The democratic peace—the idea that democracies rarely fight one another—has been called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.” Yet, some contend that this relationship is spurious and suggest alternative explanations. Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never rule out the possible existence of such confounding biases. Rather than commonly used regression-based approaches, we apply a nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We show that overturning the negative association between democracy and conflict would require a confounder that is forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars would have to find far more powerful confounders than those already identified in the literature.

This research reports an exploration of the relationship between a decision maker's role and his perception during an international crisis. Research on the social and political processes of the United Nations suggests that a variety of factors, including communication patterns, nonnational roles, and learning experiences may produce a role orientation in delegates that would have an impact upon their perceptions even when their nation is involved in an international crisis. This proposition is explored using content analysis data from the 1956 Suez crisis. The decision makers whose perceptions furnish the data are the Egyptian and Israeli Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and the occupants of high foreign policy positions in the national capitals of Egypt and Israel. The initial analysis of the data indicates only very small differences in the perceptions. The analysis of the data does not support the original proposition. Finally, some caveats concerning the research are raised.

In recent research on the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), there has been no examination of the reaction of private actors to the RTAA. Did producer groups and investors in 1934 believe the Democratic RTAA was the solution to Republican protectionism, as institutional analyses of the RTAA claim, or did they realize the RTAA was no “magic bullet” against a return of protectionism, as skeptics argue? Archival data suggests that many producer groups believed the RTAA would result in durable liberalization, but that fewer understood the likely effects of its specific features. An event study of investor reaction to the RTAA reveals that export-dependent firms experienced a significant, positive stock return increase on news of the RTAA, while heavily tariff-protected firms experienced a significant stock decline, albeit several months later.

Over the period from 1950 to 1975, regional cooperation increased dramatically in Asia. Expansion in the scope and capabilities of regional organization proceeded through the establishment of 24 IGOs primarily concerned with technical and economic problems. With institutions characteristically specific in function and making decisions through consensus and intergovernmentalism, the structure and growth in Asian organization may be described from the theoretical perspective of classic international functionalism. The more politicized IGOs have not been successful and politicization has been most influential in retarding organizational growth. The rate of growth in Asian organization increased only as politicization from East-West, North-South, and developmental and power differences among participants was avoided by limiting participation to compatible nations. A rising rate of growth in Asian organization was correlated with an increasing concentration of cooperative activity among nations in Southeast Asia compatible in policies on East-West and North-South issues and similar in power and level of development.

Multinational private enterprise is perhaps the most prominent transnational organization active in world politics today. Increasing attention has been paid to the challenge to state sovereignty posed by multinational enterprise, either as an autonomous actor or as an instrument in interstate conflict. This question is of particular relevance to Canadian-American relations, because of the central role of foreign-owned (and especially American-owned) firms in the Canadian economy. This essay assesses the impact on the host Canadian government of the 27 identifiable cases of politicized conflict that have been generated in Canada by the activities of United States-owned multi-national enterprise from 1945 through 1971, and which are publicly known to have occurred.

Many scholars argue that labor is excluded from Japan's political system. However, since the 1970s, labor has become considerably influential in the policymaking process in Japan. The oil crisis of 1973 and the Shuntou wage bargaining of 1975 have made labor, especially private-sector unions, modest in their wage demands, but at the same time these events have made labor participate actively in the policymaking process in order to maintain employment and seek some benefits from the government. This article demonstrates that Japan's increasing export-dependence and tradeoffs between wage increases on the one hand, and inflation and unemployment on the other in the 1970s, have driven labor to this new, more active role in policymaking, while the necessity for the governing Liberal Democratic party to seek a new constituency has enabled labor to achieve some success in this new role. This implies that Japan's political system has changed its nature since the 1970s; its political process has become more pluralistic with labor's participation within the existing political system.

This article presents some alternative proposals for moderating the most extreme effects of the one-state, one-vote rule in the UN General Assembly by the selective application of weighted voting. Included is a brief summary of some results of an empirical analysis of General Assembly decision making that pointed to the kinds of decisions for which weighting is recommended. Several proposed formulas and the weights which result from them are more fully described and illustrated because of their novelty and their sometimes unexpected effects.

Students of regional integration have suggested that participants in international activities may experience attitudinal changes which are favorable for subsequent integrative processes. Interviews with 24 French and Italian staff members of permanent delegations at European Community headquarters, however, indicate that these delegates did not increase their support for integration during their tenure, but that they became more realistic about European Community politics. Delegates A appear to differ primarily on the basis of ministerial affiliation and nationality, while no significant variations appeared to be correlated with other factors tested.

We reply to John Duffield's critique of the Rational Design project, a special issue of International Organization that explains the features of international institutions from a game-theoretic perspective. The project was deliberately limited to the analysis of explicit and observable institutional arrangements, and focused on the specific institutional properties of centralization, membership, scope, control, and flexibility. Its empirical contribution relies on case studies, but it is significantly amplified by the tight connections provided by a common theoretical perspective that is oriented toward testing a set of specific conjectures about institutional design. The results raise further issues of measurement and cross-case comparisons that provide valuable lessons for future work on institutional design. Although all of these research design choices are worth revisiting and questioning, as Duffield does, the initial results of the Rational Design project show that it provides a good basis from which to explore alternative research design decisions.

Before entering into the substance of our subject it would be useful to define three terms which appear in this article and which bear differing connotations in the writings of political scientists working in the field of international organization. These are: integration, international secretariat, and executive action.

