This article scrutinizes election district and inspection district reports written by the deputies of the Turkish single-party government and the role of these reports in state decision making. Underscoring social discontent and the fragile hegemony of the new regime—both of which motivated the republican elite to monitor state and party administrations and public opinion—the article argues that the practice of reporting was neither a project of social engineering nor a practice peculiar to the Turkish state but rather a requirement of a polity concerned with the opinion of its citizens. In the absence of direct political participation of the people in government, the reports mediated between the state and society. Contrary to conventional accounts of the single-party period, the article argues that the republican elite did not govern the country through top-down decrees but instead sought to ascertain public opinion and its own administrative defects so as to consolidate its fragile hegemony. Based on these findings, I propose that we redefine the early republican state as a flexible authoritarian regime that was not detached from the society.

In the late 1930s, the first independent Arab banks in Palestine, the Arab Bank and the Arab Agricultural Bank, sued customers who had defaulted on loans in an attempt to maintain solvency. Their indebted customers, unable to pay, fought back to prevent their lands from being foreclosed and sold to Zionist buyers. Each party claimed that its position was consistent with, indeed essential to, the anti-Zionist nationalist cause. The story of these pioneering Arab banks and their legal battles with their customers in the wake of the 1936-1939 revolt provides insight into Arab financial life in Mandate Palestine. It reveals the banks’ struggles to survive; complicates notions of Arab-Palestinian landlessness and indebtedness; and argues that political and economic exigencies, not reductive notions of collaboration or patriotism, produced the banks’ antagonistic relationship with their customers, whereby the survival of one came at the expense of the other.

The creation of Pakistan was a crushing blow to those hoping to establish autonomous, ethnically defined states in the western borderlands of the Indian empire. The best known of these movements, the Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgar), was active in the North-West Frontier Province since the 1920s and moved from affiliation with the Indian National Congress to advocating sovereignty and ultimately an independent Pushtun state when faced with the inevitability of Partition.1 Similar Pushtun and Balochi movements arose in the last decades of the Raj in the areas that now constitute the Pakistani province of Balochistan. In the pivotal years of 1947 and 1948, the Muslim League was able to outmaneuver and suppress these ambitious young movements, but they did not die. In subsequent decades, Balochi and Pushtun nationalism became key elements in the political discourse and the equation of power in Balochistan, and they remain so today.

The Iranian economy under the Islamic Republic has been strongly influenced by factors which lie for the most part outside the Iranian government's control, in particular lower oil sales due to the Iraqi attack and to the world-wide oil glut. One should not underestimate, however, the impact of the policies which have traditionally most concerned economists, namely, the government budget and monetary matters. The major thesis of this article is that the Islamic Republic's economy has been heavily influenced by an overvalued exchange rate which has: (a) forced reductions in government development spending; (b) fueled inflation as the government printed money to finance its deficit; (c) worsened the imbalance in foreign trade by encouraging imports and discouraging non-oil exports; (d) subsidized the consumption of imported goods, primarily benefiting the urban population, especially the rich; (e) distorted the allocation of resources in favor of commerce at the expense of production; and (f) benefited well-to-do merchants at the expense of poorer farmers and artisans.

Ever since it had been recognized that the decay of the Ottoman Empire could not be arrested by traditional methods, foreigners and non-Muslims had played a significant part in the Empire's modernization. The Compte de Bonneval and Baron de Tott were only the most famous of a group of foreign advisers who were employed by the Ottoman government to help reform the military establishment during the eighteenth century. During the Tanzimat era, 1839–1876, when the Porte became irrevocably committed to modernization, foreigners and non-Muslims were employed in a multitude of capacities. They ranged from the Prussian Von Moltke who was to advise on the vital problem of reorganizing the army, to Giuseppe Donnizetti, brother of the composer, who was charged with the somewhat less important task of organizing a Western-style military band.

This article reads Bashar al-Asad's rule through the prism of social activism and, in particular, through the field of charities. The sociopolitical transformations Syria experienced between 2000 and 2010—the shift in state–society relations, the opening of the civic arena, and economic liberalization—are explored through the activities of charitable associations, including their interactions with other Syrian actors, and we argue that they reflect the unraveling of the old social contract. The Syrian leadership outsourced important state welfare functions to charities while also creating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under its own control and supporting developmental NGOs loyal to the regime. These NGOs differed from the existing charities in terms of their social base, financial backgrounds, motivations, modes of institutionalization, and public relations strategies, and enabled the authoritarian regime to pursue a new strategy of divide-and-rule politics. At the same time, subcontracting poor-relief measures to charities eroded the regime's political legitimacy and helped sow the seeds of the 2011 uprising.

