Studies of international regimes have sought to describe international collaborative arrangements in more systematic terms than in the past, and to analyze their development in terms of major schools of international relations theory. This article refines the commonly used definition of regimes and elucidates the major hypotheses of one theoretical school, structural realism. The strength and nature of the international commodity trade regime are systematically described, and their development is analyzed in terms of the major hypotheses of structural realism. In large part, these hypotheses are supported by the analysis of what is a relatively weak international regime.

Theories of trade and domestic politics have been applied extensively to manufacturing and agriculture; the political economy of trade in services, however, remains poorly understood. This article examines how the “offshoring” of services segments labor markets and places low-skilled and high-skilled labor at odds on trade issues. Drawing from a case where trade has been politically contentious of late—motion picture services in the United States—the article finds that offshoring can aggravate wage inequality, creating incentives for low-skilled workers to demand policy remedies. Consistent with this expectation, an ordered probit analysis of labor-group lobbying reveals that low-skilled occupations in motion picture services were most likely to support countervailing duties and Section 301 action against productions filmed abroad. The findings suggest that when services are tradable, labor-market cleavages are not purely factoral or sectoral, but occupational. This new politics of trade in services has important implications for trade policy in the United States and multilateral rulemaking in the World Trade Organization.

Preceding essays have documented the dramatic growth of transnational relations between Canadians and Americans and have emphasized the development of new issue areas—private, local, regional, and national—between the two countries. As these relations expand in scope, complexity, and occasionally conflict, we would expect to see a corresponding growth in Canadian-American institutions to provide mechanisms for policy coordination, bargaining, and conflict resolution. The increase in formal governmental institutions between Ottawa and Washington has indeed been notable, but we must not conclude that these institutions constitute the core of the intergovernmental relationship. The informal and formal communications between federal government bureaucracies and between officials of the states and provinces are no less important; hence, the essay will focus not only on the bilateral institutions but also on the phenomenon that Nye and Keohane have called transgovernmental relations, that is, the non institutionalized relationships between subunits of governments and the activities they undertake that remain reasonably immune from central control (see their preceding essay in this volume).

“International safeguards” refer to a set of international agreements establishing control over the production, use, and final disposition of fissionable materials. Before the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into effect, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards had been applied to 75 reactors and ten other nuclear facilities under 51 different agreements. The design of the first regime was largely a function of political, strategic, and economic rather than technical considerations. After 1971, safeguards were made an integral part of the NPT, and became obligatory with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in signatory states. Negotiations on the NPT safeguards regime focused on efforts to minimize the major asymmetrical costs that this implied, and particularly to meet the objections of major nonnuclear weapons states. The focus of controversy centered less on resistance to incursions on sovereignty than on demands for equity in incursion. In these negotiations, technological factors facilitated the construction of a politically acceptable regime.

There is increasing agreement that states and other political actors on the world stage sometimes achieve international authority. However, there is less agreement about the nature and functioning of international authority relations. What determines whether an actor will be recognized as an authoritative actor? And what are the effects thereof? In this essay, we identify four distinct conceptions of authority in the study of international relations: authority as contract, authority as domination, authority as impression, and authority as consecration. Consideration of the typology leads to two important insights. First, the phenomenon of authority has an essentially experiential dimension. Subordinate actors’ emotional experience of authority determines their response to authority and thus also has a fundamental impact on the stability of authority. Second, the emergence of forms of international authority does not entail, at least not necessarily, the weakening of the sovereignty of states, but can equally be argued to strengthen it.

The most significant political division within Israel since 1967 has beenbetween those Israelis who favor the permanent incorporation of the portions of Eretz Yisrael (The Land of Israel) captured in the Six Day War and those Israelis who favor relinquishing most or all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for a peace agreement with the Arab world and resolution of the Palestinian problem. Although usually considered an issue of security, ideology, or diplomacy, the uncertain disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip can usefully be analyzed as a state-building problem.

Using a new measure of immigration policy and examining thirty-six advanced industrial countries between 1996 and 2012, we seek to explain systematically the variation in external labor openness among the more advanced democracies as primary destination countries, using a model where the government feels political pressure through both a voter/electoral channel and a special-interests channel. With voters primarily pressing for immigration restrictions and special interest pressure aimed at immigration openness, democratic political institutions—like a parliamentary system and proportional representation voting with greater district magnitude that make governments more responsive to voters and less responsive to special interests—should be associated with less change toward a more open official immigration policy. Our statistical evidence accords with this expectation.