Ten years ago Chadwick F. Alger identified a major problem in international organizations research. He decried the tendency to study international organizations primarily in terms of “their accomplishment of their explicit goals through the explicit mechanisms established for this purpose.” In most cases this meant concentration on the passage or defeat of resolutions in public meetings and on the extent to which the problems addressed in these resolutions have been dealt with efficaciously through United Nations bodies. Alger suggested that “this type of inquiry does not produce the only, nor necessarily the most important, impact that the organization has on relations among members.” Instead, we should devote more attention to an examination of how international organizations “affect the broader international system in which they operate even when problems are not resolved within their walls.”

The New International Economic Order (N1EO) seeks fundamental change in international relations. World shipping has experienced substantial pressure for reforms associated with NIEO goals: controversy focuses around the operation of the liner conferences, the use of flags of convenience, which retain beneficial ownership in developed nations, and the demands of developing countries for a major share in the carriage of their imports and exports. UNCTAD, and in particular its Shipping Division headed by Adib al-Jadir, has become increasingly active in world shipping. The reforms urged through UNCTAD will have a significant impact on the fleets, maritime practices, and interests of the developed world. This study examines UNCTAD's aims in world shipping–the policies being urged, the factors under consideration, and the trends emerging from the operation of UNCTAD. It further examines developed states' attempts to shape, and their reactions to, UNCTAD policies, and the interests perceived to be at stake in the current debate on world shipping.

In December 1959 the European Free Trade Association was set up in Stockholm, and thus the postwar efforts to unite western Europe have led to a significant new division within it: two separate areas of free trade are being set up, at much the same pace, the “Inner Six” centered around France and Germany, the “Outer Seven” around Britain and Scandinavia.

Indian firms are moving abroad in increasing numbers to establish manufacturing plants with local partners in less-industrialized countries. As a result, India has become one of the few important sources of Third World technology. Indian foreign direct investment was the intended consequence of foreign trade policies designed to link exports with investment, and the unintended consequence of Indian regulatory policies designed to restrict the domestic growth of large-scale private enterprises. In addition, Indian overseas operations were aided by existing financial and technical collaboration agreements in India and by expanded collaboration overseas between transnational corporations and Indian private and public enterprises. These various factors have disproportionately affected the five to ten largest Indian industrial conglomerates that control the bulk of Indian joint ventures abroad. The experiences of these firms and of the Indian government in promoting their foreign investments have had important consequences for the domestic policy process in India and for Indian foreign policy.

What effect does state violence have on the cohesiveness and fragmentation of insurgent organizations? This article develops a theory of how state violence against civilians affects insurgent cohesion and fragmentation in civil war. It argues that the state-led collective targeting of an armed group's alleged civilian constituency increases the probability of insurgent fragmentation, defined as the process through which insurgent organizations split into distinct entities, each with its own social composition, goals, and leadership. This effect is driven by the interaction of several mechanisms at the individual, group, and organizational levels: state-led collective targeting enlarges the supply of fresh recruits, strengthens the bonds between immediate group members (interpersonal cohesion), and disrupts intra-organizational coordination, strategic unity, and institutional arrangements that underpin the commitment of individual fighters to the organization as a whole (ideological cohesion). The implications of this argument are empirically tested in an analysis of armed groups fighting against their governments between 1946 and 2008. The results suggest that campaigns of massive state violence directed against the civilian constituency of rebel groups increase the overall risk of insurgent fragmentation, a finding that has important implications for the duration and escalation of civil wars.

Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war in the late spring of 1976 has usually been explained in either structural or perceptual terms. Neither kind of account does a very good job of explaining the character and timing of this military operation. But relating the intervention to changes in Syria's domestic political situation accounts for it much more satisfactorily. Specifically, Syria's ruling social coalition found itself confronted with a substantial threat to its political position in the country from small farmers, craftspeople, and workers in the north-central provinces during the first months of 1976. In response to this threat, each member of the ruling coalition adopted a program that would insure its own dominance, but only at the expense of its domestic political allies. Under these circumstances, these social forces moved into Lebanon in an attempt to secure the capital, manufactured goods, and port facilities that would enable them to suppress their domestic political opponents while maintaining their own alliance. Domestic political struggles thus provide a more plausible explanation for Syria's intervention than either of the other two arguments can.

Conventional discussions of state power have tended to list a state's resources or capabilities for power in a straightforward and unambiguousway. True, the caveat is offered that there is a difference between potential and actual power, but the difference is usually spelled out in terms either of problems of modernization (seen itself as a technique of transforming capabilities) or in terms of the will and skill of the state under discussion.1 But in a world of highly interdependent political economies, this utilization gapdepends not only on the conditions that create and sustain the state's ability tocontrol its own resources, but also on the conditions that determine 1) theaccess of others to these capabilities, and 2) the access of the state to theresources of other states. For what purposes and in what situations are astate's resources usable by it? In what situations can the state be a gatekeeper with respect to the access by others to its resources? The answers to thesequestions determine, in part, whether potential becomes actual (relative)power in present or future state-to-state relations. It is to this neglecteddimension of power that this paper is devoted.

Members of most organizations are involved at different levels of intensity: Some participants pay more attention to the organization than others. Thus the question “Who cares about the organization?” can lead to significant findings about differential levels of involvement. These findings, in turn, suggest members’ policy priorities as well as illuminating Behavioral patterns within the organization.

In recent discussions of the value of regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is regrettable that little attention has been given to the experience of the League of Arab States. For although the League as an organized expression of “regional cooperation” has existed for little more than four years, its activities thus far have raised some fundamental questions regarding the proper role of such arrangements within the framework of a United Nations system.