In recent years the political roles of the People's Assembly, the Arab Socialist Union, town and village councils, labor unions, and other Egyptian governmental structures have been analyzed. Interestingly enough, most observers would probably agree that the Egyptian parliament is for the most part a rubber stamp; that Egypt is a partyless and not a one-party state; that it lacks a viable system of local government as distinct from the prevailing system of provincial administration; and that labor unions are official but not truly behavioral entities. In short, the Egyptian policy is dissected with conceptual tools borrowed from traditional institutional analysis, while it generally is recognized that Egyptian politics are not institutionalized, or, to use Moore's term, are ‘unincorporated’. This contradiction merits comment.

According to its constitution and the ideology of the ruling Ba?th party, Syria is a socialist people's republic with a planned socialist economy. This does not mean, however, that there is no place for a private economic sector: agriculture is almost entirely private,1 as is small-scale industry, almost 90 percent of internal trade, most road transport, tourism, construction, and up to one-third of Syria's foreign trade. There is also a Syrian bourgeoisie apparently flourishing under the auspices of Syrian socialism. Since independence, however, the specific development of Syria's private sector has to a large extent been determined by political decisions, i.e., by decisions of those running state affairs.

On 14 October 1973 Turkish voters went to the polls for the seventh time since the advent of multiparty politics twenty-three years earlier. This election was the subject of unusual interest because it followed the 12 March 1971 military intervention. It was also of intrinsic analytical interest because it afforded an opportunity to determine whether previous electoral trends were continuing or not.

A public discourse of “youth crisis” emerged in 1930s Egypt, partly as a response to the widespread student demonstrations of 1935 and 1936 that ushered in the figure of youth as an insurgent subject of politics. The fear of youth as unbridled political and sexual subjects foreshadowed the emergence of a discourse of adolescent psychology. By the mid-1940s, “adolescence” had been transformed into a discrete category of analysis within the newly consolidated disciplinary space of psychology and was reconfigured as a psychological stage of social adjustment, sexual repression, and existential anomie. Adolescence—perceived as both a collective temporality and a depoliticized individual interiority—became a volatile stage linked to a psychoanalytic notion of sexuality as libidinal raw energy, displacing other collective temporalities and geographies. New discursive formations, for example, of a psychology centered on unconscious sexual impulses and a cavernous interiority, and new social types, such as the “juvenile delinquent,” coalesced around the figure of adolescence in postwar Egypt.

A substantial number of social-psychological studies dealing with the Arab world purport to explain the ‘Arab basic personality’, or ‘the Arab mind’. The alleged purpose of these studies is to understand the ‘psychology of the Arabs’ the underlying motivations of their behavior, and the reasons for their underdevelopment. Most of these studies emphasize the use of projective analyses of the Arab personality on the basis of supposedly dominant childrearing practices. The personality pattern which emerges from this research includes characteristics such as free-floating hostility, rigidity, the lack of reality testing, and suspiciousness6 which are said to explain the nature of Arab political behavior.

In his studio in Beirut in 1929, the young artist Moustapha Farroukh (1901–57) envisioned a composition to change his society. He hoped his oil painting would incite broad support among his fellow Lebanese for a revolution in conventional gender relations and women's participation in the urban social order. He titled the picture The Two Prisoners and based it on a European convention for representing the East: the Nude odalisque (Figure 1). The resulting painting exemplifies the complex role Arab intellectuals of the early 20th century played in the formation of modern art and universal modernity. Leading artists in Mandate-era Beirut felt compelled to paint Nudes and display them as part of a culturing process they called tathqīf (disciplining or enculturing). To a large extent, tathqīf consisted of recategorizing norms for interaction and self-scrutiny. Joseph Massad has revealed that one crucial component of tathqīf was the repudiation of behaviors and desires associated with the Arab Past, such as male homosexuality. An equally important component was the cultivation of “modern,” “masculine” heterosexual eroticism and a dutiful feminine compliance associated with ḥadātha (novelty) and muʿāṣira (contemporaneity). This was accomplished through the use of a genre that was deliberately new and alien in both its material media and its impact on makers and viewers.

