It has frequently been asserted that the financial problem of the United Nations is, in reality, a political problem. This proposition contains enough truth to serve us well, provided it is used not to dispose of the problem but to introduce serious consideration of it. Properly conceived, the political emphasis does not entail the denial of the meaningfulness and significance of the financial issue, but rather suggests the nature of the context within which that issue must be examined, and proposed solutions must be evaluated. Without an understanding of the political background of the fiscal difficulties of the United Nations and the political determinants of its future role in world affairs, one cannot deal intelligently with the problems and prospects of the Organization's treasury.

Canadian-American relations have tended to bore statesmen and scholars who long to be where the action is. According to one scholar, “study of Canadian-American relations tells one almost nothing about the big problems facing the world,” while in a classic essay Arnold Wolfers used the unguarded border as an example of “indifference to power.” If we view world politics with “realist” assumptions that unified states are the only actors, force is the major source of power, and solving the military security dilemma is their overwhelming objective, then Canadian-American relations are indeed dull.

Making technology autonomous from the influence of investors and proprietors in developed countries has emerged as one of the core themes in the doctrine of dependence. Technology is not only machinery; it is “a major resource for creating new wealth; it is an instrument allowing its owners to exercise social control in various forms; it decisively affects modes of decision making.…” It is seen as the key to achieving “integral development,” free from the abuses associated with the past patterns of technology transfer which were largely mediated by multinational corportions: excessive foreign exchange costs, rise in unnecessary imports, production of luxury goods, neglect of employment objectives, stagnation of the agricultural sector, excessive urbanization, insufficient use of local professionals, environmental degradation, and lack of sensitivity to local cultures. In Marxist versions of dependence-thinking the older pattern of technology transfer strengthened the enclave economy and its comprador bourgeoisie, rather than aiding the development of a national bourgeoisie and of a modern working class.

The negotiations concerning the establishment of an International Seabed Resources Agency (ISRA) raise three research questions: 1) what is the current state of the ISRA negotiations, and how have they evolved; 2) what effect do New International Economic Order (NIEO) considerations have on national behavior in these negotiations; and 3) can the ISRA negotiations “succeed” (reach a positive-sum-type outcome) and produce a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty? A methodology based on thematic content analysis is useful in answering these questions. Despite recent concessions by developed states, continued stalemate in the negotiations is likely. The Group of 77's position has hardened as it has become increasingly united behind demands for a New International Economic Order for the seabeds. Short of a breakthrough on ISRA, neither the ISRA negotiations nor the Law of the Sea Conference can succeed. Such a breakthrough might be generated either by verbal acceptance of the NIEO by the North, or by side payments.

Chronic hunger is rooted in poverty and radically unequal distributions of income and assets, within and across countries. In market or quasi-market systems, the distribution of income and assets structures both food consumption patterns and food production systems. Radical inequality leads to structures which make it difficult to eliminate hunger, both because they increase the quantity of food needed to do so and because they support production structures in which the poor are “marginalized.” The effect of radical inequality is to severely limit the usefulness of “market mechanisms” as efficient instruments for reducing hunger. Marginal adjustments of existing food markets are unlikely to make any real progress in ending chronic hunger. Broadly based development and/or changes in the structuring mechanisms supported by market economies are necessary.

Eighty interviews with bureaucratic and political actors in five national capitals illustrate the Keohane/Nye theoretical argument concerning the importance of transnational and, specifically, transgovernmental factors in world politics. Focusing upon the development and application of integrative techniques between countries which have no formal supemational integrative institutions, the paper reports on the practice of transgovernmental politics within the dyad of Canada and the United States, and the triad of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Dealing both with middlelevel bureaucratic practitioners concerned with horizontal coordination of policy and administration between countries, and with bureaucratic and political actors responsible for the cohesiveness of national policies, the paper explores situations in which the demands of external and domestic harmonization are inconsistent, and sometimes mutually contradictory. The problem of maintaining “dual coherence” in domestic and external policy and administration is identified, and procedures for attempting such coordination are discussed. Of importance are modifications within the traditional institutions of inter-state communication: foreign offices and embassies. Recommendations are made on the basis of the intra-North American and intra Scandinavian experiences. It is suggested that considerable insight into managing policy and administrative areas which are neither purely domestic nor purely external may be gained by the study of bureaucratic experience only infrequently considered by students or governmental managers. Insights which may be gained from such study, it is argued, may be of great relevance in dealing with the challenge which transgovernmental horizontal harmonization now poses for national administrations.

