As an explanation of organizational growth at the international level, functionalism postulates that people who become personally involved in the activities of international agencies will develop attitudes more favorable to international cooperation. Analysis of speeches by United States Congressmen and Senators before and after serving as delegates to the UN General Assembly indicates that significant attitudinal change may occur. At the cognitive level, Congressmen tend to pay more attention to the UN than before. The majority also experience positive change in affect toward the UN. In addition, the data provide evidence of convergence toward a mean value as participants initially holding the more extreme views (positive or negative) generally express more moderate opinions as a result of the UN experience. The fact that such a leveling of expectations occurs at a significantly higher level of favorability gives modest support to the functionalist thesis.

At the present time scientific opinion has shifted to the view that man can, in certain circumstances and at certain places, modify at least local weather conditions in limited ways. Many believe that man can dissipate certain “cold” fogs in limited areas for short periods; that he can increase rainfall or snowfall by perhaps ten to fifteen percent in a local area in narrowly limited circumstances; that he can probably convert hail into less dangerous forms of precipitation, also in narrowly limited circumstances.1 Some experiments are being conducted to learn more about such phenomena as hurricanes and lightning. Man still needs to learn much more and to develop faster computers before he can begin to think of safely undertaking intentional modification on anything more than a local and highly selected basis. Nevertheless, it is clear that even the limited effects thus far produced do not stop at some predetermined boundary; both nationally and internationally attempts to modify weather can be expected to cause dislocations and friction.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was present in the Dominican Republic continuously from June 1, 1965, to July 7, 1966. During this period the Commission worked diligently and effectively to protect basic human rights which were being threatened and abused daily. The Commission had visited the Dominican Republic twice in the past for short periods of several days. During these visits, which occurred at times of relative tranquillity, it received claims from private citizens concerning human rights violations, reported its observations, and made recommendations to the government. The Commission's role in 1965–1966 was of a different nature. It was called upon by two rival governments to come to a country in the midst of a civil strife in which human rights were being violated on a massive scale. In these circumstances the Commission proved willing to act vigorously to defend these rights. It succeeded in improving prison conditions for political prisoners, played a key role in securing the release of many detainees who had been held without charge, assisted persecuted individuals in finding asylum, tried to locate missing persons, and worked to bring the perpetrators of crimes against human rights to justice. Although by means of interpretation and practice the Commission had to some extent laid the groundwork for the role it was to assume in the Dominican Republic, its performance as an “action body” operating in an American state continuously for more than one year was unprecedented.

The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an intervention—the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal mechanisms.

We welcome David Levi-Faur's critique of our article, both because it serves to stimulate debate on this important topic and because it provides us with the opportunity to elaborate on our arguments and touch on their wider potential applicability. Levi-Faur does not take issue with our central empirical finding—that American legal style is spreading to other jurisdictions—nor with our normative assessment of the mixed blessings of this trend. We agree with Levi-Faur that many questions concerning legal change have been largely overlooked by political scientists, and we agree that he raises a number of points that highlight the need for refinements of our argument. Yet, for all that we agree on, we disagree strongly with Levi-Faur's analysis and his main lines of criticism. His core criticisms concern our conceptualization of the dependent variable in our study, our purported disregard of alternative explanations, and our inadequate attention to the importers of American law and processes of “localization.” In this article, we respond to each of these criticisms in turn. We then discuss the generalizability of our argument beyond Europe and Japan. We conclude with suggestions for further research.

This article outlines some of the propositions on organizational growth and goal structure contained in the literature on organization theory. A number of hypotheses are derived from this body of material and these are tested against the International Labor Organization experience.1

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is in the paradoxical position of performing most useful and necessary functions in the nascent world community but of giving very implausible reasons for the performance of its functions. Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen, who was until recently responsible for the United States government's UNESCO policy, reported after the Paris UNESCO conference in 1949 that the organization “had a wider public support” and yet was “more widely criticized” than any other international agency. He rightly suggested that the criticisms were prompted by UNESCO enthusiasts who claimed too much for its functions and thus aroused the opposition of realists who did not believe that its contributions to peace were as important as the organization claimed.

In the United Nations as in other political organizations elective offices are eagerly sought as badges of prestige and levers of influence. Some of the most hotly contested political battles in the United Nations have centred around elections to the prestigious and influential nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. Contests have sometimes run to many ballots before any country emerged with the required two-thirds majority, and deadlock has more than once forced a compromise in which the two-year term was divided between two contenders. Indicative of the feeling sometimes aroused was Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965 which, although prompted by other motives as well, was timed to serve as a protest against the seating of Malaysia on the Security Council. Contests for other positions are generally less spirited, but there are invariably more office seekers than offices.

We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote. We identify two organizational types with endogenous coercive enforcement and find that neither is unambiguously preferable. Like the solutions to the traditional Prisoners' Dilemma these forms require long shadows of the future to sustain. We then show that cooperation can be sustained through a noncoercive organization where actors delegate execution to an agent. Even though this institution is costlier, it does not require any expertise by the agent and is independent of the shadow of the future, and thus is implementable when the others are not.

In April 1977 the United States and four other major Western governments embarked on a unique diplomatic exercise in the hope of negotiating an agreement for the independence of the territory of Namibia, or South West Africa. The “Contact Group” as it became known (or Western Five), consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, functioned actively from April 1977 until mid-1982 as an ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team in close proximity to but not directly linked with the United Nations. The five countries secured basic agreement in 1978 on a plan calling for UN supervised elections for a constituent assembly in the territory leading to early independence and the appointment of a UN special representative to ensure the necessary conditions for such elections.

