Students of international organization, like students of domestic government, usually focus their attention on problems of formal organizational structure and arrangements and quite often neglect the substratum of informal operations and relationships. The study of public administration, in its quest for greater depth of perception, has in recent years gained rich insights through analysis of the informal and human aspects of policymaking. But international organization, still a parvenu from the American standpoint, has scarcely felt the scalpel of this particular form of dissection.

In the evolution of post-war international organization no problem, it can be argued, has moved with greater persistence into the foreground than that which focuses on the effort to devise common policies in the North Atlantic Community. Pressures to this end are both internal and external to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the one hand, the close military integration achieved by members impels them towards closer political integration. On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that NATO faces a threat which presents itself not only militarily but also politically through institutions and action programs reflecting a single political will. The effort to concert NATO policies is a reflection of the desirability and, in the opinion of many, the necessity of developing greater unity within the North Atlantic Community.

It has been the unfortunate fate of the United Nations to have been most conspicuously unsuccessful in performing that task which was to be its major responsibility and for which it was supposed to be best equipped. Naturally this has also been the fate of the Security Council upon which the Members of the Organization, by the terms of Article 24, conferred “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. Against this background of failure and consequent dissatisfaction, many have been asking whether the Security Council is fated to become like the human appendix, an atrophied organ with no useful function to perform or whether the present condition is not one that can and should be remedied or that perhaps will be changed in any case by an improvement in the state of international relations. To form a judgment on these possibilities it is necessary to recall the original conception of the Security Council, to review its record, and to analyze the causes of its decline and the likelihood of their elimination or counterbalancing by other forces.

Pressures to extend the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into fields other than the military, or actually to shift the emphasis to political, economic, and cultural objectives, have been so strong in recent years that one wonders whether there has not been a growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to lose sight of the purpose for which NATO was established and which makes it vital to the United States. Essentially, NATO is a multilateral military alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets. If the members of the alliance, on one side or the other of the Atlantic, were ever to reach the conclusion that the threat of military attack from the east had vanished or that it could not be countered effectively by common military effort, NATO would have lost its original raison d'être, though it might be continued for the sake of what today are secondary non-military functions, such as political conciliation and economic collaboration. It should be added that the primacy of the military purpose of NATO, as it exists today, does not preclude the desirability or even the necessity of extending its scope beyond purely military matters. As Ruth C. Lawson has pointed out, there is little hope for reliable military collaboration among countries ohat do not succeed in attaining a reasonable degree of harmony between their political aims and policies. Cyprus, Suez, and Algeria are symptomatic of the problems NATO faces in the political field.

The organization of the world's ninety-odd states into various systems of competing and overlapping regional associations has now been a fact of international relations for over ten years. It cannot be said that as a fact it has gone unnoticed. On the contrary, regionalism has given rise to a floodtide of literature bitterly critical of the development or determined to justify it as a necessity for world security and a support for a sagging UN structure.

The economic programs of the United Nations have been jogging along for some time now. The pace, one fears, is not quite fast enough to get anywhere by sundown. Moreover, the road map, if it ever existed, has been mislaid and a thick growth of underbrush has sprung up to obscure the pathway.

It is now three years since the Southcast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was rather hastily established after the French military collapse in Indo-China. What is its present effectiveness, and what are its prospects, as a security organization for Southeast Asia? There has never been any doubt or obscurity about SEATO's over-riding purpose to resist the extension, by whatever means, of communist rule in Southeast Asia. At die Manila Conference diere was some clash of opinion on how the purpose of die proposed body should be officially proclaimed. The United States wanted to limit it to resistance against communist aggression, while the United Kingdom and some odier countries diought it would be more politic to refer to aggression in general terms, since this might make SEATO less unpalatable to the Colombo powers. The United States then agreed to refer to aggression in general terms in the body of the Treaty, but announced its "Understanding" that its own military obligations were limited to die resistance of communist aggression. At the same time Australia insisted on its own proviso diat nothing in the Treaty must be construed as an obligation to intervene in any possible conflict between Asian members of the Commonwealth. Australia diereby sought to make it clear that SEATO was in no way concerned with the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. These verbal skirmishes only made it the more evident diat in fact, if not in form, SEATO was concerned solely widi stemming the advance of communism.