The explosive growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web in recent years has produced not only the trivial and bizarre, but also information useful for social science research and teaching. Yet most of this information is difficult to locate, particularly for those unfamiliar with the Web, primarily because of its nonlinear architecture—called “hypertext.” The purpose of this research note is to give scholars a sense of what is unique about research resources on the Web and an indication in general terms of what types of information and materials can be accessed through it. First, I describe primary and secondary materials, teaching resources, reference material, and news sources. I then suggest several guidelines for Web site development that I believe will improve the potential for social science research on the Web. Finally, I conclude by outlining some directions for further analysis raised by the widespread use of the Web for academic research and teaching. A companion guide to research resources on the Web will be posted on the International Organization Web site through which the material here (and much more) can then be accessed.

Among the striking developments of modern history the growth of nationalism and the proliferation of nation-states must surely take high place. To numerous peoples in the post-Napoleonic era the possibility of modeling themselves on England and France seemed both desirable and feasible in a time when language groupings, the reach of political and economic control systems, and the capabilities of armaments appeared roughly to coincide. Together with patriotisms reinforced by popular education and increasing literacy these phenomena emphasized the defensibility of both the spiritual and the military frontiers. The result, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was a series of wars of national unification which were followed in the twentieth century by great efforts to defend the nationality thus gained, socially, through such devices as immigration restriction, economically, by tariffs and various autarchic experiments, and militarily, in two great wars.

Parliamentary diplomacy in international organization has its roots in the movement toward “diplomacy by conference.” As early as 1928, Frederick S. Dunn could assert:

The rapidity with which the conference method has come to the forefront in the conduct of international intercourse is one of the most striking developments in the present era of world affairs. Within the space of a very few years, this method has almost entirely supplanted bilateral diplomatic negotiation in matters of interest to more than two or three nations.

This article contributes to an understanding of why autocrats have accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Leveraging their ability to obstruct their own prosecution, autocrats have traded off the risk of unwanted prosecutions against the deterrent threat that prosecutions pose to political rivals and patrons of their enemies conspiring to oust them. The risk of unwanted prosecutions and the court's deterrent threat both arise because ICC prosecutions credibly communicate guilt for international crimes to capital-disbursing democracies, which may, insofar as possible, use leader-specific economic statecraft to prevent the administration of foreign states by those whom the court signals are guilty of international crimes. Analysis using fixed effects and matching shows that a greater reliance on capital publicly financed by democracies increased the probability that a state accepted the court's jurisdiction only when it was an autocracy (1998–2017). ICC jurisdiction also lengthened the tenure of autocrats and reduced the severity of civil conflict in autocracies.

Old soldiers may “just fade away” as General Douglas MacArthur reminded us, but the controversy over the relative merits of regionalism and globalism in international organization will ever be with us. That question generated as much heat as any other issue at San Francisco in 1945 with the possible exception of the veto. In more recent years the inadequacies of the United Nations, the changing nature of the Cold War, the growth and expansion of regional organizations, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the continued shrinking of the universe have kept the heat of this controversy at a relatively high level.