Debates and events during the year since the publication of the last report to the General Assembly have brought to the fore different concepts of the United Nations, the character of the Organization, its authority and its structure.

The English East India Company's “company-state” lasted 274 years—longer than most states. This research note uses new archival evidence to study the Company as a catalyst in the development of modern state sovereignty. Drawing on the records of 16,740 managerial and shareholder meetings between 1678 and 1795, I find that as the Company grew through wars, its claim to sovereign authority shifted from a privilege delegated by Crown and Parliament to a self-possessed right. This “sovereign awakening” sparked a reckoning within the English state, which had thus far tolerated ambiguity in Company sovereignty based on the early modern shared international understanding of divisible, nonhierarchical layered sovereignty. But self-possessed nonstate sovereignty claimed from the core of the state became too much. State actors responded by anchoring sovereign authority along more hierarchical, indivisible foundations espoused by theorists centuries earlier. The new research makes two contributions. First, it introduces the conceptual dynamic of “war awakens sovereigns” (beyond making states) by entangling entities in peacemaking to defend sovereign claims. Second, it extends arguments about the European switch from layered sovereignty to hierarchical statist forms by situating the Company's sovereign evolution in this transformation. Ultimately, this study enables fuller historicization of both nonstate authority and the social construction of sovereignty in international politics.

The transformation of the political environment of Western Europe in the mid-1960's has been only partially completed. On the one hand, in many economic sectors relations among the six members1 of the European economic communities are set within the context of a new process and a new institutional method of community building and are being modified by the notion of a common interest beyond six sets of national interests. But, on the other hand, the relations among the Six in the “political” realm—that is, in the sphere of foreign and defense policy—have not yet been transformed by common institutions. It is in this area that the confrontation between traditional methods of interstate relations and the new community m thod is currently taking place, and it is here that the ultimate validity of the concept of European unification will face its most difficult test. Therefore, a crucial question in Europe today is whether or not the Six will be able to organize their political life on a collective basis as they have done in many economic sectors.

How have market and state shaped the long-term coevolution of economic performance and social protection during the nineteenth century and post–World War II waves of globalization associated with British laissez-faire liberalism and U.S.-embedded liberalism? Under the impulse of seemingly ever-intensifying globalization, this question is emerging at the core of a novel body of political economy research that seeks to compare the two waves of globalization to draw useful lessons from the past. This research also reflects the concerns recently voiced by neoliberals and neointerventionists about the long-term stability and viability of post–World War II embedded liberalism. Satisfactory investigations of how market and state shape the long-term coevolution of economic performance and social protection in the two regimes remain lacking. Cointegration analyses of the two hegemonic powers that shaped the evolution of the two regimes—nineteenth-century Great Britain and post–World War II United States—demonstrate that the complementarity of market and state in embedded liberalism is associated with better long-term economic performance and social protection.I thank the following people for their help and support in developing this project: Katarina Juselius, Soren Johansen, Mike Artis, Ilijan Georgiev, Suzanne Perry, Ed Mansfield, Dennis Quinn, Lars-Erik Cederman, Ron Jepperson, Mark Kesselman, Luis Moreno, Martin Rhodes, Benedicta Marzinotto, Ron King, David Clinton, and the participants in the Nordic Project funded by the Danish Social Sciences Research Council. Two anonymous reviewers provided valuable suggestions. A Jean Monnet Fellowship from the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute provided financial support for the project. Any errors are my own.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

The English parliamentary system emerged from the dramatic struggle between the English Parliament and the Crown over the principle of political or “democratic” control. For leaders of the Commons such as Edward Coke a single false step beyond the line of the sovereign's endurance meant the Tower of London. Another struggle in a different key and on a different level has begun with little publicity on the Continent. The European Parliamentary Assembly in the newly established European Communities is seeking to assert some degree of control and influence not only over the mushrooming Commissions, but also over the powerful Councils of Ministers. Obviously, there is no danger of an irate Council of Ministers confining the obstreperous parliamentarians to the dungeons of Strasbourg. Moreover, the European Parliamentary Assembly is far from being a parliament. Members of the Community “executive” such as Jean Monnet have encouraged rather than fought the Assembly. In these as in other respects the analogy with the development of the English parliamentary system must not be pressed too far. But the broad contours of the contest, the pressures and counter-pressures, the use and abuse of legal argument, and the reliance on genuine and fabricated precedent offer an interesting study in the development of a parliamentary body.

Change has been the one constant in the brief but eventful history of the United Nations. Whatever its shortcomings, the UN has proved itself responsive to the turbulent forces of a dynamic age. Whether it will be able to marshal these forces, to channel them for productive ends, remains to be seen.

Recent research has shown that inequality between ethnic groups is strongly driven by politics, where powerful groups and elites channel the state's resources toward their constituencies. Most of the existing literature assumes that these politically induced inequalities are static and rarely change over time. We challenge this claim and argue that economic globalization and domestic institutions interact in shaping inequality between groups. In weakly institutionalized states, gains from trade primarily accrue to political insiders and their co-ethnics. By contrast, politically excluded groups gain ground where a capable and meritocratic state apparatus governs trade liberalization. Using nighttime luminosity data from 1992 to 2012 and a global sample of ethnic groups, we show that the gap between politically marginalized groups and their included counterparts has narrowed over time while economic globalization progressed at a steady pace. Our quantitative analysis and four qualitative case narratives show, however, that increasing trade openness is associated with economic gains accruing to excluded groups in only institutionally strong states, as predicted by our theoretical argument. In contrast, the economic gap between ethnopolitical insiders and outsiders remains constant or even widens in weakly institutionalized countries.