Since the signing and ratification of the treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), there has been renewed interest in the organization which pioneered die European effort toward economic integration under supra-national institutions. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) commemorates this year two anniversaries which are of more dian usual significance. February 10 and May 1, 1958, mark die completion of die first five years of die common market for coal and iron ore, and for steel and scrap, respectively. February 10 also marks die end of die “period of transition” provided by die treaty to cushion die impact of competidon on weak industries and to facilitate their adaptation to die conditions of the common market. During this period, some member countries were authorized to continue certain customs duties (e.g., on Italian imports of coke and steel), subsidies (e.g., for Lorraine coal and coke), and odier protective devices; and in some cases, provision was made for financial assistance by the Community itself (e.g., in favor of coal mines in Belgium and Sardinia). But unlike the escape clauses included in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), diese exemptions and supports were limited to five years, widi die possibility, in some cases, of a further extension of two years. Also during this period, measures were to be taken to eliminate discriminatory practices and to harmonize the conditions of competition, particularly in transport, and a common tariff was to be worked out vis-à-vis non-member countries.

A significant aspect of post-Stalinist Soviet foreign policy has been the flexibility and imaginativeness with which it has maneuvered in under-developed areas, particularly in the non-aligned nations of Southern Asia—Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia. This innovation involved a fundamental shift in tactics and must now be considered a prominent feature of Soviet foreign policy. The previous neglect of South Asia was occasioned by a preoccupation with the sovietization of eastern Europe, the imperatives of postwar reconstruction and economic expansion, and the rise of communist China; it may also be attributed, in important measure, to Stalin's underestimation of the role which the area might play in enhancing the international position of the Soviet Union. This aspect of Stalinism is now over. Since 1953, Soviet leadership has pushed its interests in South Asia with skill and vigor, both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of international organizations. Of late, the bilateral ventures have received careful attention in this country. Less systematic attention, however, has been devoted to Soviet behavior in international economic organizations. In this respect, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) affords an excellent opportunity to investigate this phase of Soviet political behavior.

In the Indonesian case, involving contention before the Security Council between Asian nationalism and a western democracy, the UN was a significant influence in a process of political change. The Netherlands, having resorted with apparent success to the use of force, finally agreed to withdraw from Indonesia. Despite the fighting, this case illustrates the perennial problem of peaceful change—how is legitimacy transferred? What non-military pressures and inducements are required to bring about the renunciation of a position which is legally and militarily defensible?

The postwar tempo of political change in Africa has carried the “dark continent” from the diplomatic backwaters to a central position in world affairs in but a decade. The pace is likely to accelerate rather than abate in the next few years. A crucial question is whether this swift passage from tribal and colonial societies to independent national states can be achieved in a non-violent and orderly way. The stakes for the future are considerable. A peaceful and rational accommodation of the interests and aspirations of the European metropolitan countries with those of the dependent African territories is likely to preserve and enhance vital Eurafrican economic ties to the mutual benefit of both sides of the present colonial equation.

Eighth United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: At the Eighth UN Technical Assistance Conference, held under the presidency of Mr. Drago (Argentina) at UN Headquarters on October 10, 1957, 75 governments announced contributions which amounted to $30,250,000 for 1958. As a result of an increase in the contributions of 21 governments over the 1957 figures, the total contributions announced represented a net increase of approximately $600,000, allowing for actual reductions in several contributions due to fluctuations in the rates of exchange.

