The historically unstable world trade in sugar has long stimulated multilateral efforts to stabilize sugar prices. In the negotiations leading to the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) of 1977, both producers and consumers were willing to make short-term concessions in the interest of reaching an accord that would benefit all in the long run–a pattern that has hardly been typical of North-South bargaining in general. But the ISA has failed to achieve its goal of more stable sugar prices in the years since its enactment. This failure is primarily due not to shortcomings in the agreement itself but rather to a major expansion of production in the only important sugar exporter that failed to ratify the ISA, the European Community. The ISA is important not only in its own right but also because it offers a good example of the promise–and the problems–of international commodity agreements in bringing about more stable and equitable relations between North and South.

The recent growth in Italian Communist party (PCI) influence on national policy making has been accompanied by a reversal of the party's traditional opposition to Italian participation in NATO and the European Communities. Why? Most fundamentally, this reversal is due to Italy's increasingly irreversible involvement in the network of economic interdependence that links the Western economies. PCI leaders have come to recognize and accept the political consequences of interdependence. Other important factors contributing to the policy shift are: 1) changes in Italian public opinion that made opposition to Italy's Western alignment increasingly costly for the PCI; and 2) constraints imposed by the PCI's need to seek alliances with non-Communists, both in Italy and elsewhere in Western Europe. Serious problems lie ahead for Italy's relations with her allies, but these problems would only be exacerbated by an apocalyptic assessment by Western leaders of the PCI's foreign policy line.

Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor's funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earmarked funding reduce the performance of IDO projects. The additional reporting required of IDOs by earmarked funds, while designed to enhance accountability, ultimately increases IDOs’ supervision costs and weakens their performance. We first test these hypotheses with data on project costs and performance of World Bank projects using both ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable analyses. We then probe the generalizability of those findings to other organizations by extending our analysis to four other IDOs: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Using data on the performance of 7,571 projects approved between 1990 and 2020, we find that earmarked funding undermines both cost-effectiveness and project performance across IDOs. Donors seeking value for money may consider allocating more money to core funds rather than to earmarked funds.

What is Eastern Europe? There are geographical and political interpretations of the term. “Eastern Europe,” the territory east from the river Elbe, is first of all a historical category, for the region has evolved over thousands of years. Eastern Europe was already displaying specific traits as early as the very beginning of medieval European development in the 5th to 8th centuries. After the discovery of America and the merging Atlantic trade, Eastern Europe was left on the “periphery” of the modern world system, lagging behind Western Europe until the 18th century. The “double revolution” of the late 18th century–the Industrial Revolution in England and the socio-political revolution in France–posed many challenges to Eastern Europe. The region met these challenges with a series of reforms based on an imitative strategy of catchup. In the aftermath of World War I, Eastern Europe developed new patterns of reactions, prompted by backwardness and its belated start, by the hindrances and problems of economic, social, and national development, by the presence of numerous and only partly assimilated national-religious minorities. As a result of power relations within the world system, however, a specifically East European socialist model came to fruition following World War II. Political Eastern Europe became almost identical with historical Eastern Europe.

Changes in the structure of the global economy have resulted in a withering of governmental control of certain activities presumed to be de jure within the domain of governments. The international monetary crises of the 1960s have demonstrated the emergence of financial markets that seem to operate beyond the jurisdiction of even the most advanced industrialized states of the West and outside their individual or collective control. The flourishing of multinational corporations has affected the national science and economic growth policies of highly developed and less developed states alike by restricting the freedom of those governments to establish social priorities. Tariff reductions carefully and arduously negotiated on a multilateral basis through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), through bilateral arrangements, or through emergent regional economic organizations have similarly increased the number of relatively nonmanipulable and unknown factors which must be accounted for in planning a wide spectrum of domestic and foreign economic policies—from regional development policy or anti-inflationary efforts on the domestic side to the international exchange rate of a state's currency.

Since World War II national trade union organizations have become involved in the internal political affairs of other countries, usually through the labor organizations in these countries. Soviet trade unions, a precursor and model in this respect, supported Soviet foreign policy through their international trade union contacts. United States unions played an important role in promoting the Marshall Plan, winning trade union support for it in Western Europe, and countering the opposition of communist-oriented trade unions in France and Italy. British and French unions were active in the colonial territories of their countries and often continued their influence after these territories achieved independence. United States unions have been active in Latin America and in the less developed areas of the Caribbean and Africa.

