Theories of fragmentation and constitutionalisation have long been presented as antagonistic accounts of the global legal order. Fragmentation theorists posit a non-hierarchical order explained in terms of the relationships between general and specialised areas of international law. Constitutionalisation’s adherents, by contrast, identify the global legal order’s ongoing transformation from horizontal and consent-based roots towards a hierarchal structure grounded upon fundamental principles. The proliferation of international tribunals has long been recognised as a factor muddying the picture of constitutionalisation and pointing towards fragmentation within international law. We argue, however, that this proliferation enhances the global order’s potential for constitutionalisation. The current state of fragmentation within the uncodified global order is comparable to long periods when the UK’s uncodified constitution exhibited the hallmarks of fragmented development. We bridge these supposedly rival explanations for the development of legal orders by re-evaluating the role played by competing courts in the UK’s constitutionalisation process, reassessing developments familiar to common-law historians through the prism of fragmentation theory. The UK example indicates that fragmentation is not, of itself, an insurmountable obstacle to constitutionalisation within the global order and may even mark a stage within this process. We employ lessons derived from this comparison to evaluate current flashpoints in relations between international tribunals, including the European Court of Justice’s Opinion 2/13 which has for now stymied the EU’s efforts to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

This paper provides the first overarching exploration and discussion of the relationship between law and compassion, based on a broad review of law and associated literature. The paper reviews the English-language literature worldwide, identifying and analysing key themes. It lays out a number of themes by which the relationship may be examined, including the problematic of defining compassion, addressing the concept of compassion, its components, to whom it is owed and under what conditions it is owed. The paper reviews how compassion is defined in formal law, including in case-law and legislation across a range of common-law and civil-law countries, and in international human rights and humanitarian law−revealing various judicial and legislative approaches to the place, meaning and application of compassion. The discussion of primary and secondary sources suggests a number of ways of thinking about the place or absence of compassion in law: how it helps theorise law, including its normative presuppositions and the conceptualisation of law. The paper concludes with consideration of possible pathways for future research on law and compassion.

This paper argues that feeling compassion (and other relational emotions) makes an important, beneficial difference in adjudication, as it improves the exercise of the perspectival imagination – that is, it helps a judge to better understand, and to better describe, a situation as another person experienced it. Even where a judge has a highly developed capacity for empathy and sympathy (these being cognitive and evaluative processes that are distinguishable from emotions), there is something to be gained by a judge actually feeling compassion. However, given the potential for the distortion of understanding as a consequence of feeling compassion, any such feeling has to be accompanied by the robust exercise of the perspectival imagination – that is, by imagining multiple perspectives (including sometimes constructing imaginary ones), so as to avoid privileging any one perspective over others. It is further argued that this ‘imagining by feeling’, as I call it in this paper, is not a threat to impartiality or the rule of law, but in fact a condition of it. It is part of the rule of law that people have a right to be heard, especially those whom we may otherwise find it difficult to understand. Imagining by feeling helps judges to better ‘hear’ a greater diversity of those who come before them, and thus helps the judiciary to improve the quality of the rule of law.

Crowd equity funding is a type of crowdfunding that allows companies to obtain seed or other capital through small equity investments from a large range of investors via an online portal. This form of finance has been viewed as a way to remedy the shortfall of capital for small and medium enterprises. As a result, a number of countries such as the US, Italy and New Zealand have promoted this form of finance. Accordingly, the paper first considers the reasons behind the rise of crowd equity funding on government agendas around the world. It then focuses on the Australian setting, by highlighting the different proposals that have been put forward to introduce legislation friendlier to crowd equity funding. The aim is to view the extent to which the proposed models provide the right balance between investor protection and entrepreneurship.

This paper aims to summarise the current understanding and literature around Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It provides a brief history of the key terms associated with the right to equal recognition before the law and encompasses both academic writing in this area and General Comment No. 1 from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The content is intended to provide readers of this Special Issue with a general understanding of developments surrounding Article 12 so they can fully engage with the other papers within this Special Issue and with the content of the Voices of Individuals: Collectively Exploring Self-determination (VOICES) project as a whole.

Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has created a revolution in legal-capacity law reform. It protects the right to exercise legal agency for people with disabilities with more clarity than any prior human rights instrument. This paper explores what constitutes an exercise of legal agency and what exactly Article 12 protects. It proposes a definition of legal agency and applies it to the lived experience of cognitive disability. It also uses a republican theory of domination to argue that people with cognitive disabilities who are experiencing domination are forced to assert legal agency in even daily decision-making because of the high level of external regulation of their lives and the ever-present threat of others substituting their decision-making. It identifies Article 12 as a tool for protecting such exertions of legal agency and curtailing relationships of domination.

This paper will explore the difficulties facing law in promoting compassion and responding to caring relationships. These include the difficulties in determining whether a person has demonstrated compassion and in enforcing any legal requirement for compassion. The paper will use the ethics-of-care literature to critique two key legal tools: human rights and the concept of best interests. These concepts are typically designed to promote individualistic abstract understandings of the self, which are problematic when used in the setting of intimate relationships. However, this paper will suggest that it might not be necessary to abandon the concepts of rights and best interests. They may be useful for setting the boundaries for a space in which appropriate care and compassion can be exercised. It will also be suggested that both rights and best interests are not immune from a relational analysis and might, with appropriate modification, be used to promote the exercise of compassionate relational care.