Until recently, the topic of charitable organizations seemed to have fallen in disgrace. Social scientists have given little attention to this sector of associational life. Instead, a great deal has been written on the issues of democratization through pressure groups or on the transformation of social movements into professional organizations while assessing the overall impact of development promoted by donors. Yet three signs point to the need for a better understanding of charitable organizations. First, new research studying Islamic activism through the lens of social-movement literature has offered innovative results. Second, studies on the impact of aid during the second intifada have revealed that charitable organizations as well as Islamic organizations offered a significant amount of emergency support, sometimes competing with professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, the fact that Hamas, also known for running a vast network of charitable organizations, achieved such a significant political success in the 2005 municipal and 2006 legislative elections should invite social scientists to consider whether and how political momentum can also be obtained through activism in the charitable sector.

From the day in April 1946 when the last French soldiers left and Syrians were finally able to run their own affairs, their policies toward other Arabs have differed significantly, although decreasingly over the years, from the policies pursued by Egyptians. Within their country, Syrian legislators used to privilege Arab over non-Arab foreigners in various respects, including the investment of capital as well as the acquisition of citizenship and political rights, while fewer, if any, advantages of this sort were granted in Egypt Such differences in the treatment of noncitizen Arabs at home have been paralleled by different policies toward other Arab states. Unity schemes, a prominent feature in inter-Arab relations generally, are one key area where approaches diverged quantitatively as well as qualitatively and where favorable attitudes in Syria often contrasted with considerable reluctance on the Egyptian side.

In the Ottoman system the population of the Empire was organized upon a confessional basis, not upon a territorial or linguistic one. It was composed of religious communities each of which had its own internal organization and was controlled by a religious hierarchy. Socially and culturally each community (millet) formed a separate entity, each kept apart from the other. There was no attempt to create uniformity. Consequently, no intercommunal solidarity or social integation evolved in Ottoman society.

Iran has experienced the rare phenomenon of having two pro-Soviet Communist parties simultaneously: the Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran (Party of the Iranian Masses), known as the Tudah; and the Firqah-i Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan (Democratic Party of Azarbayjan), or simply, the Firqah-i Dimukrat.

Although spiritual realities do not find a place in the explanatory scheme of modern science, they nevertheless play a significant role in the everyday life of people. This article discusses the interrelationship between blood and spiritual genealogies among Sufi orders in the Muslim world in general and in the Nile Delta of Egypt in particular. Contrary to theories of geographic reductionism that highlight the geographical features of the Delta, this research sheds light on the impact of cultural and religious factors, such as regional Sufi orders and related saint cults, on the inhabitation and perpetuation of the local landscape. Moreover, compared with the rich scholarship of the grand Sufi orders and saints, studies that deal with local branches of dominant Sufi orders are sparse. The relationship between Sufi beliefs and practices in local contexts and in broader national or global (Muslim) worldviews is also considered.

Over the last fifteen years the Syrian Ba'th Party has succeeded-in a country previously known for weak governments and military coups-not only in entrenching a strong relatively stable system of single party rule, but also in launching its own variety of socialist and modernizing revolution. The explanation of this transformation in the nature of Syrian political life is one of the interesting problems of contemporary Syrian and Middle Eastern politics. What accounts for it? This essay will explore one approach to a partial explanation: a study of party recruitment and socialization practices.

The decade of the 1930s in Egypt has been subject to varying interpretations in recent scholarship. The publication of books on classical Islamic themes and figures by men who previously had advocated the adoption of Western scientific techniques and cultural values as essential to Egypt's modernization has been seen as indicative of an intellectual crisis which contributed to a more general conservative reaction from 1935 onwards. While analyses have varied as to the motivation and scope of this crisis, a dominant influence upon scholarly literature has been Nadav Safran's important study, Egypt in Search of Political Community, and his conclusion that ‘the intellectuals surrendered their previous bearing — rationalism and a Western cultural orientation — without being able to produce any viable Muslim-inspired alternative’. Given the importance of Safran's work and its relationship to the research presented here, we will discuss the period in question and, in particular, Taha Husayn and Muhammad Husayn Haykal, with specific references to Safran's general approach as well as to his treatment of the 1930s.

Until the seventeenth century of our era, the Islamicate society that was associated with the Islamic religion was the most expansive society in the Afro-Eurasian hemisphere and had the most influence on other societies. This was in part because of its central location, but also because in it were expressed effectively certain cultural pressures–cosmopolitan and egalitarian (and anti-traditional)– generated in the older and more central lands of this society.