‘Multilateral diplomacy’, like many other terms current in the literature of international relations, tends to serve less as a topic for careful study than as a symbol, evoking generalized reactions of approval or disapproval, confidence or anxiety. In the mind of the public, the mention of those two words today calls up a picture of a big, noisy international conference, complete with committees and chairmen, agenda and rules of procedure, debates and votes, rostrum and gallery, earphones for simultaneous translation and microphones and cameras for world-wide transmission of the proceedings.

Since its inception twelve years ago the UN has never handled very large sums of money by comparison with national budgets. Nevertheless, the small contributions have often been given grudgingly by member states with mumblings of “waste” about the personnel and the programs. In our view such innuendoes are unfounded. But we think there is room for improvement in the presentation of the budgets of the UN and its specialized agencies, particularly by developing appropriation categories which tend to indicate and measure the performance of the Organization.

The signing of the ANZUS Pact represented a confluence of attitudes. Australia and New Zealand were disturbed at the liberal Japanese peace treaty, while the United States wanted the treaty to go through with as little opposition as possible. All three countries were afraid of the march of communism in the Far East. The ANZUS Treaty made the Japanese peace settlement palatable to the Pacific Dominions, and at the same time it improved the channels of military cooperation in the Pacific. The significance of ANZUS lay as much in what it did not say as in its formal provisions; the United Kingdom was not included in ANZUS, and its absence gave rise to an extended debate in several countries. There were objections from certain Australian and New Zealand political leaders, and in the United Kingdom the Conservatives lamented “exclusion” while the Labor government declared “… it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact”.

The following summary covers the activities of the Security Council at its 806th meeting and from its 809th to its 826th meeting. At the 809th meeting three new members, Canada, Japan, and Panama, were welcomed, and thee retiring members, the Philippines, Australia, and Cuba, were paid tribute for their services.

At its 791st meeting the Council began consideration of the India-Pakistan question in the light of a report by Ambassador Jarring on the visit he had made to the sub-continent at the request of the Council on February 21, 1957. The representative from Pakistan, Mr. Khan Noon, who opened the discussion, observed that Mr. Jarring stated that he could not report any concrete proposals likely to contribute towards a settlement of the dispute. Mr. Noon declared that every effort made by the four mediators appointed by the Council from time to time to create appropriate conditions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir for the holding of a fair and free plebiscite under the auspices of the UN had failed because India was not prepared to carry out its international obligations. Every suggestion made by Mr. Jarring for a peaceful solution of the problem was accepted by Pakistan, he said, so that if, as recorded in the report, his suggestions were not mutually acceptable, they were unacceptable only to India. Mr. Noon maintained that every problem having any bearing on the holding of a plebiscite was taken care of in the international agreement contained in the two United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of 1948 and 1949 and listed as violations of the resolutions a number of acts by India, such as the inclusion of Kashmir as a state of India in the Indian Constitution, and the financial integration of Kashmir into India in 1955. He enumerated several Pakistanian concessions, including the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistanian nationals from Kashmir in advance of the truce agreement, although this obligation arose only after the signing of the truce agreement, and the agreement to the large-scale disbandment of Azad forces before the Plebiscite Administrator assumed office, although under the UNCIP resolution this move was envisaged only after the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.

Listed below is membership of UN bodies for 1958. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated.

The third emergency special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-Generall in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on August 7, 1958, 2 was held from August 8 through August 21, 1958 (732d–746th plenary meetings). Following the adoption of the provisional agenda,3 the Soviet delegate, Mr. Sobolev, opened the discussion, urging that the General Assembly take steps to ensure the immediate withdrawal of the United States troops from Lebanon and the United Kingdomforces from Jordan because their presence constituted a permanent threat to the peace and security of the peoples and was a violation of the UN Charter. Mr. Lodge (United States) replied to Mr. Sobolev's statement, saying that the Soviet Union, in calling for a special General Assembly session, sought to attack the United States, but that this was not the purpose of the Security Council in voting for the United States resolution under which the session of the General Assembly was being held. The aim of the United States in introducing its resolution was to promote a chance for constructive action on the Middle East.