An analysis of 344 selected votes in the four major issue areas in the UN General Assembly from 1971 to 1977 examines the question whether China has fulfilled its promise to support the Third World and oppose the superpowers. The findings are: 1) China was much more favorable to the Third World than to the West in this period and more supportive of the developing nations than of the Communist bloc on all except colonial issues; 2) China voted with the Third World more often than with the Communist nations, even when colonial issues were included; 3) China was least friendly to the United States on the majority of issues and in all years; and 4) the Soviet Union was the most anti-China nation in the Communist world, and of the four permanent members of the Security Council, Soviet voting agreement with China was the third lowest on political and security issues in the overall period and was often the lowest on arms control and disarmament. Thus at least within the context of UN voting, China has succeeded in developing its pro-Third World and anti-superpower position, particularly on economic and security issues.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the role which the three regional economic commissions of the United Nations serving the developing world play, whether consciously or unconsciously, in promoting integration within the regions which they serve. The emphasis is upon economic integration, not because it is more important than political union or federation or because it is a necessary antecedent to political integration. No attempt is made here to establish the thesis that the relationship between economic and political integration is that of a continuum. Any contribution which the UN regional economic commissions make to regional or sub-regional integration will almost certainly be in the economic area, given their terms of reference, the nature of their work programs, and the environmental conditions in which they operate. Economic integration resulting from ideas and initiatives originating in the regional commissions may contribute to the evolution of political union.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has greatly expanded its activities on behalf of political prisoners since the Second World War. The ICRC's involvement with this issue has resulted from a series of incremental steps, taken over more than a hundred years, and it raises difficult legal, political, and moral questions. Is the ICRC, by operating in this highly sensitive area, endangering its special relationship with governments–a relationship that is vital for the performance of its more traditional functions in wartime? Should the organization be more open or less Swiss? Is it evading fundamental moral issues? The ICRC's success in achieving its objectives also raises questions as to why states have permitted a nongovernmental organization to intervene in their internal affairs and whether the ICRC provides a model that other nongovernmental organizations concerned with human rights might seek to emulate.

The inherited international regimes for the ocean, outer space, and the weather-based largely on the principles of open access and free use-are inappropriate to the emerging needs in these realms for efficient and equitable allocation of resources and for conflict management. Neither a substantially greater exercise by national governments of management authority, nor a marginalist approach to increasing the authority of functionally-specific international institutions will suffice. A major commitment to expand and strengthen processes of international accountability among the users of these realms is required. Institutional targets for the mid-1980s should include a comprehensive ocean authority; an outer space projects agency; a global weather and climate organization; and an international scientific commission on global resources and ecologies. Transitional strategies, of a marginal and functionally-specific nature, however, will be required in the meantime, directed toward internationalizing information on the nonterrestrial realms, drawing the relevant actors into consultative arrangements, and limiting current unilateralist trends.

Mercantilist explanations for the development of international trading orders have assumed that changes in peripheral areas during the 19th century corresponded with developments among the largest and most advanced countries of the period. Relatively free trade, however, was not the rule at three important ports along the Arabian coast when Great Britain was in a hegemonic position in the area. Rather, British predominance in this part of the world was generally associated with increasing closure in commercial affairs at these three ports. This finding throws doubt on both the collective goods logic and the notions of “the imperialism of free trade” that have been appropriated by writers such as Gilpin, Kindleberger, Krasner, and Keohane. Two alternative ways of explaining the pattern of trading relations at these three ports are sketched, and three ways of amending the mercantilist position to account for these data are suggested.

The demand by Third World countries for a “new international economic order” also has its political dimension. Do the threats of commodity cartels, debt defaults, and investment expropriation reflect a fundamental shift in the balance of power between North and South? This paper argues, to the contrary, that the power of the South is quite limited. An analysis of trade, financing, and investment relations between North and South reveals the latter's clearly subordinate position, which is all the more weakened by the fragile political-administrative structures of many Third World regimes. Nevertheless, the demands being made should in some form be accommodated since they serve Northern interests in two important respects: they potentially allow the North new means of leverage in relations with the South; and they offer the North the opportunity to coordinate its various policies and interests in regard to the Third World. Had the South not called for a new international economic order, the North should have pressed for one.

The debt crisis riveted attention on political issues at the international level. Groups of states clash, and the North-South divisions are very noticeable. As conflict and cooperation among governments, banks, and multilateral agencies make headlines, three blocs appear to contend: the banks, the debtor governments, and the creditor governments. These are the obvious players in the workouts, and it is important to understand the conventions that bind them.