In many ways the study of international integration is in what Thomas Kuhn has called the pre-paradigm stage of the development of science. This stage is characterized by disagreement on the entities to be studied and the definitions, concepts, and indicators to be employed. Controversy is widespread even on the simplest of issues and, what is more discouraging, this controversy does not take place in a theoretical-methodological context which facilitates its resolution. There is a general lack of common standards by which to evaluate knowledge, decision-rules to interpret evidence, and criteria to measure progress. Thus, what constitutes advance for one school may mean retreat for another, and efforts to exchange views and harmonize aims frequently only serve to further define existing cleavages. Given this disagreement on broad philosophical issues it should not be surprising that research efforts and presentations of “evidence” have had little compelling impact in altering theoretical convictions. It is also no accident that the two most promising efforts to date are not presentations of data but are attempts to fashion a generally acceptable framework within which to evaluate evidence. Leon Lindberg has urged the adoption of a systems perspective which would harmonize a variety of research efforts and would, as well, make findings roughly comparable. Joseph Nye has suggested that we must “disaggregate” the concept of integration before we can meaningfully answer the important questions facing us. I have already indicated how complementary Lindberg's and Nye's suggestions are, and I feel that implementation of their suggestions would aid in making research findings touch base with one another and thus impart to evidence its proper multiplying effect.

In the aftermath of World War II, states created a complex set of bilateral and multilateral institutions to govern international aviation markets. National governments concluded bilateral agreements to regulate airport entry and capacity and delegated to the airlines, through the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the authority to set fares and the terms of service in international markets. The resulting mixture of public and private institutions produced a de facto cartel that lasted for more than thirty years. Consistent with the Rational Design framework put forth by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, I argue that the institutions states created reflect the bargaining and incentive problems generated by international aviation markets. This case provides support for four of the Rational Design conjectures and slightly contradicts three others.

Cross-sectional evidence from interviews at the United Nations found some delegate socialization. Third World delegates with longer tenure showed frustration with the organization, expansionist interests toward its economic activities, and satisfaction with their governments' missions to the United Nations, suggesting increased identification with governmental supranationalist goals. Western delegates with longer tenure showed cynicism about world politics, frustration with the United Nations, expansionist interest toward the Secretariat, and dissatisfaction with their UN missions, suggesting tension between governmental policies and socialized delegate supranationalism which delegates may reduce by leaving the United Nations. Such socialization implies little more than a reinforcement of national policies.

The finding of even this disheartening socialization in the United Nations calls for more careful research in organizations where delegate socialization is theoretically more likely. Such research should use scales more complex than those commonly used and should consider bodies “intermediate” between national governments and international organizations, such as permanent missions.

This article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

Traditionally, examinations of the international relations of the less developed countries (LDCs) have focused on influences that can be attributed generally as originating in the developed countries (DCs). In fact, relatively few scholarly analyses of inter-LDC relations have been undertaken. Since South-South relations have grown appreciably in recent years, however, it is important that a framework for studying these relations be developed, and this framework must include an awareness of the significance of the international economic system

During the last decade dependency theory has emerged as an important, if highly controversial, perspective on contemporary North-South relations. This paper assesses the utility of dependency approaches by examining one concrete North-South relationship over an extended period, that between Commonwealth cane sugar producers and Great Britain. After detailing the origins of the colonial sugar trade and the later impact of British free trade policies, the article follows the evolution of British-Commonwealth sugar relations from the enactment of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1951 to the signing in 1975 of the Lome Convention's Sugar Protocol governing sugar imports into the enlarged Community. Two conclusions are drawn from this historical case study regarding the usefulness of dependency theory. First, dependency theorists exaggerate the cohesiveness of the posture of developed market economy countries toward the Third World. Second, dependency theory has too often neglected the need to explore realistic alternatives to dependency available to underdeveloped countries.