Technical assistance remains a poorly understood tool for promoting development. Programs continue to grow, but persistent questions are raised about their effectiveness by practitioners and academic observers. Today's uncertainty contrasts dramatically with the exuberance which attended the launching of two landmark technical assistance programs, the Point Four Program of the United States and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) of the United Nations.

Although much has been written on the attitude of new states toward international law in general, little concern has been given in contemporary literature to the attitude of these states toward the judicial machinery of international law and its principal organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Writings on the new states' attitude toward international law are also, on the whole, theoretical and general in character to the extent that they could be described as analyses of what this attitude could or should be rather than what it is in fact. Typical of these writings is Brierly's statement that some of the new nations “at least are inclined to look on international law as an alien system which the Western nations, whose moral or intellectual leadership they no longer recognize, are trying to impose upon them”—an outlook which suggests at best an indifferent attitude toward the Court whose primary function is to apply this (alien) system of law. As a result, it has been said that the new states' attitude toward the Court is an indirect manifestation of their rebelliousness against the present system of international law or, at least, an example of their consciousness of the sovereignty they have recently acquired.

This article seeks to briefly relate the changing Indian diplomacy at the United Nations to requirements of domestic and international politics. The inferences and observations made in the article have been largely influenced by a series of formal and informal interviews with Indian and other diplomats, particularly those attending the 21st and 22nd sessions of the General Assembly.

The Community of the Six owes its origin and continued success largely to the inventiveness and political astuteness of a small group of leaders, generally associated with Jean Monnet (France) and, from 1956 on, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. The purpose of this article is to assess the strategy of Monnet and his associates and their influence on the formation and development of the three European Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC) or the Common Market.

The primary purpose of this study1 is to relate a large number of variables, pertaining to the national attributes of the members of the United Nations, to the voting patterns of these members in the 23rd (1968) and 24th (1969) sessions of the General Assembly. This effort may be viewed as a continuation of an earlier one entitled “Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly,”2 based on 1961 and 1963 data.3

Since the establishment of the three European Communities (the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] in 1952 and the European Economic Community [EEC] and the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] in 1958) four agreements of association with non-member states have been concluded. The first of these was signed by ECSC and the United Kingdom on December 21, 1954. The other three agreements, concluded by EEC with Greece, with a number of newly independent African states and Madagascar, and with Turkey, were signed on July 9, 1961, July 20, 1963, and September 12, 1963, respectively. During the last few years other countries in Europe and Africa have expressed a desire to become associated with EEC, and preliminary discussions that may eventually result in additional association agreements are now under way with Austria, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. Only Euratom has so far refrained from negotiating an association agreement although the Euratom Treaty contains provisions identical to those of the EEC Treaty for the conclusion of such agreements.

While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s.

Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers.

The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, IAEA safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy—i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the INFCE: full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again.

The very notion that coalition diplomacy possesses economic aspects implies a concept of coalition as a form of international organization reaching well beyond the classical political and military alliance. An alliance normally commits each member to join with its partners if any of them is involved in hostilities. It may be solely defensive or both offensive and defensive. Whatever its scope, it takes as given the military establishment of each member and the economic resources each is prepared to devote to building its military strength. A government may feel that possession of reliable allies permits the meeting of its security interests with less effort and at less cost than being entirely on its own, but this is a matter for independent decision by each member, calling neither for consultation nor for planned joint effort.

It has frequently been asserted that the financial problem of the United Nations is, in reality, a political problem. This proposition contains enough truth to serve us well, provided it is used not to dispose of the problem but to introduce serious consideration of it. Properly conceived, the political emphasis does not entail the denial of the meaningfulness and significance of the financial issue, but rather suggests the nature of the context within which that issue must be examined, and proposed solutions must be evaluated. Without an understanding of the political background of the fiscal difficulties of the United Nations and the political determinants of its future role in world affairs, one cannot deal intelligently with the problems and prospects of the Organization's treasury.

In the last ten years, employment in the textile and clothing industry in the European Community has decreased by roughly one million workers. In the face of falling employment, profits, and investment, and of surplus capacity, business and labor have increasingly pressured state and European authorities for adjustment assistance and import protection. Although most industrialized countries face similar pressures, policy making in the member states of the European Economic Community is made difficult by the uneven development of the EEC, which regulates trade policy and state aids to industry and restricts business practices but which is not able to construct interventionist or structural policies. Further complicating the situation is the split between two groups of states that differ profoundly on whether the EEC should adopt a liberal trading, noninterventionist position or a protectionist trade policy combined with state aids to mitigate the economic and social effects of restructuring. Tracing these developments over the last ten years, I argue that contradictions in the European political economy in textiles have led to a protectionist bias in Community policies, notwithstanding important developments in outward processing as a means of restructuring.