This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and improves the prospects of a peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. To test the effect of these two institutional features on the level of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), I present an original data set that measures variation in institutional design and implementation across a large number of regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in the 1980s and 1990s. Employing multivariate regression techniques and the regional unit of analysis, I find that a wider scope of economic activity and regular meetings among high-level officials mitigate violent conflict. These results remain intact after controlling for alternative explanations and addressing concerns of endogeneity.Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 45th Anual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 16–20, 2004 and at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004. For helpful comments and suggestions I thank the editor and two anonymous referees of this journal, as well as Paul Fritz, Yoav Gortzak, Edward Mansfield, Timothy McKeown, Brian Pollins, Peter Rosendorff, Donald Sylvan, Alex Thompson, and Peter Trumbore.

There are errors in the data used in the analysis of Hicks and Zorn's “Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals of Welfare Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978–94,” which appeared in the Summer 2005 issue of International Organization (Vol. 59, 631–62). New, corrected data are now included in the data appendix for the article available at 〈http://www.sociology.emory.edu/ahicks/IO.html〉 Accompanying the data appendix is a second appendix of text and tables that includes an errata report, new analyses, and revised findings. New analyses do not indicate that pressures from unemployment, societal aging, and globalization stressed in Hicks and Zorn (2005) drive retrenchment. Rather they indicate that strong aggregate economic performance—affluence, economic growth, and low de-industrialization in particular—and institutional centralization of political power inhibit retrenchment, while the reverse fosters it. This at least is the case for the two least restrictive of Hicks and Zorn's three measures of retrenchment. For outcome measures that do not identify a retrenchment unless there is, at least, a 6 percent cut in social spending (a threshold condition of C = −0.06 for the identification of a “retrenchment” on the underlying spending variable PCRS), Hicks and Zorn's hypothesized determinants do not have statistically significant effects. This indicates that their model lacks explanatory power for deep cuts in social spending.