The central problem of our time is to achieve the effective management of the power relations of states. The world is constituted as a system of independent but interdependent states—independent in authority but interdependent in destiny. States are units of power. While power is a complex conception, for present purposes it may be construed in the narrow sense of force. Physical ability to kill, to damage, or to coerce, is the particular aspect of power which serves as the focus of this article. States are characterized by the possession, in varying degrees, of this capacity to damage or destroy each other. This power may be used in competitive struggle, producing destruction on a massive scale. It may be used unilaterally, producing enslavement and degradation of its victims. In short, both survival and freedom, both sheer existence and the higher values that enrich existence, are implicated in the problem of power. The national interest of every state, and the common interest of all men, in the preservation and development of civilization are threatened by the paroxysms of violence which states are capable of unleashing. Hence, the primacy of the task of controlling the use of force by states, of managing the power relations of states, cannot seriously be questioned.

Organizations, like human beings, are not born to an identity. They establish one in the course of their maturation. The identity they can develop is limited by the social origins of the organization and by the environment during their early years, but it is not predetermined by these factors in any simple fashion.

Interim Commission of WHO: The third session of the Interim Commission of WHO, which began on March 30, 1947 at Geneva, closed on April 12, after assigning priority to the various health problems confronting the world. Representatives of sixteen of the eighteen member states (Liberia and the Ukrainian SSR being absent) attended the session. Results of Conference discussions indicated wide-spread agreement on such matters as 1) appointment of expert committees to develop program proposals relating to specific diseases, 2) strengthening of national health services, and 3) facilities for training public health personnel. It was hoped that a practical first year's program could be presented to the first World Health Assembly when that body convenes, probably in February, 1948.

Several writers have asked whether there exist among states varying predispositions to support the United Nations. Hayward Alker has answered this question with reference to the voting patterns of member nations in support of increased UN activities particularly in the peacekeeping field. More recently Robert Keohane has ranked states by using a support measure based on delegation size and has suggested that size of national delegations to the United Nations is indicative of support for the organization.

The question arises whether “technological imperatives” or political considerations will guide the activity and determine the structure of regimes that support the use of technology on an international scale. In the case of communications satellites, the establishment of such a regime involves the search for structures that could satisfy technology and still remain responsive to political forces that desired to affect the decision-making process. The regime which has emerged resulted from the interplay of technology and politics. Initially it consisted of a single global agency, INTELSAT, but as the full potential of the technology became known, a single agency could not provide an adequate forum for the political interests that were associated with each new application that was discovered. Thus, the regime came to consist of a number of related organizations each dedicated to particular uses of the technology.

Precise international metrics and assessments may induce governments to alter policies in pursuit of more favorable assessments according to these metrics. In this paper, we explore a secondary effect of global performance indicators (GPIs). Insofar as governments have finite resources and make trade-offs in public goods investments, a GPI that precisely targets the provision of a particular public good may cause governments to substitute away from the provision of other, related, public goods. We argue that both the main effect of the GPI (on the measured public good) and this substitution effect vary systematically based on the domestic political institutions and informational environments of targeted states. Specifically, we contend that both the main and substitution effects of GPIs should be largest for governments that are least accountable (opaque and nondemocratic) and should be smallest for those that are most accountable. We illustrate the logic of these arguments using a formal model and test these claims using data on primary and secondary enrollment rates across 114 countries. We find that countries substitute toward primary education enrollment rates (which is targeted by the Millennium Development Goals) and away from secondary (which is not), and that these effects are mitigated as accountability rises.

The United Nations two decades after San Francisco is a very different body from the one which its creators fashioned, and it is a reasonable presumption that there were none or virtually none who presided over its creation who foresaw even dimly what it would become in the short span of twenty years. In particular, few could have believed at that time that the tidal wave of anticolonialism would sweep so drastically over the domains of the imperial powers and leave behind in its wake an organization so largely populated by the new Asian and African states which emerged from the deluge. It is also one of the significant elements in the situation that few could have imagined that the process of decolonization could be carried through with so little needed in the way of violent struggle by the colonial peoples and so much conceded in peaceful acquiescence by their colonial masters. One of the world's great revolutions has been accomplished with a minimum of revolutionary action and sacrifice.