The rule of law as a globally recognised concept is multi-faceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the common-law tradition, it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 115; Cotterrell, 1992, p. 157). The rule-of-law concept has been criticised as being of unique European origin, where plural social organisation and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp. 80–110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p. 5).

Global social indicators have become a core point of interest of scholarship in law and other social sciences. The term ‘legitimacy’ is occasionally mentioned in this literature but without in-depth discussion. This paper aims to fill this gap by way of exploring the relationship between global social indicators and the concept of legitimacy. The crucial issue of such indicators is that, being drafted in a general fashion and based on a quantitative metric, they can be regarded as somehow ‘law-like’, thus raising questions about their legitimacy. This paper addresses these issues at both the general level of social theory and the operation of indicators in action.

This paper presents a double genealogy of indicators as instruments of governance. These have their roots both in the use of statistical tools for normative purposes by states and in the development of indicators within firms as preferred instruments of ‘new management’. The paper argues that social indicators not only convey information, but are genuine tools of global governance and that, for this reason, their legitimacy depends not only on their accuracy, but also on their accountability. If indicators are intended to produce or effectively produce regulatory effects, they should be subjected to the rule of law and to judicial review. The essay ends by formulating four main principles that these indicators should comply with.

People with disabilities continue to experience a disproportionately high level of state intervention in their private lives. Many disabled people's organisations have long sought to challenge this discriminatory approach and, in recent times, have relied upon the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in support of their claims. In this paper, we argue for the abolition of disability-specific legal bases for state intervention in the private lives of adults. We also argue for the introduction of a narrower disability-neutral legislative framework for state intervention in the lives of all adults – based on risk of imminent and serious harm to the individual's life, health or safety, while providing greater respect for the person's legal capacity as expressed through her will and preferences.

Plants have been and will continue to be fundamental to the evolution of human society. However, the law’s traditional approach to plants, based broadly on the need to facilitate the exploitation of plants for the benefit of humans and to regulate the impacts of that exploitation, fails to recognise the ways in which plants can be said to participate in society. This participation takes three forms: a contribution to the achievement of social goals, the shaping of social spaces and the influencing of individual and collective human behaviours. It is argued that the recognition of these roles that plants play in society in law and policy could begin to redress the continuing decline in plant diversity, and lead to a reformed understanding of society’s relationship with plants and the wider natural world.

Health-care law presents numerous challenges to the conception of the law as a dispassionate arbiter of disputes or protector of rights. Issues relating to end-of-life care, the assessment of mental capacity and decision-making for those who lack capacity, amongst others, epitomise the complex nature of health-care law. They also raise globally applicable questions about discrimination, or equal protection, as well as concerns for relief of suffering, the assessment of best interests and the exercise of individual autonomy. This paper will evaluate the extent to which law's traditional objectivity (dispassion) is undermined by the introduction of concerns about compassion into judicial and executive decisions. Focusing primarily on the law in England and Wales, but with reference to multi-jurisdictional case-law and international instruments, it will consider whether the law provides compassionate approaches and outcomes in end-of-life decision-making, and the implications of compassion for legal certainty.

Managerial devices are rapidly developing as a means for driving the legal performance of organisations, including those of states and corporations. This paper explores the managerial rationality underpinning global legal indicators, and the constraints they convey on institutional behaviour. In particular, it argues that indicators are better understood as part of a system of management control and distributed governance, which is steadily eroding state-centred forms of authority, including state law. In this context, legitimacy and reactivity are contingent to their cycle of production and implementation, which is fourfold: data-collecting, benchmarking, auditing and allocating incentives. Each process is meant to generate respectively subjectification, self-knowledge by comparison, accountability and stimulus for action. Indicators with higher degrees of legitimacy become entrenched in institutional practices and legal decision-making processes. The paper concludes that regulatory spaces where indicators unfold need critical and political scrutiny to expose their pernicious effects, undesirable uses and inevitable misuses.

In this paper, we seek to radically reframe the legal construct of consent from a disability perspective. Drawing on feminist scholarship and human rights standards around ‘free and informed consent’, we apply a concept of freedom to negotiate to laws regulating both consent to sex and medical treatment – key areas in which the legal agency of people with disabilities (especially people with cognitive disabilities) is routinely denied, restricted or ignored. We set out the essential ingredients for reframing consent: namely, legal personhood, freedom to negotiate and understanding. We also outline conditions (i.e. coercion, undue influence and power imbalances) that impede valid consent. This represents a first attempt to move beyond labelling adults with certain disabilities as lacking the ‘mental capacity’ necessary to give valid consent – in order to explore in more depth particular expressions of consent or refusal and seek new validity criteria, beyond the label of ‘mental incapacity’.

Compassion poses difficult challenges for the rule of law. The compassionate response is often cast as a deviation from settled law rather than a principled application of it. Compassion so understood is troubling, most obviously because it poses a challenge to overall fairness, notice and consistency. Although compassion is usually approached as a factor influencing substantive outcomes, I argue to the contrary that compassion cannot serve as a reliable indicator of who should prevail in legal debates. Whether compassion should inform substance is a normative question that must be answered in light of the purposes of the tribunal and the principles it seeks to advance. I propose instead that compassion's importance lies in its ability to aid decision-makers in understanding what is at stake for the litigant. In this sense, compassion is closely tied to humility: both are reminders of human fallibility and of the limits of individual understanding.